HISTORY

OF THE

COLONIZATION

OF THE

FREE STATES OF ANTIQUITY.

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COLONIZATION

OF THE

FREE STATES OF ANTIQUITY,

APPLIED TO THE

K Great Britain

Preſent CONTEST between GREAT BRITAIN and her AMERICAN COLONIES.

WITH

REFLECTIONS concerning the future SETTLEMENT of theſe COLONIES.

By — Baron Minister of the Church of Scotland

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BRITANNICVM

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ADVER-

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following are the Editions of the antient Authors moſt frequently referred to in the Courſe of this Eſſay: Polybius Caſauboni, Diodorus Siculus Weſſelingii, Herodotus Gronovii, Thucydides Hudſoni, Appianus Tollii, Titus Livius Drakenborchii, Paterculus Burmanni. When Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus is quoted, the Part of his Works appealed to is the Antiquities of Rome publiſhed by Hudſon.

COLONIZATION

OF

FREE STATES.

INTRODUCTION.

COLONIZATION is one of the methods which nations, in all ages, have employed to ſecure their conqueſts, or to extend their territories. If a tract of country had been ravaged and depopulated by war, a colony was provided to re-people, to defend, or to cultivate it. If it was poſſeſſed by inhabitants, few in number, and unwarlike, who had territory to ſpare, and would make little reſiſtance to the firſt invaders, it was conſidered as a captivating prey to any ſtate advanced in cultivation, or perhaps overloaded with people; and a colony was diſpatched to ſeize and appropriate it. Accordingly, we find that colonization proceeds nearly in the ſame direction, and almoſt keeps pace with the progreſs of civilization. The hiſtory of ſociety informs us, that civilization has held its courſe from eaſt to weſt, from Aſia, through Africa and Europe,

and from Europe to America. Colonization follows the ſame line. From the beſt accounts of tranſactions ſo remote, it appears, that the Aſiatics firſt became conſpicuous by their ſettlements on the eaſtern ſhore of the Mediterranean ſea; that they planted colonies in the greater part of the iſlands, and on many of the coaſts of that ſea; and that they peopled, or, at leaſt, introduced cultivation into Greece itſelf. From Greece we trace the direction of colonization to Italy and Sicily; and, from Italy, it extended, under the Romans, to the weſtern boundaries of their empire. From the ſubverſion of the Roman empire in Europe, to the diſcovery of America and the Indies, the practice of colonization ſeems to have been ſuſpended. The barbarity and ignorance which univerſally prevailed during that time, and the dominion uſurped by ſuperſtition and folly over the minds of men, repreſſed every enterpriſe which might contribute to poliſh and improve mankind.

The diſcovery of America and the Indies preſented a great field for adventures. The greater part of the nations of Europe attempted to obtain a ſhare of the new countries, and ſent out colonies for that purpoſe. The maritime powers, however, poſſeſſed advantages ſuperior to the other ſtates. They monopolized, in a great meaſure, the American and Indian eſtabliſhments, ſo that moſt of them have become the property of England, Holland, France, Portugal, and Spain.

A practice ſo general, it is natural to expect, ſhould be the reſult of ſome common principles of human nature, or the conſtitution

of

of civil ſociety. A ſimilarity of management, for this reaſon, would probably be adopted by the ſeveral ſtates who, at different times, have ſent out colonies; and, if ſuch management can be diſcovered, it will lead to the general principles of colonization. If, however, we ſhall not be ſo fortunate as to aſcend to principles, it may ſtill be uſeful to ſurvey, with attention, the conduct of cultivated and enlightened nations, as, from their example, we ſhall probably derive the moſt important inſtruction.

At a ſeaſon when the rebellion of the Britiſh colonies in America, one of the greateſt events of modern times, engages deeply the attention of the nation, when the re-eſtabliſhment of peace will probably ſoon become the ſubject of parliamentary diſcuſſion, an author, unknown to the leaders of public meaſures, prompted by no view of emolument, animated only with a love of truth, and with zeal for the preſervation of a conſtitution the moſt perfect the world ever beheld, offers to his countrymen an hiſtory of colonization, as practiſed chiefly by the Carthaginians, Greeks, and Romans. His great object has been, to inveſtigate the nature of the connection which ſubſiſted between theſe nations and their colonies; to determine the extent of the juriſdiction the former aſſumed over the latter; but, particularly, to aſcertain the practice of antiquity with regard to the much controverted article of taxation. Two reaſons induced him to undertake this taſk: *Firſt*, Becauſe he had obſerved, in the courſe of the controverſy concerning the propriety and juſtice of the preſent war, the practice of antiquity frequently appealed to, and commonly miſrepreſented; but, chiefly, becauſe

cauſe he wiſhed to prepare the nation for the parliamentary ſettlement * which may take place on the ſubmiſſion of the colonies, both by ſuggeſting to the legiſlature itſelf all the information which can be derived from the pureſt and moſt ſatisfactory precedents of ancient hiſtory, and by attempting to reconcile the minds of the people in general to that ſettlement, when they ſhall find it, perhaps, ſupported by the policy of thoſe ages which enjoyed the moſt perfect civil liberty.

In purſuing his inquiries, the writer has not ſatisfied himſelf with any ſecondary authorities. He has had recourſe to the originals themſelves; and, that every reader, who chuſes to take the trouble, may be ſatisfied of his integrity and candour, he has been always careful to refer to the ſources from which he derived his information. The multiplicity of ancient authors, whoſe names appear on the margin, may give an air of pedantry to the performance; but this circumſtance will be of ſmall importance, if it ſhall add weight and conviction.

CHAP.

* The public ſeems to expect ſuch a ſettlement. The proclamation of the Commiſſioners in America offers a reviſal of the exceptionable acts of parliament: And the capital publications on the ſide of government give hints of repreſentation.

CHAP. I.

OF THE CARTHAGINIANS.

SECT. I.

Their Origin—Flouriſhing State—Settlements.

THE Phoenicians were the moſt early civilized people of whom we have any account in profane hiſtory. They had acquired the knowledge of letters and arts at a period when all the weſtern part of the world was ſunk in barbarity and ignorance. Their ſituation on the ſea-coaſt, and the narrowneſs of their territory, obliged them to have recourſe to commerce and navigation for ſubſiſtence; and they carried theſe arts to a degree of perfection unrivalled by antiquity, and hardly to be credited in modern times.

They firſt extended themſelves along the ſouth coaſt of the Mediterranean ſea; and, at different times, occupied almoſt the whole of it, from the borders of Egypt to the Straits of Gibraltar. They planted many leſſer colonies in that rich and pleaſant country, among which the names of Utica *, Hippo, Adrumetum, and

* Juſtin. lib. 18.

Leptis *, ſtill exiſt, before they founded their great eſtabliſhment at Carthage. Utica, according to Ariſtotle †, was ſettled no leſs than 280 years before the building of Carthage. The laſt, however, in time, engroſſed the territories, extinguiſhed even the names of the greater part of the reſt, and, perhaps, allowed only emigrations from Tyre, without admitting any more coloniſts.

The Carthaginians became rapidly one of the moſt opulent and flouriſhing ſtates in the world. Every circumſtance was favourable. They brought along with them a knowledge of many of the moſt uſeful arts of life. They had no foreign enemy to check their enterpriſes, or to ſtrip them of the fruits of their induſtry. They poſſeſſed a climate ſo healthy, that Salluſt tells us ‡, few of the inhabitants died of any infirmity but old age. Their ſoil was ſo grateful to the labour of the huſbandman, that its fertility is celebrated by many of the writers § of antiquity. They enjoyed the moſt extenſive naval commerce known in antient times; and they lived under a free government, reſembling that of the Romans ‖, compoſed of Sufetes or Conſuls, of a ſenate, and of aſſemblies of the people. From all theſe cauſes, they had riſen to ſuch power, at the beginning of the laſt Punic war, that the city of Carthage

* Salluſt. Jugur. † De mirabilibus. ‡ Jugur.

§ Horace, Ovid, Pliny, Polybius, and Salluſt. They tell us, in the uſual language of early ſociety, applied to the produce of corn, that the lands of Africa yielded, not only a hundred fold, but frequently two hundred fold, and ſometimes even three.

‖ Polyb. lib. 6. cap. 49.

thage contained no fewer than 700,000 inhabitants *. In Africa, they had 300 cities under their juriſdiction; and they poſſeſſed a line of the fineſt coaſt in the world, of near 2000 miles in length, extending from the Syrtis Major to the Pillars of Hercules †. They had acquired, beſide, the ſouth-eaſt coaſt of Spain, and very probably a large portion of the interior part of the country, from the Straits of Gibraltar to the eaſt extremity of the Pyrenean mountains. To all which they had added ſettlements in many of the iſlands ‡ of the Mediterranean, but eſpecially in Sicily, Sardinia, and the Baleares §.

In the moſt flouriſhing ſtate of their affairs, but it is uncertain preciſely at what time, the Carthaginian ſenate ‖ planned two great naval expeditions, which were directed to paſs the Straits, and to ſteer their courſes, one toward the ſouth, and the other toward the north. The deſign of theſe armaments was, to make diſcoveries, and to ſettle colonies on the ſhores of the Atlantic. The former was commanded by Hanno, and the latter by Himilco. Hanno wrote an account of his voyage, and publiſhed it in his own language; but the original is unfortunately loſt. There remains, however, a Greek tranſlation of this work ¶; and from it we learn that Hanno embarked in a fleet of ſixty ſhips, containing no fewer than 30,000 people, with all the implements neceſſary to build houſes, and to ſettle colonies. He ſailed ſlowly ſouthward, meaſuring his courſe

* Strab. lib. 17. † Polyb. lib. 3. cap. 3. ‡ Appian, lib. 1. cap. 1.
§ Majorca and Minorca. ‖ Pliny, lib. 5. ¶ Called Hanno's Periplus.
The Greek tranſlation was publiſhed at Baſil, anno 1533, by Sigiſmundus Galenius.

courſe by the days it occupied ; and ſtopped at proper diſtances, to explore the country, and to plant ſettlements. He gave names to the places in which he left inhabitants ; but theſe names are either ſo mangled in the tranſlation, a practice frequent with Greek writers when they uſe foreign words, or the ſettlements of Hanno were ſo ſoon demoliſhed, that no mention is made of them in any maps, either antient or modern. Bochart *, guided by the etymology of the Carthaginian language, which he holds to have been a dialect of the Hebrew, is of opinion, that Cernè †, a place near Mount Atlas, and conſequently, about the 28th degree of north latitude, was the laſt ſtation in which Hanno planted a colony. He proceeded, however, farther ſouthward, to make diſcoveries. He reached a great broad river, which he does not name ; but deſcribes by indelible marks, its abounding with crocodiles, and the hippopotamus. Bochart concludes, with much probability, that this deſcription can apply only to the river Gambia, one of the branches of the Niger, which runs into the Atlantic near the Iſland of Goree. He is induced to adopt this concluſion, from the conſideration, that no other great river is to be found, for many degrees ſouth and north of the Niger, and that it is the only river on the weſt coaſt of Africa, in which the crocodile and hippopotamus are diſcovered. If this opinion is to be adopted, Hanno penetrated beyond the tropic of Cancer, and within fourteen degrees of the line ; a navigation not a little ſurpriſing, when we reflect that it was performed by coaſting, and without the knowledge of the compaſs.

Of

* Vol. 5. page 643. † Cerné ſignifies, the laſt colony, or, the fartheſt inhabited land.

Of the voyage to the north of the Straits, there remains not on record a ſingle tranſaction, except that it was conducted by Himilco, and performed in four months. No evidence could have been produced, even of its exiſtence, had it not been occaſionally mentioned by Pliny *, and by Feſtus Avienus, a poet of the fourth century, who writes, that he read an account of it in a Carthaginian author. Of the navigations, however, of the Phoenicians into theſe ſeas, the moſt inconteſtible proofs may be collected. Their frequent voyages to the Caſſiterides †, from which they brought tin for the ſupply of the Mediterranean market, are noticed by many antient authors of the beſt credit ‡. But as, neither in theſe voyages, nor in thoſe to an unknown iſland in the Atlantic, recorded by Diodorus Siculus ‖, nor in the ſtill more ſplendid navigation narrated by Herodotus §, in which the Phoenicians embarked on the Red Sea, ſailed round the ſouth coaſt of Africa, and returned home by the Pillars of Hercules, are any accounts to be

* Lib. 5. † Either Britain or the Scilly iſlands. ‡ Strab. lib. 5. Pliny, lib. 7. Herodotus, lib. 3. cap. 115. ‖ Lib. 5. cap. 19.

§ Melpomene. Herodotus remarks, that the accounts of this voyage were incredible; becauſe the voyagers related, that, in ſailing round the ſhores of Africa, they beheld the ecliptic, or the daily courſe of the ſun, lying toward the north. The ignorance of the hiſtorian, in this caſe, is more reprehenſible than his incredulity; and the objection is a confirmation of the truth of the narration it is brought to confute. A circumſtance, ſo incredible at that time, could ſcarcely be fabricated; nor can it be eaſily ſuppoſed, that ſuch an appearance could have been imagined, unleſs it had been ſeen. It is now univerſally known, that this appearance actually attends the voyage round the coaſt of Africa. Little doubt, then, ſeems to remain, that the Phoenicians were in poſſeſſion of one of the moſt important and ſplendid diſcoveries of modern times, the navigation to the Indian ſeas by the Cape of Good Hope.

found of the eſtabliſhment of colonies, or any facts which may throw light upon the management of them, it is improper here to purſue their hiſtory.

SECT. II.

Hiſtory of the Carthaginians obſcure—They reſtricted the Trade of their Colonies—Impoſed Taxes on them.

IT is much to be regretted, that no hiſtorical monuments remain of the Carthaginians compoſed by themſelves. The accounts of them that exiſt are derived chiefly from the authors of Rome, whoſe narrations are marked with all the characteriſtics of partiality natural to the writers of a rival nation. Previous to the period at which they contended with that republic for the empire of the world, their hiſtory is in a great meaſure unknown; and, even poſterior to that period, it is confined chiefly to their military and naval operations. The Roman writers thought it unneceſſary to narrate more of the Carthaginian affairs than was requiſite to explain their own. They give an account of their great tranſactions, their battles, and the number of their fleets and armies; but they leave us almoſt ignorant of their civil conſtitution, their commerce, and their laws. Theſe circumſtances render it impoſſible to trace, with entire ſatisfaction, their management of their colonies. Enough, however, remains to prove, that the juriſdiction they aſſumed over them was very extenſive.

The

The moſt authentic documents on this ſubject are, the treaties of peace and commerce concluded between the Carthaginians and the Romans, which fortunately have been preſerved by Polybius*. They are very curious remains of antiquity, as well on account of their matter, as of their brevity and ſimplicity, and merit highly the peruſal of the reader. The firſt was concluded the year after the expulſion of the Kings of Rome, under the Conſulſhip of Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, 28 years before the expedition of Xerxes † into Greece, and 246 from the building of Rome. It breathes a jealous commercial ſpirit, eager to guard againſt the dangers of invaſion, but forward to encourage navigation for the purpoſes of trade. It ſtipulates, that the Romans ſhould not, with any ſhip of war ‡, approach nearer to the ſhores of Carthage than the head of the White Promontory §, unleſs driven to the ſouthward of that Cape, by ſtreſs of weather, or

* Lib. 3. cap. 22. &c.

† 75 Olympiad. The æras moſt frequently mentioned in this treatiſe are the Olympiads, and the building of Rome. The Olympiads were terms of four years, and ſerved to compute time among the Greeks. The building of Rome anſwered the ſame purpoſe among the Romans. That the reader may eaſily know how to reduce both to the vulgar æra, let him remember, that the beginning of the Olympiads correſponds to the year 777 before Chriſt; and the building of Rome to the year 753 before Chriſt. The Trojan war is reckoned to have happened about 400 years before the beginning of the Olympiads.

DODWELL'S TABLE.

‡ Longa navis, as explained by Polybius.

§ Antient Carthage ſtood at the bottom of a deep bay, 30 miles north of the city of Tunis. On the eaſt ſide of this bay, a long cape run northward into the ſea, and divided the bay from the Syrtis Minor. The head of this cape was called Pulchrum Promontorium.

or purſued by an enemy; in which caſes, they were obliged to depart in five days. It grants, however, admiſſion, into the Carthaginian harbours, to all trading veſſels of Rome. It even exempts them from all impoſts, and expence, except what might be due to the crier, or clerk of the ſales. It offers the ſame privileges to commercial ſhips of Rome along all the coaſts of Carthage, in the iſland of Sardinia, and in that part of the iſland of Sicily which was ſubject to the Carthaginians *.

From this treaty, it is evident, that the Carthaginians thought themſelves at liberty to extend, or reſtrict, as they pleaſed, the commerce of their colonies in the iſlands of Sicily and Sardinia; and that the Romans had no right to trade with theſe ſettlements, indepe-

* It will perhaps be acceptable to the reader to peruſe this treaty as tranſlated by Caſaubon.

" Amicitia Romanis et Romanorum ſociis cum Carthaginienſibus, et Carthaginienſium ſociis, his legibus et conditionibus eſto. Ne naviganto Romani, Romanorumve ſocii, ultra Pulchrum Promontorium; niſi tempeſtatis aut hoſtium vi fuerint compulſi. Si quis vi delatus fuerit, emendi aut accipiendi quicquam, praeter neceſſaria reficiendis navibus et ſacris faciendis, jus ne ei eſto. Intra diem quintum qui navem applicuerint abeunto. Qui ad mercaturam venerint, ii vectigal nullum pendunto, extra quam ad praeconis aut ſcribae mercedem. Quicquid hiſce praeſentibus fuerit venditum, publica fide venditori debetur, quod quidem in Africa aut Sardinia fuerit venditum. Si quis Romanorum in eam Siciliae partem venerit, quae imperio Carthaginienſium paret, jus aequum in omnibus Romani obtinento. Carthaginienſes ne quid noceant Populo Ardeati, Antiati, Laurentino, Circeienſi, Tarracinenſi, neve ulli alii e Latinis qui ſub ditione erunt. Etiam eorum urbibus, qui ſub ditione Romanorum non erunt, abſtinento. Si quam earum acceperint, Romanis ſine ulla noxa tradunto. Caſtellum ullum in Latino agro ne aedificanto; ſi cum armis inſeſti pedem in regione poſuerint, in ea ne pernoctanto.

dependent of ſtipulation, any more than they were entitled to negociate with Carthage itſelf. The allowing of the coloniſts, on the other hand, to receive in their ports the merchandiſe of Rome, on the ſame terms it was admitted at Carthage, though a conſpicuous mark of the generoſity of the parent ſtate, is a proof, at the ſame time, that this privilege might have been with-held. But the colonies, perhaps, were then in their infancy, and needed every encouragement to make them flouriſh. We ſhall find, from the next treaty, that the mother-country became afterwards more reſerved and jealous.

The next treaty ſeems to have been the great navigation-act of Carthage, and to have remained in force till that republic was diveſted, in the Punic wars, of the ſettlements and territories to which it relates. We are uncertain at what time it was framed, as it bears no date; but probably it was concluded not long after the former. In both acts, the allies of Rome are mentioned and included. The ſame ſtates are enumerated in the latter which had been named in the former; a proof that the Romans had acquired no new allies during the intervening ſpace, and conſequently, that it could not be very long, as the conqueſts of that active and enterpriſing people proceeded with great rapidity.

On the part of the Carthaginians, this treaty is materially different from the former. The line of limitation, to the ſouthward of which the Roman ſhips of war were not to approach the ſhores of Carthage, is extended from the head of the White Promontory to

the cities of Maſtia and Tarſeium, which were ſituated near the pillars of Hercules *; ſo that the Roman ſhips of war muſt have been excluded from all the coaſts of the dominions of Carthage in Africa. Even the trading ſhips of Rome are prohibited by this treaty from entering the ports of the colonies and cities of Africa Propria †, and the harbours of the iſland of Sardinia. They are allowed, however, acceſs to Carthage, and to that part of the iſland of Sicily which was ſubject to the Carthaginians ‡.

By this negotiation, the commerce of the colonies of Africa and Sardinia is clearly monopolized for the benefit of the mother-country.

* Stephani Dictionarium Geographicum, &c.

† The word in the treaty is *Africa*; but it is plain, *Africa Propria* only can be meant. This country lay to the ſouth and eaſt of the original territories of Carthage. Polybius informs us, lib. 1. cap. 72. that the Carthaginians chiefly drew their proviſions and their taxes from it, and reſerved their own territories to ſupply their private expences. In this country, were the colonies of Leptis, Utica, and Hippo.

‡ This treaty is thus tranſlated by Caſaubon:

"Amicitia Romanis et Romanorum ſociis, cum populo Carthaginienſi, Tyriis, et Uticenſibus, eorumque ſociis, his legibus eſto. Romani ultra Pulchrum Promontorium, Maſtiam, et Tarſeium, praedas ne faciunto; ad mercaturam ne eunto, urbem nullam condunto. Si in Latio urbem aliquam Carthaginienſes ceperint, quae ſub ditione Romanorum non erit, pecuniam et captivos ipſi habento; urbem reddunto. Si qui Carthaginienſium aliquos ceperint queiſcum foedere ſcripto juncti ſint Romani; qui tamen ſub Romanorum imperio non erunt; hos in populi Romani portus

try. If the Romans wanted any of the commodities of theſe ſettlements, they were not at liberty to purchaſe them in the firſt and cheapeſt market, but were obliged to procure them, in the beſt manner they could, in the port of Carthage. If the colonies needed any of the commodities of Rome, they were compelled to ſeek them in the ſame channel. To render the monopoly more beneficial for the parent ſtate, the Roman merchants were not allured in this treaty, as in the former, by an exemption from impoſts; they were ſubjected to the ſame regulations with the citizens of Carthage.

It is impoſſible, at this diſtance of time, to aſcertain with preciſion the reaſon of the indulgence granted to the Carthaginian portion * of the

tus ne deducunto; ſi quis erit deductus, et manum Romanus injecerit, liber eſto. Eodem jure et Romani tenentor. Si Romanus ex aliqua regione quae ſub imperio Carthaginienſium erit aquam commeatuſve ſumpſerit; cum his commeatibus ne cui eorum noceto quibuſcum pax et amicitia eſt Carthaginienſibus . . . . facito. Si qua injuria alicui facta erit, privato nomine ejus perſecutio ne cuiquam eſto; ſed ubi tale quid admiſerit aliquis, publicum id crimen eſto. In Sardinia et Africa neque negotiator quiſquam Romanorum, neque urbem condito; neve eo appellito, niſi commeatus accipiendi gratia, vel naveis reficiendi. Si tempeſtas detulerit, intra dies quinque excedito. In Sicilia, ubi Carthaginienſes imperaverint, item Carthagine omnia Romanus facito, vendito, quae civi licebit. Idem Romae Carthaginienſi jus eſto."

This treaty is, in ſome places, imperfect. Polybius ſupplies, in the following tenor, what refers to the allies of Rome:

"Similiter Romani cavent ne fiat injuria Ardeatibus, Antiatibus, Circeienſibus, Tarracinenſibus; haec autem ſunt oppida Latii maritima, quae legibus hujus foederis volunt eſſe comprehenſa.

* It extended along the whole of the ſouth coaſt, from Lilybaeum to Pachynum. Strab. lib. 6. cap. 17.

the iſland of Sicily, by putting its commerce on the ſame footing with that of Carthage itſelf. One reaſon appears very plauſible, that the Carthaginians intended to render popular their government of that iſland, to raiſe an emulation between their ſubjects and thoſe of the Greek colonies *, in order to induce the latter to migrate into their territories; and, by this means, perhaps, to obtain the dominion of the whole.

No obſervation is more common in politics than that money is the ſinews of war. No obſervation, however, is more true, than, that, though all hiſtorians treat chiefly of war, few of them convey any information about its ſinews. It is not eaſy to account for this defect, principally chargeable againſt antient hiſtory. The fact is indiſputable. The author has ſearched all the antient writers of reputation who mention the Carthaginian affairs; but has not found in any of them, except Polybius and Livy, the leaſt account of their ſupplies. They narrate, at the ſame time, military and naval tranſactions, of ſuch magnitude, as demonſtrate, that theſe ſupplies muſt have been immenſe.

The leading object of the ſtate of Carthage was commerce; and that nation excelled all antiquity in the arts of navigation. They were induced to employ mercenary troops in their military operations; becauſe manufacturers did not make the beſt ſoldiers, and becauſe they could hire and maintain foreign troops cheaper than their own. They had, accordingly, mercenaries from all the quarters

* The Romans did not enter Sicily till the firſt Punic war, many years after the framing of this treaty.

quarters of the old world, Aſiatics, Greeks, Gauls, Spaniards, and Africans. The firſt great military expedition in which they engaged, was the invaſion of Sicily, when they conſpired with Xerxes King of Perſia to extinguiſh for ever the very name of Greece *. Xerxes was to attack the Grecian territories in perſon, while the Carthaginians invaded their principal colonies in the iſland of Sicily. Xerxes brought millions of men into the field, threw bridges over the ſea, and cut roads through mountains. The Carthaginians approached Sicily with the following ſtupendous armament; 300,000 men, 2,000 ſhips of war, and 3,000 tranſports and victuallers †. No ideas were entertained but thoſe of conqueſt. When they reached the land, they ſaid, the war was finiſhed, as the only enemy they dreaded was the ſea. The Sicilians were not diſmayed at the ſight of this hoſt, almoſt innumerable. They ſet fire to their fleet, and acted by land with an army of L. 50,000 men. They defeated their aſſailants, killed 150,000 of their troops, and took the reſt priſoners. Twenty ſhips of war eſcaped the flames, and made the beſt of their way towards Carthage. But they were overtaken by a ſtorm, and all the crews periſhed, except a very few men, who, ſaving themſelves in a ſmall boat, informed their countrymen of the melancholy tidings ‡.

However ill contrived, ill conducted, and unſucceſsful this armament might be, it was a ſtriking evidence of the reſources of Carthage.

* Diodorus, lib. 11. cap. 1. &c.

† Theſe numbers are aſſigned by Diodorus; and he aſſerts they are below the truth. Lib. 11. cap. 20.

‡ Diodorus, ibid.

thage. Immenſe muſt have been the riches of that nation which could make ſuch an exertion. Heavy and extenſive muſt have been the taxes which could furniſh ſuch riches.

The laſt military operations of the Carthaginians were their wars with the Romans; the moſt memorable tranſactions of antiquity, whether we conſider their duration, their extent, or their conſequences. They then contended for univerſal empire, and were ſuperior to their rivals in every thing but experience in the military art.

The taxes were ſo heavy, during the firſt of theſe wars, that, at the end of it, money could not be procured to pay the arrears of the mercenaries. The troops were collected at Carthage, and the bold propoſal was made to them, that, conſidering the preſent exigencies of the ſtate, they ſhould relinquiſh ſome part of their demands. They were fired with reſentment, and rebelled. They were joined by all the diſcontented colonies and cities in Africa Propria *, who were provoked, no leſs by the quantity of the exactions during the war, than by the ſeverity of the manner in which they were collected. A dreadful civil war enſued, which endangered the exiſtence of the Commonwealth.

The reader will not be ſurpriſed at ſuch convulſions, when he is informed, that the chief burden of the war was laid on theſe provinces.

* Polyb. lib. 1. c. 6.

vinces. The inhabitants of the towns * were obliged to advance double the ſums they had formerly been accuſtomed to pay under the name of taxes. But, of the fruits of the field, procured by the labour of the huſbandman, there was required no leſs than half the produce †. The amount of this impoſt will appear perfectly incredible, unleſs we recollect the amazing fertility of Africa. After paying this exorbitant demand, the peaſant would retain, to reward his induſtry, a more plentiful increaſe than is to be reaped, by equal expence, in moſt other countries on the face of the globe.

It is extremely probable, that the Carthaginians extended taxation to their ſettlements in Spain, and the iſlands of the Mediterranean, though no evidence of it is now to be found, except as to the iſland of Sardinia ‡, from which they received various aids. When ſo ſeverely preſſed at home to raiſe ſupplies, it is not to be ſuppoſed they would ſpare theſe diſtant provinces. One thing is certain, that they drew from them recruits for their army; for, among their troops, frequent mention is made of Sardinians, Baleareans, and Iberians.

Happy had it been for this great and induſtrious people, had they been contented with retaining the extenſive, rich, and populous

* The city of Leptis, according to Livy, lib. 34. cap. 62. paid a talent every day to Carthage, as a tax. Reckoning, with Doctor Arbuthnot, the talent equal in value to L. 193 : 15 : 0, this city muſt have paid annually L. 70,719. This tax was exacted in the ſecond Punic war, and was probably equal, at leaſt, to what was paid in the firſt.

† Polyb. lib. 1. cap. 72.

‡ Ibid. lib. 1.

lous territories they poſſeſſed; or had they, inſtead of puſhing their conqueſts towards the north, been ſatisfied with extending their dominions towards the ſouth, and carrying along with them, into the habitations of barbarity and idleneſs, all thoſe arts which civilize and employ mankind. They might have flouriſhed long, one of the greateſt and happieſt nations which ever appeared. But, intoxicated with their power, and vain of their opulence, they determined to aſpire after univerſal empire. They encountered the Romans, who, while they were more hardy and warlike, were filled with the ſame views, and who extinguiſhed for ever the ambition of Carthage.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

OF THE GREEKS.

SECT. I.

General View of the Political Conſtitution and Reſources of the Greek States.

TO underſtand the account of the Colonization of Greece, it will be neceſſary to take a previous ſurvey of its reſources and political conſtitution. The Greek ſtates make ſuch a conſpicuous figure in hiſtory, that the reader will not eaſily believe their inhabitants were ſo few, or their territories ſo ſmall, as certain circumſtances compel us to admit. The whole extent of their country, even when they flouriſhed moſt, comprehended only the peninſula of Peloponneſus, and the territories ſtreaching northward from the iſthmus of Corinth to the borders of Macedonia, bounded by the Archipelago on the eaſt, and by Epirus and the Ionian ſea on the weſt. The mean breadth of Peloponneſus, from north to ſouth, can ſcarcely be reckoned more than 140 miles, and its mean length, from eaſt to weſt, cannot be eſtimated

at more than 210 miles. Yet, within this narrow boundary, were contained ſix independent ſtates, Achaia, Elis, Meſſenia, Laconia, Argolis, and Arcadia. Admitting, then, that the territories of theſe ſtates were nearly of equal extent, the dominions of each particular ſtate will appear to be no more than 23 miles in breadth, and 35 in length.

The country belonging to the Greeks on the north ſide of the iſthmus, I have computed, from the beſt maps, to contain, of mean breadth, 153 miles, from north to ſouth, and, of mean length, 258 miles, from eaſt to weſt. It comprehended no fewer than the following nine independent commonwealths, Theſſaly, Locris, Boeotia, Attica, Megaris, Phocis, Ætolia, Acarnania, and Doris. Suppoſing then, as in the former caſe, theſe commonwealths to have been nearly equal in point of territory, in order to obtain an idea of the mean magnitude of their dominions, we ſhall find each of them to have poſſeſſed lands to the extent only of 17 miles in breadth, and 28 in length. What is ſtill more extraordinary, ſeveral of them conſiſted of cities, which were independent of one another, and were aſſociated only for mutual defence. Both the Locrians and the Achaeans afford inſtances of this caſe. The former had not even all their territories contiguous *, nor did they act always in concert †; and the twelve cities of the latter ſeem to have been connected in no other manner than by alliance ‡.

The

* Strab. lib. 9.

† The Locri Opuntii only ſent troops to the allied army of Greece, to oppoſe Xerxes. Herod. lib. 7. cap. 203.

‡ Pauſanias. lib. 7.

The government of all theſe ſtates was more or leſs republican; and the Greeks appear to have had no conception of a free conſtitution, in which an appeal to the people was not ultimately competent. The hiſtory of Greece affords abundant evidence of the truth of this remark. The early monarchies were of ſhort duration and extremely limited. Kings, as well as uſurpers, are conſtantly branded with the odious name of tyrants. Even the temporary revolutions which ſometimes took place, from democracy to monarchy, occaſioned by private ambition, or foreign influence, are no objections againſt the general obſervation. For the people, when left to the free operation of their natural ſentiments and feelings, returned with keenneſs and tumult to the antient conſtitution.

At Athens, the whole legiſlative power, and a great part of the executive, were lodged with the people. Even at Sparta, the two Kings poſſeſſed not more authority than the Conſuls of Rome, or the Sufetes of Carthage *. They were preſidents of the ſenate †, and commanded the armies of their country. But they had no influence in the appointment of the ſenators. Theſe were elected by the people ‡. And the Kings retained the privilege only of propoſing the buſineſs to be canvaſſed, and of giving the firſt vote in the deciſion. When they went to war, they were attended by a ſort of field deputies, or counſellors, called Polemarchs §, without whoſe advice and concurrence they could undertake no enterprize of moment.

Two

* Ariſt. polit. lib. 3. † Xenoph. de repub. Laced. ‡ Ariſt. Polit. lib. 2.
§ Xenophon. de repub. Laced.

Two of the Ephori * alſo accompanied the camp, who inſpected, not only their behaviour, but that of the whole army. Theſe nominal Kings poſſeſſed no enſign of royalty but that of ſucceſſion; while the people held the legiſlative power, the privilege of naming the ſenate and the Ephori, and the honour of electing individuals, out of their own order, int o both theſe high ſtations ‡.

While the people enjoyed ſo much power under the Greek republics, the territories poſſeſſed by theſe could not be extenſive, nor their citizens numerous. As, in every important tranſaction of government, appeals were made to the people, it was neceſſary their number ſhould neither be ſo great, nor their ſituation ſo diſtant, as to render it impoſſible to convene and conſult them.

The whole lands belonging to the Lacedaemonians were divided by Lycurgus into thirty-nine thouſand ſhares ‖; one of which was allotted to the family of every citizen; and, as theſe ſhares were on no account to be augmented or diminiſhed, the number of

* The Ephori were a ſort of tribunes, who protected the privileges of the people.

‡ Ariſt. Polit. lib. 2.

‖ Plutarch aſſerts, that theſe lots yielded annually, at an average, 82 medimni of barley, and a ſmall quantity of fruits. Counting, then, with Dr Arbuthnot, the medimnus to hold to the Wincheſter buſhel the ratio nearly of 13 to 14, it is eaſy to compute the produce of a crop of all the lands of Sparta. It amounted only to 430,404 quarters. This is a quantity of grain not greater than is raiſed in ſome ſingle counties of England; and is a demonſtration of the ſcantineſs of the reſources of that republic, and conſequently of all the other republics of Greece, except Athens, next to which Sparta was the moſt opulent and powerful. *Plut. in vit. Lycurg.*

of citizens muſt have remained invariable. Of theſe, nine thouſand were aſſigned to the citizens of Sparta *, who only were called to attend the leſſer aſſemblies † of the people. The greater aſſemblies ‡ conſiſted of the thirty-nine thouſand freemen, collected from all the territories of Sparta, who met to deliberate on the great affairs of ſtate, to make laws, and to decide concerning peace and war.

The citizens of Athens were not ſo numerous as thoſe of Sparta. They ſeem rarely to have amounted to more than 20,000. This is the number aſſigned by Demoſthenes § and Plato ‖. From a ſurvey of Athens made ſtill later under the archonſhip of Demetrius Phalerius, the citizens were again found to be 20,000 ¶.

It is extremely proboble **, that theſe were the whole freemen of the Athenian territories, who attended the ordinary aſſemblies of the people, and in whoſe hands was repoſed the government of the ſtate. The Athenians lived originally, like the Lacedaemonians, diſperſed in cities through the different diſtricts of Attica. The-

 ſius

* Plutarchi Lycurg. † Xenophon. lib. 3. Hellen.

‡ Ibid. lib. 5. Hellen. § Orat. in Ariſtogitonem. ‖ In Critia.

¶ Anonymus apud Meurſium de fortuna Athenarum, cap. 4.

** A number, ſomewhat larger, is mentioned in a paſſage of Athenæus, lib. 6. which gives an account of a ſurvey of Attica, made under the ſame Demetrius Phalerius, when the Athenians were found to be 21,000, the ſtrangers 10,000, and the ſlaves no fewer than 400,000. The latter were moſtly captives, and were employed at ſea, in the mines, and other ſervile occupations. Xenophon, in his book de Vectigalibus, mentions one Nicias, who had a thouſand ſlaves, whom he let to Socias a miner, at the rate of an obolus, 1 ¼ penny each a-day, with an obligation on the part

ſius found this diſtribution extremely troubleſome and inconvenient. The public buſineſs could not be properly conducted, becauſe the attendance of the people could not be eaſily procured. He enlarged, therefore, the city of Athens, and, by addreſs or authority, prevailed with the citizens to abandon their habitations in the country to the care of their ſlaves, and to aſſume, for the future, their reſidence in the city.

Athens and Sparta were the principal and leading commonwealths of Greece. Their example was followed, their manners were imitated, and their alliance was courted, by all the other ſtates. The former were zealous, in their turn, to extend their influence over their allies, by propagating among them their reſpective manners, cuſtoms, and forms of government. Of courſe, moſt of the other ſtates adopted, either wholly, or in part, their civil inſtitutions. A particular account of the political conſtitutions of theſe ſtates is, for this reaſon, unneceſſary. But it is, at the ſame time, impracticable. We ſcarcely know more of their ſeparate polities, than that they were republican. Their influence was ſeldom ſo great as to render their conſtitution or their operations objects of attention to their countrymen, while the brilliancy of

part of the latter, to return the ſame number he received. He obſerves, that Hypponicus had 600, and Philomonides 300, let on the ſame terms. He recommends it warmly to the Athenian ſtate to raiſe a revenue, by purchaſing ſlaves, and letting them in the ſame manner. The difference in the number of the Athenians, aſſigned in this paſſage, from that quoted above, ariſes, probably, from an occaſional fluctuation of the Cenſus; which, unleſs a freeman poſſeſſed, he was excluded from the aſſemblies of the people.

of the tranſactions of Athens and Sparta has almoſt monopolized the pages of antiquity. We may, therefore, conclude, with confidence, that, however diminutive the affairs of theſe republics appear, when compared with a modern political ſcale, thoſe of the other ſtates would ſuffer greater diminution, when eſtimated according to that ſtandard.

The Greeks, alſo, were deſtitute, in a great meaſure, of all the uſeful arts, particularly of agriculture and commerce. At Athens, indeed, the ornamental arts, oratory, poetry, ſtatuary, and architecture, flouriſhed in a manner unrivalled by antient or modern times. But, at Sparta, even theſe arts were prohibited by Lycurgus, and deſpiſed by the Lacedaemonians. Eloquence they derided, as an engine of ſophiſtry and deceit. They contemned poetry, becauſe it tended to debilitate the mind, by inſpiring ſympathy and compaſſion, and rendered men leſs fit for the atchievements of war. They prohibited the building of every houſe where any tool ſhould be employed beſide an axe and a ſaw *. The mechanic arts and agriculture were deemed ignoble employments, and practiſed only by ſlaves †. The citizens of Sparta devoted their whole time to the operations of war, or to gymnaſtic exerciſes ſubſervient to that profeſſion ‡. They contented themſelves with the bare neceſſaries of life, both for food and clothing. They interdicted altogether the uſe of the precious metals. As they had no money, they could have no artiſts. They lived chiefly on bread, black broth, and

* Plutar. Lycurg. † Ariſt. Polit. lib. 7. cap. 9. ‡ Xenoph. de Repub. Laced.

and cheeſe *; viands remarkable among the ancients themſelves for being homely and unſavory, and which mark very ſtrongly the loweſt ſtate of agriculture. Among the ſupplies ſent by the King of Egypt to Sparta, at the beginning of the Aſiatic war conducted by Ageſilaus, when that ſtate was in the zenith of its power and glory, were 600,000 modii of wheat †.

Among the praiſes of Attica, Xenophon ‡ enumerates the temperature of its climate, the deliciouſneſs and ripeneſs of its fruits, its great abundance of fine ſtone for building ſplendid temples and altars, and public edifices, the richneſs of its ſilver mines, its centrical ſituation for trade, and the convenience of its bays and harbours. He affirms, however, that the people were poor, and never could procure ſubſiſtence from their own territories. He urges his countrymen, with all that inſinuating eloquence ſo characteriſtic of his writings, to apply themſelves to commerce, as the moſt effectual means of ſupplying all their wants. Demoſthenes aſſerts §, that the Athenians imported more corn than any other ſtate of Greece, and that they received it chiefly from Pontus and Byzantium. Towards the end of the Pelopponeſian war, the Lacedaemonians interrupted the importation of corn, which produced a famine at Athens, as the city depended principally on that mode of ſupply ‖

If

* Plutar. Lycurg.

† Juſtin. lib. 6. cap. 2. about 18,750 quarters, counting the modius equal to a peck Engliſh.

‡ De vectigalibus. § Oratio adverſus Leptinem. ‖ Diod. lib. 13. cap. 107.

If ſuch was the ſituation of the moſt powerful and flouriſhing republics of antiquity, even in the days of Xenophon and Demoſthenes, what muſt have been their condition before the Perſian invaſion, when navigation and ſhip-building were almoſt unknown in Greece? Thucydides informs us *, that the Athenians had no decked veſſels nor triremes, before the expedition of Xerxes; and that, previous to this period, they uſed only a ſort of open boats, navigated by fifty oars. They learned the utility and importance of navigation when they were obliged to equip a fleet to oppoſe that of the Perſians. He acquaints us, further, that all the Greek ſtates anciently ſubſiſted by plundering one another, and that their depredations and incurſions were not reckoned diſhonourable or unjuſt; that the cuſtom among the Greeks of going conſtantly armed, aroſe from this opinion, and theſe robberies. The cuſtom, he remarks, was retained, even in his time †, by no fewer than three ſtates, the Locri, Ætoli, and Acarnanes; and the Athenians, he adds, were the firſt people who aboliſhed both theſe barbarous practices. Pauſanias ‡ affirms, that the poorer ſort of people in Euboea and Phocis had no better cloathing than ſkins.

But the moſt curious monument of the poverty of the Greek republics is preſerved by Polybius §. Cleomenes ‖, the laſt King of Sparta of that name, ſacked Megalopolis, a city of Arcadia, and the place of the nativity of the hiſtorian, becauſe the inhabitants would not renounce their alliance with the Achaeans, and accept that of the Lacedaemonians.

* Lib. 1. cap. 14. † That of the Peloponneſian war. ‡ Arcadica.
§ Lib. 2. cap. 61. et 62. ‖ About the 131ſt Olympiad.

daemonians. Phylarchus, a moſt partial and ill informed author, in narrating this tranſaction, had aſſerted, among other improbabilities, that Cleomenes ſeized, in Megalopolis, plunder to the value of 6000 talents *. Polybius cenſures this account, as moſt exorbitant and incredible. He aſſerts, that the booty could not be ſuppoſed to amount to more than 300 talents †, and that the plunder of all the ſtates of Peloponneſus, unleſs the inhabitants had been ſold for ſlaves, could not, in the moſt flouriſhing period of their affairs, furniſh the enormous ſum of 6000 talents. He ſupports this opinion, by an account of a valuation of the lands, houſes, and poſſeſſions, of the Athenians, made with a view of impoſing a tax on their territories in Attica, in order to ſupport the war ‡, which, in conjunction with the Thebans, they had undertaken againſt the Lacedaemonians. That valuation was inferior to the ſum aſſigned, by Phylarchus, as the price of the pillage of Megalopolis. It amounted only to 5750 § talents ‖.

When it is conſidered that this valuation was made at an advanced period of the affairs of Greece, when ſome degree of luxury had been introduced into that country, and the communication laid open

* L. 1,162,500. † L. 49,125.

‡ This ſeems to have been the Bellum Laconicum Boeoticum, which happened in the 100th Olympiad. § L. 1,114,062.

‖ It is not a little ſurpriſing, that an author of the diſcernment and erudition of Meurſius, ſhould ſo far miſtake the meaning of Polybius, as to repreſent this valuation to have been an annual tax. The higheſt tax paid, both by the Athenians and their allies, never amounted, annually, to more than 1700 talents.

Meurſius, de Fortuna Athen.

open between it and the eaſt, and when, conſequently, the value of money muſt have been conſiderably diminiſhed, the picture exhibited of the ſcantineſs of the reſources of the Grecian republics cannot fail to ſtrike with ſurpriſe.

SECT. II.

Cauſes of Colonization among the Greeks—Their Settlements in Magna Graecia—Croton—Thurii—Tarentum.

THE preceding account of the conſtitution and finances of the Greek ſtates will naturally ſuggeſt the motives which actuated them in planting colonies in diſtant regions, and the conduct they were obliged to adopt with regard to theſe colonies. In a narrow uncultivated country, containing a great number of independent tribes, ſtraitened for territory and ſubſiſtence, ſeveral cauſes would induce the inhabitants to emigrate. As no proviſion was made for the natural increaſe of population, as the Greeks knew little of agriculture and leſs of manufactures, and as a great part of them were idle and warlike *, recourſe was frequently had to force, and the weaker were compelled to cede their fields and habitations to the ſtronger †. The ſpirit of enterpriſe and conqueſt, alſo, which frequently ſeizes nations in their progreſs toward refinement, added to contempt for the characters of more unwarlike people, induced frequently the Greeks to incroach on the territories of their neighbours.

The

* Iſocratis Panegyrica. † Thucyd. lib. 1. cap. 2.

The moſt fertile ſource, however, of the colonization of Greece, was that ſpirit of turbulence and faction which poſſeſſes all republics, but particularly infeſted thoſe of that country. When a ſtate was overloaded with people, from whoſe profligacy or idleneſs it dreaded innovation, it projected a colony to relieve itſelf from apprehenſions. When a factious demagogue became formidable to the conſtitution of his country, he was diſpatched, at the head of his followers, to ſome diſtant region, over which he might preſide, and the government of which he might model to his mind.

As the principal object of Grecian colonization was, to diſcharge ſupernumerary members, or to preſerve the conſtitution of the parent ſtate, it was not to be expected, that, tho' ſhe had been able, ſhe would have been diſpoſed to concern herſelf much in the proſperity of her offspring. The truth is, ſhe was neither able nor willing. The colony was permitted to adopt that form of government which it choſe to prefer, and to continue, or not, its connection with the mother-country, as beſt ſuited its intereſts. The former entertained not, for a long time, the moſt diſtant thought of taxing the latter, or of retaining over it any mark of ſovereignty; becauſe ſhe could afford it no compenſation in the article of defence. She was ſcarcely able to preſerve the domeſtic territories ſhe poſſeſſed, and could afford no protection to her colonies. The only connection known, for many ages, between the mother-country and the colony was that of affection or alliance.

In

In the courſe of the Grecian affairs, however, Sparta and Athens became principal ſtates, and almoſt the whole of the other commonwealths and the foreign colonies attached themſelves to one or other of theſe communities. The object of theſe alliances afforded a pretext for taxation both of allies and colonies, which Sparta and Athens, but particularly the latter, ſeized with avidity. Theſe remarks will be ſupported by facts which will occur in the account of the colonization of Greece.

The foreign countries in which the Greeks planted their principal colonies were, the ſouth-eaſt coaſt of Italy, extending from Brundiſium to the frith of Sicily, called by the antients Magna Graecia; the eaſt coaſt of Sicily, from the frith, to the promontory of Pachynum; and a great part of the coaſt of the leſſer Aſia, lying along the eaſtern ſhore of the Archipelago, named Æolis and Ionia. They had, beſides, many ſettlements on the ſhores of Thrace, from the Sinus Thermaicus * to the Propontis, and in the iſlands of the Archipelago and the Ionian ſea. The colonies of Aſia and the iſlands were chiefly planted by the Athenians; thoſe of Italy and Sicily, by the republics of Peloponneſus †.

The moſt early ſettlements were thoſe of Magna Graecia and Sicily. The chief of them in Magna Graecia were Croton, Sybaris, and Tarentum; in Sicily, Syracuſe.

According to Strabo ‡, Croton was founded by the Achaeans, who arrived by accident in Italy, in their voyage homeward from

* Gulf of Salonichi. † Thucyd. lib. 1. 12. ‡ Lib. 6.

the Trojan war. To ſecure their ſhips from the dangers of the ſea, they drew them upon the beach, according to the manner of antient navigators, and retired to explore the country, having left their women near their veſſels till they ſhould return. The latter, however, diſguſted with the length and dangers of the voyage from Troy, reſolved not to go again to ſea; and, that they might compel their countrymen to ſettle in the territories on which they had landed, in their abſence, they ſet fire to the ſhips. Croton became a famous colony. The climate was healthy, and the country fertile. It increaſed in cultivation, and in numbers, and finally acquired ſuch eminence, as to rival Greece itſelf in philoſophy and arts. Pythagoras leaving Samos, his native country, erected a ſchool there, and eſtabliſhed one of the moſt illuſtrious ſects of antiquity, which continued long to flouriſh. It was no leſs conſpicuous for athletic exerciſes. Its wreſtlers were renowned over Greece, and ſeveral times carried away the prizes in the Olympic games. This colony ſent one ſhip * to the combined fleet of Greece aſſembled at Salamis to oppoſe the fleet of Xerxes in the Archipelago, at the time of the Perſian invaſion; and it was the only ſettlement in Italy or Sicily which furniſhed any aſſiſtance.

This concurrence, in ſupport of the liberties of Greece, was, however, no mark of political ſubjection. All the aids granted on this occaſion were the fruits of alliance, or voluntary contribution. The Greek ſtates ſuſpended all private animoſities, and cordially conjoined their forces to repel the invaſion. They diſpatched ambaſſadors to all their foreign ſettlements, to ſolicit aſſiſtance, though moſt

* Herod. lib. 8. cap. 47.

moſt of them were unable or unwilling to comply with their requeſts. The colonies, in general, of Italy and Sicily, thought themſelves little intereſted in the quarrel, becauſe they were remote from the ſcene of action.

Sybaris, called afterwards Thurii, ſituated between the rivers Crathis and Sybaris, which empty themſelves into the bay of Tarentum, was alſo ſettled by the Achaeans; though neither the time nor the occaſion of this emigration are mentioned by the writers of antiquity. The colony was powerful and ſucceſsful, had under its juriſdiction four adjacent ſtates, poſſeſſed twenty-five cities, and could bring into the field 300,000 men *; which it did in the war with its neighbours the Crotoniatae †. The latter, however, got the victory in the field, and brought ſwift deſtruction on the people of Sybaris, by demoliſhing the banks of the river Crathis, and overwhelming their city with an inundation. This war happened in the time of Pythagoras, who is ſaid to have directed the operations of the Crotoniatae ‡.

The people of Sybaris, who ſurvived this calamity, ſent deputies to Greece to implore aſſiſtance, and a recruit of inhabitants. They applied to the Spartans; but their ſolicitations were refuſed. They had recourſe next to the Athenians, who conſented to ſend them ten ſhips filled with emigrants, under the direction of Lampon and Xenocrates.

* Probably the whole inhabitants who could bear arms. † Strab. lib. 6.

‡ About 83d Olympiad. Diod. lib. 12. cap. 10.

Xenocrates *. Theſe leaders publiſhed proclamations, in the cities of Peloponneſus, of their intended expedition, and conſulted the oracle about its ſucceſs. Great numbers of people joined them from all quarters, with whom they ſet ſail for Italy. On their arrival, they reſolved not to rebuild their capital in its former ſituation, which expoſed them ſo ſeverely to the vengeance of their enemies. They choſe a new foundation for it near a ſpring called *Thurii*, from which, for the future, the colony received its name. The Thurii ſoon acquired great reputation for riches, learning, and arts. The philoſophy of Pythagoras had ſpread over all the ſtates of Magna Graecia, and had contributed highly to enlighten and poliſh the minds of men. Two illuſtrious legiſlators, rivals of Solon and Lycurgus, appeared on this occaſion, Charondas, among the Thurii, and Seleucus among the Locri, both diſciples of that illuſtrious philoſopher. The conſtitution of Thurii was formed after the model of that of Athens. The people were divided into ten tribes, which received names deſcriptive of the cities from which the members of them were deſcended. From theſe names we diſcover, that three tribes had come from Peloponneſus †, three from the northern republics of Greece ‡, one from Athens §, one from Euboea ‖, one from the Iſlands ¶, and one probably contained the old inhabitants **. The Thurii were members of the league †† for mutual defence, which ſubſiſted among the ſtates of

* Diod. ibid. † Arcadem, Achaidem, et Eleam. ‡ Boeoticam, Amphictionidem, et Dorienſem. § Athenaidem. ‖ Euboidem. ¶ Inſularem. ** Iadem, the old name of Achaia; *Diod.* lib. 12. cap. 11. †† Diod. lib. 14. cap. 448.

of Magna Graecia. They had wars with the Lucanians, and Dionyſius tyrant of Syracuſe, in which they were reduced to the greateſt diſtreſs, were deprived of their liberties, and the greater part of their wealth. But no evidence remains of their receiving directly any protection from the mother-countries. Nor are any veſtiges to be found of their expreſſing, either attachment or allegiance, by furniſhing aſſiſtance to the latter, in money or in troops.

The Tarentines were a colony of Spartans, and emigrated from Laconia, according to Strabo *, on the following extraordinary occaſion. Teleclus, King of Sparta, was murdered by the Meſſenians, when he came to offer ſacrifice to the Gods, in their capital Meſſenè. The Spartans were, to the higheſt degree, enraged by this flagrant and enormous breach of hoſpitality, and bound themſelves, by a ſolemn oath, to march directly againſt that city, and not to return home till they had laid it in aſhes. The Meſſenians made an obſtinate defence, and the war † was protracted for twenty years. The Spartan women, in the mean time, complained that Lacedaemon would be ruined, no leſs than Meſſené; that the men fell daily by the ſword, while the women were childleſs by the abſence of their huſbands, and brought no recruit to the commonwealth. The Spartans engaged in the war were ſatisfied of the truth of theſe repreſentations, and diſpatched from the army

* Lib. 6.

† Firſt Meſſenian war, which happened about the firſt Olympiad.

thoſe of their number who had left Lacedaemon ſo young, as not to have been bound by the oath. They ordered them to have promiſcuous correſpondence with all the unmarried women of Sparta; and from this intercourſe aroſe a race of men, who were called *Partheniae*, becauſe their fathers were unknown. When the war was ended, the Partheniae cauſed much combuſtion and imbarraſſment in the conſtitution of Lacedaemon. They could ſucceed to no legal inheritance as citizens, and they would not ſubmit to be ſlaves. A conſpiracy was formed, and a maſſacre was likely to enſue. It was happily detected, when on the point of execution; and the people were relieved from the fears and dangers of a revolution, by the expedient of an emigration. The Partheniae accordingly left Peloponneſus, under the direction of Philanthus, one of their number, and landed in the bay of Tarentum, where they built the city of that name, and acquired great power, both by ſea and land. They were able to muſter 30,000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry; and they equipped the greateſt fleet ever known in theſe parts. Learning and arts flouriſhed exceedingly among them, eſpecially under the famous Archytas, who embraced, with ardor, the philoſophy of Pythagoras, and preſided long over that commonwealth *.

Luxury and faction, at length, found acceſs into the Tarentine ſtate. Strabo obſerves, probably with ſome degree of exaggeration, that they had more public feſtivals than there were days in the year; and ſedition ſeems to have prevailed among them ſo violently, that they

* Strab. lib. 6.

they could not agree to allow a native to command their fleets and armies. For this reaſon, in the war with their neighbours the Meſſapii and Lucani, they employed as generals, firſt, Alexander Moloſſus, from Epirus, and afterwards Archidamus and Cleonomus, from Sparta *.

When the Athenian fleet, during the Peloponneſian war, touched on the coaſts of Tarentum in its voyage to Sicily, under pretence of aſſiſting the Egeſtaei againſt the Selenuntii and Syracuſians, but, in reality, with a view to conquer that iſland, the Tarentines would not permit the Athenians to enter their harbours, nor even to purchaſe proviſions †. The reſt of the Greek colonies in Italy behaved not with much more complaiſance. They would only allow the Athenians to purchaſe proviſions, but forbid them to enter their towns.

This behaviour aroſe in part from attachment to the cauſe of the Peloponneſians, from whom they were moſtly deſcended, and with whom the Athenians were at war, but chiefly from jealouſy of the power of Athens, and from diſlike to ſee Sicily reduced under its dominion. In the future voyages of the Athenians, and when fortune ſeemed to favour their arms in Sicily, theſe colonies treated their fleets with every mark of reſpect; a demonſtration, that they were influenced by intereſt, much more than by any other conſideration.

SECT.

* Diod. lib. 16. cap. 62.

† Thucyd. lib. 6. cap. 44.

SECT. III.

Greek Colonies in Sicily—Syracuſians—Their Conduct on Occaſion of the Perſian Invaſion—and in the Peloponneſian War—Set at Liberty by Timoleon—Receive numerous Emigrations from Greece.

ANTIENT Sicily was a ſcene of conſtant revolutions. The Greeks planted in it many colonies, Meſſana, Megara, Naxus, Agrigentum, and Syracuſe *. All theſe, however, except Syracuſe, were of little conſequence, and of ſhort duration. The Carthaginians very early poſſeſſed themſelves of the ſouth coaſt of the iſland, and were extremely anxious to add the whole of it to their empire. Syracuſe only was able to oppoſe their efforts; and, in the courſe of this conteſt for ſovereignty †, the leſſer ſettlements frequently changed their maſters. From a view, therefore, of the affairs of Syracuſe, we may learn the nature of the political connection which Sicily had with Greece.

Syracuſe was ſettled by a colony from Corinth, under the direction of Archias one of the Heraclidae ‡. She attained a degree of power and opulence ſuperior to all the Greek colonies. Her reſources were greater, her territories more extenſive, and her tranſactions more memorable than thoſe of any republic of Greece itſelf, if we except Athens and Sparta. The firſt intercourſe between the Syracuſians

* Strab. lib. 6. † Juſt. lib. 22. ‡ Strab. lib. 6. Thucyd. lib. 6. cap. 3.

racuſians and the Greeks happened at the time of the Perſian invaſion, when the latter ſent ambaſſadors to the former, to ſolicit them to join the general alliance againſt Xerxes. The anſwer * of Gelon king of Syracuſe, to this requiſition, is conceived in the language of an independent ſtate, againſt which the ambaſſadors offered no objection. They urged, however, their claim to precedency. The king repreſented, that the Greeks implored his aſſiſtance with a bad grace; that they regarded their own intereſt only, and were indifferent to that of Sicily; that he had formerly ſupplicated, at different times, their aid againſt his enemies, the Carthaginians and the Egeſtani; but that, on theſe occaſions, he had been treated with the moſt mortifying neglect; that now, when war and danger threatened their own country, and when they wiſhed his aſſiſtance, they condeſcended to ſolicit a ſtate they had formerly deſpiſed; and that, were he to retaliate their conduct, he ſhould certainly refuſe their requeſt. He would not, however, he ſubjoined, imitate their behaviour, but would aſſiſt them with 200 triremes, 20,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 4,000 ſlingers and light armed troops, if they would conſent that he ſhould be general of the forces of the alliance. The ambaſſadors of Sparta, then the principal ſtate of Greece, anſwered with haughtineſs, 'If he intended to 'join the alliance, he muſt obey the general of Lacedaemon; if he 'diſdained to ſubmit to him, he might with-hold his troops.' Gelon felt the harſhneſs of this reply, but was not provoked by it. He even condeſcended to abate ſomething of his demands, and offered to furniſh the ſupplies he mentioned, provided he were allowed

* Herod. lib. 7. cap. 158.

lowed to command the fleet. The Athenian ambaſſadors now interpoſed, but with more complaiſance than thoſe of Sparta. They alledged, that they could grant precedency to no ſtate but Sparta, that the antiquity of their common-wealth, and their ſuperior knowledge of naval affairs, entitled them to command the fleet, if the Lacedaemonians ſhould chuſe to command the army, and that they could not reſign this honour to Syracuſe. Gelon, mortified with the refuſal of both his demands, rejoined with firmneſs and ſpirit, that the Greeks ſeemed to be well provided in commanders, but had no army nor fleet to command; that as they would yield nothing, on their part, they could not expect his aſſiſtance; and that their obſtinacy had deprived their country of the moſt powerful ally ſhe had to expect.

Gelon did not over-rate his reſources. We find, he actually offered more ſhips than the half of all the combined navy of Greece, and more than were furniſhed both by the Athenians and Spartans. Herodotus has ſupplied us with a liſt * of the ſhips contributed by the different powers of the alliance, and from it we learn, that the fleet amounted to 378 triremes, of which the Athenians equipped 180, and the Lacedaemonians only 16. The troops of Gelon, however, did not remain long inactive. Their attention was ſoon called to another quarter, to defend their own country againſt the Carthaginians †.

The Athenians acquired great influence among their neighbours, by the conſpicuous part they acted in repelling the Perſian invaſion.

* Lib. 8. cap. 48. † Page 17.

ſion. They began to rival Sparta, and even to attempt the ſovereignty of Greece. Their ambition produced the Peloponneſian war, the object of which was, to decide whether Sparta or Athens ſhould have the precedency. In this war, Syracuſe was neceſſarily involved, by the invaſion of the Athenians, in order to reduce Sicily under their ſubjection *.

The Athenians aſſembled their fleet † at Corcyra, conſiſting of 134 triremes, 100 of which belonged to Attica, and the reſt to her allies, two veſſels of fifty oars, and one tranſport which carried 30 horſes. They ſteered their courſe, in the uſual direction, acroſs the Ionian or Adriatic ſea, to the coaſt of Magna Graecia, and then along that coaſt to Sicily. They attacked and defeated the forces of Syracuſe, laid ſiege to the city, and reduced the inhabitants to the utmoſt diſtreſs. In this ſituation, the Syracuſians ſent the moſt preſſing ſolicitations for aid, firſt to Corinth, their parent ſtate, and next to Sparta ‡. They urged the Corinthians, from the relation that ſubſiſted between them, in conſequence of being their deſcendants. But they aſſailed the Lacedaemonians by arguments drawn from intereſt, and from fear. They repreſented, that it was advantageous to attack the Athenians in the abſence of their troops; that the Spartans ſhould not remain inactive, till Sicily was ſubdued, when the Athenians would return fluſhed with victory, and reinforced with new allies, to conquer Peloponneſus; that now was the

* Page 37. † Thucyd. lib. 6. cap. 43. ‡ Ibid. lib. 7. cap. 88.

the time to ſend reinforcements into Sicily, and to make a diverſion in favour of Syracuſe, by invading Attica, unleſs they intended to permit Athens to obtain the ſovereignty of Greece.

The Corinthians entered, with much zeal, into the views of the Syracuſians. They determined, not only to grant them the aid they requeſted, but diſpatched ambaſſadors along with theirs to Sparta to ſecond their applications. The moſt valuable part of the aſſiſtance furniſhed by the Lacedemonians, was a general called Gilippus, to command the forces of Syracuſe. They had made little progreſs in maritime affairs, and ſent, beſides, only two ſhips. The ſupplies from the Corinthians were more liberal. They contributed twelve ſhips of their own, and prevailed with the Leucadians and Ambraciotae, two of their colonies, to add five more *.

Theſe aids turned the fortune of the war in favour of Syracuſe. Nicias, the Athenian general, implored his countrymen for reinforcements in the moſt preſſing terms †. They decreed to ſend him immediately ten ſhips, and appointed a fleet of obſervation ‡ of 20 triremes, to cruiſe round the coaſt of Peloponneſus, to intercept the ſupplies that might be conveyed to Sicily. To theſe they added afterwards a much more powerful armament, conſiſting of 73 gallies, and many troops ‖. The Lacedaemonians, however, finally

* Thucyd. lib. 6. cap. 104. † Ibid. lib. 7. cap. 11. ‡ Ibid. lib. 7. cap. 17. ‖ Ib. cap. 42.

ly prevailed, and the Athenians were compelled to abandon Sicily *.

The Syracuſians, about ſixty years after theſe tranſactions †, oppreſſed by the tyranny of Dionyſius the Younger, and harraſſed and plundered by the Carthaginians, applied again to Corinth for aid. They received firſt the famous Timoleon ‡, for their general, and ten gallies loaded with ſupplies; to which afterwards were added

* Dr Price miſrepreſents this piece of hiſtory, in order to draw from it an argument againſt the probability of ſucceſs in reducing America. "The citizens of "Syracuſe," (he obſerves, Eſſay on Civil Liberty,) "thus circumſtanced," that is, "*as determined men, fighting on their own ground, within ſight of their houſes and families, and "for that ſacred bleſſing liberty, without which man is a beaſt, and government a curſe;* "withſtood the whole power of the Athenians, and almoſt ruined them." Would not the reader conclude, from theſe words, and the other examples quoted at the ſame time, of the States General and the Cantons of Switzerland, that the citizens of Syracuſe had been either ſubjects or coloniſts of the Athenians, that they had been cruelly oppreſſed by that people, and that, from their own reſources, they had ſucceſsfully reſiſted the oppreſſion, and had almoſt ruined the oppreſſors? Now, what are the facts? The Syracuſians were an independent ſtate, and neither ſubjects nor coloniſts of Athens. The Athenians entered Sicily to invade the allies of the Peloponneſians with whom they were at war; and among theſe allies were the citizens of Syracuſe. The Syracuſians would certainly have been forced to ſubmit to the Athenians, if they had not been reinforced by ſupplies from the ſtates of Peloponneſus, who, in a great meaſure, transferred the ſeat of the war into Sicily, by the aids they ſent to Syracuſe. It was, therefore, the reinforcements from Peloponneſus, not the power of Syracuſe, which withſtood the Athenians, and, though it by no means ruined, yet it compelled them to relinquiſh Sicily.

† 108th Olymp. ‡ Diod. lib. 16. cap. 72. &c.

ten more, furniſhed in the ſame manner. Timoleon baniſhed Dionyſius, and expelled the Carthaginians. He made free all the Greek cities in Sicily, and eſtabliſhed democracy in Syracuſe. The conſtant wars, however, with which, for a long time, Sicily had been waſted, had almoſt depopulated the country. Timoleon, therefore, ſupplicated Greece for a recruit of inhabitants. He cauſed it to be proclaimed through all the ſtates of Peloponneſus, that the ſenate and people of Syracuſe offered habitations and lands to all perſons who ſhould repair thither to poſſeſs them. The reputation of Sicily for opulence and fertility was ſo great, that no fewer than 50,000 people emigrated to take poſſeſſion of the vacant territories; and, before this event, 5,000 perſons had arrived from Corinth.

In the circuit we have traverſed, no veſtiges have appeared of any diſpoſition, in the ſeveral parent ſtates, to impoſe taxes on their colonies, or even to retain ſovereignty over them. All the inſtances of intercourſe which have been ſpecified, aroſe entirely, either from attachment or policy. Indeed, none of the republics of Peloponneſus, except Sparta, had it in their power to act a contrary part; and, although the Lacedaemonians never demanded any annual tribute, they ſeized every occaſion of levying money from their allies and colonies. Polybius remarks *, that the inſtitutions of Lycurgus were adapted only to preſerve the Lacedaemonians from invaſion, and to continue them a poor and warlike people; but that they were altogether unſuitable for extending their dominions, or for rendering them

* Lib. 6. cap. 46. and 47.

them a great and powerful nation. When the Spartans, therefore, contended for the ſovereignty of Greece, in the Peloponneſian war, and when they extended their conqueſts in Aſia under Ageſilaus, they found it neceſſary to graſp at every pretence for raiſing money, while they ſeemed to maintain the ſpirit of their conſtitution by impoſing no taxes. Accordingly, in the beginning of the Peloponneſian war, they demanded a ſum of money and 500 ſhips from the colonies of Sicily and Italy, and appointed them to ſettle among themſelves the various contingents which ſhould be furniſhed by the reſpective colonies *. They demanded money and ſhips from their allies in the courſe of that war †, and received even ſubſidies from Perſia ‡. They pillaged moſt unmercifully the territories of their enemies, and converted the plunder to the uſe of the public §. Their frequent and ruinous wars with their neighbours, the Meſſenians, were prompted by the money they expected to raiſe

* Thucyd. lib. 2. cap. 7.

† Ibid. lib. 8. cap. 3.

To equip the expedition, to be employed in defence of the Olynthians, about the end of the Peloponneſian war, the Lacedaemonians, as we are informed by Xenophon, (Hiſt. Graec. lib. 5.) prevailed with their allies to conſent, that a ſtate of the neceſſary ſupplies ſhould be ſent to every city within their juriſdiction; that any city might convert the ſervice of a ſoldier into money, after the rate of half a drachma (i. e. half of 7 ¼ d.) a day; of a horſeman for the pay of four ſoldiers; and, if any city ſhould furniſh neither men nor money, that the Lacedaemonians might exact from it a ſtater of gold (i. e. 16 s. 4.) for every day during the continuance of the expedition. No conſideration is had of the ſize of the city; a proof that this mode of raiſing money was new, and extremely unequal.

‡ Thucyd. lib. 8. cap. 5. § Polyb. lib. 6. cap. 47.

raiſe by ſelling the captives for ſlaves. They ſold even the Aſiatic colonies, according to Polybius *, that they might procure money from Artaxerxes to enable them to conquer Greece. In the hiſtory of the Athenian colonies, we ſhall ſee a different management adopted.

SECT. IV.

Aſiatic Colonies—Subjected to Taxation by the Athenians.—Rebellion of the Samians—and of the Lesbians.

AEOLIS and Ionia were the territories of the Grecian colonies in Aſia. They occupied a conſiderable part of the eaſtern coaſt of the Archipelago, and extended, according to Strabo †, from the river Caicus, to the river Meander. The Hermus traced the boundary between them. Æolis began to be ſettled about 100 years after the Trojan war, upon the return of the Heraclidae, who probably gave occaſion to the emigration. All the Æolian colonies came originally from Peloponneſus, though they preſerved little intercourſe with that part of Greece, and were finally ſubjected to Athens. They poſſeſſed, according to Herodotus ‡, eleven cities on the continent §, and ſeven in the adjacent iſlands ‖.

The

* Ibid. † Lib. 13. ‡ Lib. 1. cap. 149. § Their names were, Cyme, Lariſcae, Novus Murus, Tenus, Cilla, Notium, Ægireſſa, Pitana, Ægaeae, Myrina, Grynia. ‖ Five in the iſland of Leſbos, one in Tenedos, and one in Centum.

The colonies of Ionia were planted by Androclus *, the ſon of the laſt King of Athens, who relinquiſhed his native country on the revolution which, at his father's death, baniſhed him from the throne, and eſtabliſhed democracy. He, with his followers, built twelve cities † in Ionia, and the iſlands adjacent.

Both the Æolians and Ionians flouriſhed exceedingly. The former poſſeſſed a better ſoil, but the latter a preferable climate. Their ſituation led them to navigation, and they made conſiderable progreſs in that art, before it was underſtood in Greece. Learning, alſo, which always precedes refinement in arts, abounded in Ionia, and the city of Miletus produced ſome of the moſt celebrated philoſophers of antiquity ‡, while Samos gave birth and education to Pythagoras. The Ionian, and probably the Æolian cities, were all independent, and had no political connection with one another, unleſs when they aſſociated for mutual defence ‖.

After Cyrus King of Perſia had conquered Lydia §, he attacked the Aſiatic colonies; and on this occaſion they made their firſt application to Greece for protection. The Æolians and Ionians, without addreſſing their reſpective parent ſtates, joined unanimouſly in an earneſt petition to Sparta, then the leading commonwealth of

* Strab. lib. 14. † Miletus, Myus, Priene, Epheſus, Lebedus, Colophon, Teos, Claſomene, Phocaea, Samos, Chius, Erythrae. Herod. lib. 1. cap. 142.

‡ Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes. ‖ Herod. lib. 1. cap. 170.

§ 58th Olympiad, Sigonius de temporibus Athaenarum.

Greece, for aid againſt their enemies. The Lacedaemonians heard their ſolicitations, but did not grant their requeſts. All they did was, to ſend an imperious meſſage to Cyrus, commanding him to deſiſt from hoſtilities againſt the Greeks, which the latter, as might have been expected, treated with contempt *. The colonies were compelled to ſubmit to Perſia.

They remained under the dominion of Perſia till the invaſion of Xerxes †, when they were ſet at liberty by the deciſive battles of Plataea and Micale, in which, on the ſame day ‡, the Perſian forces in Greece and the Leſſer Aſia were entirely routed. The Ionians, notwithſtanding theſe victories, deſpaired of being able to retain long their liberty againſt the power of Perſia. It was therefore propoſed by the Lacedaemonians, and aſſented to by the Peloponneſians, that they ſhould be tranſported from Aſia altogether; that the republics of Greece, who had joined the invaſion, ſhould be expelled from their habitations, and that the Ionians ſhould be allowed to poſſeſs them. The Athenians diſcovered, on this occaſion, ſome ſymptoms of that authority which afterwards they extended much farther. They rejected the propoſal, as tending to deprive them of their colonies, and complained that the Peloponneſians ſhould attempt to interfere in the affairs of Athens §. They not only perſuaded the Ionians to remain in Aſia, but prevailed with

* Herod. lib. 1. cap. 153.

† 75th Olympiad, Sigonius de temporibus.

‡ Herod. lib. 9. cap. 87.

§ Herod. lib. 9. cap. 105. Diod. lib. 2. c. 37.

with them, notwithſtanding their fears of the power of Perſia, to enter into a treaty, ratified by ſolemn oaths, in which a promiſe was given of perpetual attachment to the Athenians.

The good conduct and ability of the Athenian commanders, Themiſtocles and Ariſtides, added to the zeal the people of Athens had exhibited, in the courſe of the Perſian war, recommended them highly to all the ſtates of the alliance. The Athenians *, therefore, now claimed openly the precedency in the affairs of Greece, and their pretenſions were received with more partiality and favour, on account of the treachery and unworthy behaviour of Pauſanias †, the Spartan general, who had condeſcended to accept money ‡ from Artabaſus the Perſian commander, as a reward for betraying the intereſts of his country. Ariſtides ſeized this favourable opportunity, to propoſe a general tax, for the purpoſes of common defence againſt the future attacks of Perſia; and to make the meaſure more acceptable, it was added, that the money ſhould be depoſited in the iſland of Delos, the moſt ſafe and ſacred place in the dominions of Greece. The overture was univerſally approved, and, in compliment to the integrity and ability of Ariſtides, he was appointed, not only to determine the aſſeſſment, but to fix the contingents which ſhould be paid by the ſeveral ſtates. He named 460 talents ‖ as the ſum, and rated ſo diſcreetly the different allies, as to merit ever after the appellation of *Juſt* §.

This

* Nep. Ariſt. † Thucyd. lib. 1. cap. 96. ‡ Diod. lib. 1. cap. 44. Nep. Pauſanias.
‖ Thucyd. lib. 1. cap. 96. § Æſchinis orat. de falſa legatione.

This meaſure laid the foundation of the grandeur of Athens; ſo that, from the Perſian invaſion, to the Peloponneſian war, that republic ſhown with a luſtre unrivalled in the hiſtory of Greece, and acquired ſuch eminence in arms, arts, and learning, as has rendered her the admiration of mankind. Beſide the illuſtrious men already mentioned, there flouriſhed about this time Phidias the ſtatuary *, Socrates, Plato, Herodotus, and the orators Pericles and Iſocrates. The ſeaſon for the appearance of her greateſt orator was not yet arrived. That was reſerved till a time of greater public danger, which alone could prompt the eloquence of Demoſthenes.

In extending her influence among her allies, Athens proceeded with much addreſs. She admitted them, with the moſt flattering condeſcenſion, to a participation of her councils. She prevailed with them to advance her countrymen to the command of the combined fleet and army. She rendered the meaſures of the Spartans ſo unpopular, that they became tired of the war, and left the army with their allies †. In the mean time, ſhe transferred the treaſury from Delos to Athens ‡, and augmented the tribute to 600 talents §. She

* Diodor. lib. 12. cap. 1.

† The Spartan allies ſeem not to have rejoined the army againſt Perſia, after they left it with Leotychides on the victory of Mycalé. Pauſanias had only twenty ſhips in the expedition againſt Cyprus, ſo that very few of the Spartans or their allies could be preſent. The tax, therefore, impoſed by Ariſtides muſt have affected only the allies of Athens.

‡ Diod. lib. 12. c. 54. Sigonius de rep. Ath. lib. 4. c. 3.

§ Thucyd. lib. 2. c. 13.

She gradually converted the ſervice of the allies into money, and, on their delaying or refuſing to advance the ſtipulated converſion, ſhe compelled them by force, and reduced them from the condition of allies to that of ſubjects *. She fortified her capital, and the ports of Phalerus and Piraceus, notwithſtanding the remonſtrances of the Lacedaemonians, who dreaded the growing power of the Athenians, though they pretended to be afraid only of the bad uſe which, on ſome future occaſion, the King of Perſia might make of theſe works to enſlave Greece †.

The Athenians ſuddenly acquired the ſovereignty of almoſt all the iſlands of the Archipelago, and of the whole of the eaſtern coaſt of that ſea. The Ionian colonies became their zealous friends, and the Æolians their ſubjects. Both followed their ſtandard in war, and advanced contributions for the public expence ‡. The Ionians preſerved their allegiance till the power of Athens was unable to protect them, if we except the rebellion § of the iſland of Samos, the principal colony of Ionia, which happened in the 84th Olympiad, a few years before the commencement of the Peloponneſian war. A ſhort account of this event will explain the manner in which the Greeks treated their colonies on ſuch occaſions.

Some miſunderſtanding took place between the Samians and their neighbours the Mileſians, which finally terminated in a war. Both

* Thucyd. lib. 1. cap. 99. † Ibid. lib. 1. cap. 90. ‡ Ibid. lib. 2. cap. 9. lib. 7. cap. 57. § Diod. lib. 12. cap. 27.

parties appealed to Athens; but the former, ſuſpecting that the Athenians leaned to the ſide of their enemies, rejected their arbitration, and applied to the Perſians for aid. Pericles was diſpatched with a fleet of forty gallies, to reduce the Samians to ſubjection, which he ſpeedily effected. He changed their government from ariſtocracy to democracy; he impoſed on them a fine of 80 * talents, to reimburſe the expences of his expedition; he demanded fifty hoſtages as ſecurity for the payment of the fine, and for their good behaviour for the future; and having entruſted theſe hoſtages to the cuſtody of the Lemnians, he ſet ſail for Athens.

Pericles had ſcarcely left Samos when this revolution cauſed prodigious commotions. The friends of the ariſtocracy would not ſubmit to the new government, and again ſupplicated the Perſians for protection. Piſſuthes, who preſided in the Leſſer Aſia, ſent them a detachment of 700 men, expecting by it to obtain the dominion of the iſland. Theſe ſupplies approached Samos in the night, got eaſy acceſs into the city, re-eſtabliſhed the ariſtocracy, and baniſhed the friends of Athens. Pericles undertook, a ſecond time, to quaſh this revolt. He was accompanied with ſixty gallies, with which he attacked and defeated ſeventy ſhips of the enemy; and being reinforced by twenty-four triremes from Chios and Mitelene, he laid ſiege to Samos itſelf. In a few days, however, he was obliged to quit the ſiege with a part of his forces, to oppoſe a fleet of Phoenicians which had been detached by the Perſians to the aſſiſtance of the Samians. The latter ſeized this favourable opportunity of making a ſally

* L. 16,700.

ſally on the Athenians, and defeated them. Pericles, however, ſoon returned, and brought with him ſuch a reinforcement of ſhips from the adjacent colonies, as gave him a manifeſt ſuperiority over the fleet of the rebels. He provided alſo, by means of a Spartan engineer, the famous beſieging machines of antiquity, the *aries* and the *teſtudo*, which were, for the firſt time, employed on this occaſion. He beat down the walls, intercepted the ſupplies of the city, and finally reduced it to ſubmiſſion. He puniſhed, on the ſpot, the authors of the rebellion with death; exacted a fine of 200 talents * to replace the expence of the war, ſtripped the Samians of all their ſhips, demoliſhed their walls, and reſtored the democracy.

In the courſe of the Peloponneſian war, the Ionians and Æolians acted as faithful friends of Athens, by contributing money, and furniſhing troops. They are mentioned by Thucydides as tributaries and ſubjects of that ſtate at the commencement † of the war. They are mentioned again, under the ſame character, in the ſeventeenth ‡ year of it, when the Athenians invaded Sicily.

The Leſbians, an Æolian colony, were the only exception. They revolted from the Athenians in the fifth year of the war, and joined the Lacedaemonians §. In the ſpeech ‖ recorded by Thucydides, as made by their ambaſſadors to Sparta and her allies, in order to induce

* L. 38,750. † Lib. 2. cap. 9. ‡ Lib. 7. cap. 57. § Thucyd. lib. 3. cap. 2.
‖ Ibid. lib. 3. cap. 9.

induce them to aid and protect their country, they ſpecify not any inſtances of cruelty and oppreſſion practiſed by the Athenians, as reaſons of their rebellion. All their arguments were derived from their ſuſpicions and their fears. They maintained, that the Athenians, though once the moſt gallant and generous nation, the patrons of liberty, and friends of mankind, had of late degenerated greatly from principles ſo laudable in themſelves, and on account of which they had afforded them their warmeſt ſupport; that that ſtate had adopted a tyrannical and ruinous ſyſtem of adminiſtration; that they ſought for pretences to enſlave their allies and colonies, inſtead of defending the liberties of Grecce againſt the common enemy; that they had already executed in part their plan of deſpotiſm, and waited only for a favourable opportunity to render it complete; and that it was in vain to expect reformation, or to with-hold reſiſtance till ſome flagrant act of injuſtice or tyranny ſhould be committed againſt themſelves; prudence demanded that they ſhould arm and oppoſe, before the evil became incurable.

The moſt inattentive reader cannot overlook the coincidence of ſentiments adopted by the Leſbians with thoſe lately maintained by the Americans. It is the praiſe of modern times, it is the felicity of theſe colonies, that the moderation and humanity of a Britiſh parliament will not permit them to puniſh ſimilar crimes in a ſimilar manner with the republic of Athens.

The advantages of this rebellion were too momentous to the Lacedaemonians, not to be heartily and readily embraced. They promiſed

ſed *, therefore their protection, and ordered the aſſiſtance required. The Athenians, however, anticipated them. They diſpatched Clinippides with 40 gallies, and commanded him to obtain reinforcements from the Aſiatic allies and colonies. This armament reached Leſbos before the Peloponneſian ſuccours arrived. The Leſbians were defeated at ſea, their capital Mitylené was beſieged and taken, and the iſland reduced to ſubjection, notwithſtanding the Spartans both ſent a fleet to their aid, and made a diverſion in their favour, by an invaſion of Attica.

The Athenians were provoked beyond meaſure by this unnatural and ungrateful rebellion. In the firſt tranſports of their reſentment, they paſſed the moſt cruel and bloody vote, that all the males of Leſbos, arrived at the age of puberty, ſhould be put to death, and the women and children ſold for ſlaves; and they ſent the ſame day a ſhip with commiſſioners to ſee the decree put in execution.

When their paſſions ſubſided, they began to reflect on what they had done. A meeting of the citizens was therefore convened next day. The former ſentence was reviewed, and, after much contention, it was carried, by a ſmall majority, to make ſome mitigation †. A ſhip was inſtantly diſpatched, to prevent the execution of the former order. The deputies of Leſbos, who had come to plead their cauſe at Athens, returned on board this laſt veſſel. They procured changes of rowers, that one party might ſleep

* Diod. lib. 12. cap. 55. † Thucyd. lib. 3. cap. 49.

while the other was employed. They offered them the moſt palatable proviſions, and promiſed them the higheſt rewards, to procure their moſt vigorous exertions. The former ſhip had departed full twenty-four hours before them, and they could not overtake her in her courſe. They arrived, however, before the Athenian commander had finiſhed the reading of the firſt order. The Leſbians were immediately aſſembled, and informed both of their danger and their ſafety. Even the laſt and mitigated ſentence was abundantly ſevere, that the chief abettors of the rebellion, amounting to 1000 men, who had been formerly tranſmitted to Athens, ſhould be put to death; that the lands of all the Leſbians, except the Methymnaei, who had retained their loyalty, ſhould be divided into 3000 ſhares, of which one tenth ſhould be conſecrated to the Gods, and the remainder divided by lot among coloniſts from Athens; and that the government of the iſland ſhould remain for the future in the hands of the Athenians *. The Leſbians were compelled, by neceſſity, to rent their own lands from the Athenians to whom they fell, at the rate of two minae †, for each ſhare.

Towards the end of the Peloponneſian war, the Ionians and Æolians were compelled to relinquiſh their attachment to Athens, and to ſubmit themſelves, partly to the Perſians, and partly to the Lacedaemonians, who had combined together to humble the Athenians. Sparta, afterwards, broke with Perſia, on the defeat of Cyrus,

* Thucyd. lib. 3. cap. 50. † A mina was equal to L. 3 : 4 : 7.

Cyrus, whoſe pretenſions the former had ſupported with all her influence, and ſent Ageſilaus into Aſia, to protect the Graecian ſtates in that country. He, however, was ſoon obliged to return home, to defend his country againſt a combination of almoſt all the republics of Greece, who could no longer ſuffer the inſolence and rapacity of the Lacedaemonians. The latter, in revenge, by the ignominious peace of Antalcidas, ceded for ever the Greek colonies in Aſia to Artaxerxes.

SECT. V.

Colony of Corcyra—Conteſt between the Corcyraeans and Corinthians, about the ſupremacy of the colony of Epidamnus—The determination of the Athenians on that ſubject.

THE other principal colonies of Greece were ſettled in Corcyra, an iſland of the Ionian ſea, at Amphipolis, on the coaſt of Thrace and Potidaea, on the eaſtern border of Macedonia.

Corcyra was inhabited by a colony of Corinthians, who ſeem to have been planted very early, though neither the time nor the occaſion are mentioned by ancient hiſtorians. They acquired conſiderable riches and power, by aſſiduous application to trade and navigation, and preceded, in improvements of this kind, all the ſtates of Greece, except Athens. They contemned the Corinthians, from whom

whom they deſcended, becauſe the latter were not ſo opulent as themſelves, and refuſed to allow them the uſual marks of reſpect offered by colonies to the mother-country, namely, to ſend annually certain ſacrifices of firſt fruits to the Gods * of the Metropolis †, to grant its inhabitants precedency at the Olympic games, and on all other public occaſions ‡; to employ one of its prieſts to preſide at ſacrifices, to inſpect the intrails of victims, and to interprete omens §. Theſe animoſities finally produced a war between the Corinthians and Corcyraeans; the cauſes and ſome of the tranſactions of which it is neceſſary briefly to narrate, becauſe they explain the principles of colonization, which, hitherto ‖, had generally prevailed in Greece.

The ſource of the rupture was a diſpute concerning the ſupremacy of a colony ſettled at Epidamnus, known afterwards by the name of Dyrrachium. The coloniſts conſiſted chiefly of Corcyreans, tho' they were joined with ſome emigrants from Corinth, and were conducted, by one Phialus, a native of that city ¶. Some commotions aroſe among the Epidamnii, which they could not adjuſt without foreign aid. They applied firſt to Corcyra; but their ſupplications were treated with neglect. They conſulted the oracle, concerning the meaſures they ſhould next adopt, and were

* Polybii Excerpta, 114. Diod. lib. 12. c. 30. † The name the Greeks gave to the mother-country. ‡ Scholiaſt on Thucydides, lib. 1. c. 25. § Thucyd. ibid. ‖ 85th Olympiad, ſome years before the Peloponneſian war. ¶ Diod. lib. 12. c. 3. Thucyd. lib, 1. c. 24.

were adviſed to ſolicit the aſſiſtance of Corinth. The Corinthians heard their requeſts with favour, took them into their protection, and promiſed the aid required. They were induced to act this part, from reſentment of the ingratitude and undutiful behaviour of the Corcyraeans, and from the claim they poſſeſſed to the ſuperiority and direction of the colony.

The troops of Corinth had ſcarcely reached Epidamnus before it was vigorouſly attacked by the Corcyraeans, who were highly incenſed, both by the application to the Corinthians, and by the interference of that ſtate. The city being cloſely beſieged, and reduced to great diſtreſs, the Corinthians were again ſupplicated for aid, who projected a new colony for the relief of the place. They iſſued a proclamation, that all perſons who would emigrate to Epidamnus ſhould be intitled to the ſame rights and immunities which they enjoyed while citizens of Corinth; to which they added a remarkable alternative, that, whoever wiſhed to ſhare the advantages of the coloniſts, and chooſed notwithſtanding to remain at home, might obtain that privilege on payment of 50 drachmas * to the ſtate. By rights and immunities it was meant, that the coloniſts were to enjoy the ſame laws, religion, and government, which were eſtabliſhed at Corinth †, at leaſt, that the Corinthians had no intention to deprive them of any of theſe privileges; for it does not appear they were able to ſecure to them the poſſeſſion of what they promiſed. The converſion of the advantages of the coloniſts, for the

* A drachma was worth 7½ d.

† Scholiaſt on Thucyd. lib. 1. cap. 27.

ſmall ſum of 50 drachmas, is a farther proof of the low eſtimation in which theſe were conſidered, both by the Corinthians and the coloniſts, and ſeems to have been an expedient calculated to raiſe money from the more opulent citizens, in order to defray the conveyance of the emigrants, many of whom very probably were unable to tranſport themſelves. Many people joined the colony, and many advanced the money *.

The Corcyraeans were informed of theſe operations at Corinth, and immediately ſent ambaſſadors thither to complain. They repreſented, that Epidamnus did not belong to the Corinthians, but to them; if any doubt remained on this head, they were willing to refer the deciſion to the oracle of Delphi, or to any neutral ſtate of Peloponneſus; and, if theſe overtures ſhould not ſatisfy, they would be obliged to ſolicit the protection of the Athenians, a meaſure which would be agreeable to neither of the parties.

The Corinthians would liſten to no propoſals of accommodation, unleſs the troops of the Corcyraeans were withdrawn from Epidamnus. After ſome intermediate operations, therefore, which by no means contributed to reſtore peace, the latter applied to Athens, and the former diſpatched ambaſſadors to the ſame place, to counteract their negotiations. Every matter of ſtate was debated before the Athenian people, and the ſeveral deputies appeared at their tribunal, to ſupport the claims of their reſpective countries. Thucydides † has preſerved the ſpeeches, or at leaſt the ſubſtance of the

* Thucyd. ibid.

† Lib. 1. cap. 32.

the ſpeeches, which were delivered on this occaſion, and what they contain concerning colonization merits attention.

The Corcyraeans maintained, that their being coloniſts of Corinth was no good reaſon why they ſhould not obtain the aſſiſtance they aſked; that every colony, indeed, ought to honour and reſpect its metropolis, as long as it was treated with kindneſs and reſpect; but that, ſhould the latter adopt a contrary conduct, and, inſtead of cheriſhing, proceed to injure and affront the former, it might withdraw its attachment, and even revolt; that coloniſts were not tranſplanted to diſtant countries to be made ſlaves, but were entitled to retain all the privileges they poſſeſſed in their native country; and that the Corinthians had committed great injuſtice, becauſe they had refuſed the moſt reaſonable terms of accommodation, namely, to terminate the controverſy in an amicable manner by arbitration.

The Corinthians replied, That the pretence of injuſtice, as a reaſon of revolt, was ill founded; for the Corcyraeans had renounced their allegiance long before the preſent diſpute; that, as injury and oppreſſion were unreaſonable and cruel, on the part of the mother-country towards the colony, they were, at leaſt, equally reprehenſible on the part of the latter towards the former; that as the colony was not ſent to Corcyra to be made ſlaves, ſo, neither was it planted there that it might inſult and affront the metropolis; that the Corcyraeans complained without cauſe, was evident from the good correſpondence which ſubſiſted between Corinth and her

her other colonies, the Leucadians and the Ambraciotae, by whom ſhe was treated with much reſpect and attachment; that all ſhe ever aſked of any of her colonies was, the common and decent marks of reſpect, and to join her as allies in war; that ſhe had never demanded more from the Corcyraeans, although they had rebelled againſt her; that, even ſuppoſing ſhe had treated them with ſome degree of aſperity, it did not become them to reſent that uſage; that they would have acted better the part of dutiful children, had they yielded a little to the frowardneſs or peeviſhneſs of the parent; that ſuch conduct, on their part, would have gained the approbation of all Greece, while the injuſtice and ſeverity of the parent ſtate would have expoſed her behaviour to univerſal cenſure; that, with whatever colouring they might cover their actions, the true cauſe of former inſolence and preſent hoſtility aroſe from a ſpirit of independence and tumult, inſpired by the acquiſition of wealth.

From the arguments and concluſions adopted and drawn by the parties in this diſpute, it appears, that the reſpective rights and privileges, both of the metropolis and the colony among the Greeks, were ſtill extremely undetermined. Nothing can be more equivocal, on the one hand, than the general principles, that coloniſts ought to be treated with kindneſs and favour by the mother-country; that the former were not conveyed to diſtant countries, in order to be made ſlaves, or to be ſubjected to the peeviſhneſs or oppreſſion of the latter; and that, if they thought themſelves expoſed to ſuch treatment, they might renounce their allegiance, claim independence, and apply to any foreign commonwealth for aid.

No leſs vague and unſatisfactory are the maxims employed on the other ſide; that the colony owed all marks of honour and reſpect to the mother-country, and ought not, inſtead of theſe, to offer her injury and inſult; that the relation between the former and the latter reſembled that between a parent and a child; and that all the duties of attention, honour, ſubmiſſion, and aſſiſtance, were included in this relation.

When ſuch principles were appealed to in a political controverſy, it was obvious, that the occaſion of it had not frequently exiſted, and that the deciſion could not be momentous. Had the connection between the mother-country and the colony involved matter not of mere ceremony, but important civil rights and privileges, the diſcuſſion muſt have excited the attention of ſociety, the principles of deciſion would have been generally known, and the arguments might have been expected to be more ſatisfactory and concluſive. Even the clauſe apparently moſt preciſe and definitive, that the coloniſts ſhould, in time of war, muſter themſelves under the ſtandard of the mother-country, and act as her friends, is expreſſed in terms ſo general and ambiguous, and might be ſo extended or reſtricted, according to the views and neceſſities of the parties, that it is difficult to decide whether it included any obligation on the part of the former to furniſh aſſiſtance to the latter. Accordingly, we find that the Athenians determined this cauſe againſt the Corinthians, accepted the alliance of the Corcyreaeans, and ſent them protection. They judged it their intereſt to be connected with a people ſo powerful at ſea, although their conduct might be dangerous

to themſelves, by affording a precedent of impunity to their own colonies, in caſes of rebellion. It is obvious, that the parent ſtates urged the principles of attachment, reſpect, and alliance, as reaſons of ſubmiſſion, becauſe they poſſeſſed no reſources to enforce thoſe of allegiance. The Athenians had lately acquired theſe reſources, had impoſed taxes on their colonies, and their behaviour, on this occaſion, in ſupporting a colony in rebellion againſt its metropolis, is a proof how much they undervalued the former principles. They ſucceeded, however, in their deſigns. The Corcyreaeans became zealous friends and allies of the Athenians, and aided them with money and ſhips during the courſe of the Peloponneſian war *. Their ſituation rendered them particularly ſerviceable in the war with Sicily. The Athenian fleets aſſembled at Corcyra, and having there provided naval ſtores, directed their courſe from that iſland by the ſhorteſt and ſafeſt paſſage to the ſhores of Italy. This was the only part of the voyage to Sicily which could not be performed by coaſting, and, ſhort as it is, it may be conſidered, perhaps, as one of the boldeſt efforts of antient navigation.

SECT.

* Thucyd. lib. 2. cap. 9. and lib. 7. cap. 57.

SECT. VI.

Thracian Colonies—Amphipolis—Potidaea—Review of the Colonization of Greece.

THRACE was the region in which the Greeks planted their laſt ſettlements. They had formerly extended their emigrations on every other ſide; this quarter only remained to be appropriated. Its northern ſituation, the inhoſpitable nature of the climate, and the country abounding with mountains and foreſts and wild beaſts, but particularly its warlike and ſavage inhabitants, long prevented the Greeks from attempting to take poſſeſſion of it. The Athenians, however, after the Perſian invaſion, and the great increaſe of their naval power, found themſelves in a condition to ſurmount every obſtacle, and, partly by colonies, and partly by conqueſt, procured the dominion of almoſt the whole coaſt of the Archipelago, from the river Strymon to the Dardanelles.

Amphipolis was the chief of theſe colonies, and, by its ſituation, formed a barrier to all the reſt. It ſtood between two branches of the Strymon, commanded a paſſage over it, and had moſt convenient and ready acceſs to the ſea, from which it was diſtant only three miles *. Ariſtagoras the Mileſian firſt undertook to plant here a colony of Aſiatic Greeks, whom he led from his native country,

* Thucyd. lib. 4. cap. 102.

country, to eſcape ſubjection to the Perſian yoke under Darius; but theſe ſettlers were ſoon expelled by the Edoni, a tribe of the Thracians. The Athenians, thirty-two years * afterwards, tranſported to Amphipolis 10,000 coloniſts†, who retained poſſeſſion of the place for ſome time; but, endeavouring to extend their territories, and to acquire more lands, they gave great offence to the Thracians, who attacked them at a place called Drabeſcus, and totally extirpated them. The Athenians repeated the attempt to effectuate a ſettlement in this important ſtation, twenty-nine years afterwards, under Agnon the ſon of Nicias, and ſucceeded.

This colony remained under the juriſdiction of Athens till it was ſet at liberty in the Peloponneſian war, by Braſidas the Lacedaemonian, who had marched an army through Theſſaly to attack the Athenian dominions on the coaſt of Thrace. Braſidas got poſſeſſion of the place partly by ſurpriſe, and partly by treachery; but he had not force ſufficient to retain his conqueſts. He made, therefore, a merit of neceſſity, and pretended he had undertaken this expedition to aſſert the liberties of the Greeks in that country againſt the tyranny of Athens. The people of Amphipolis, on the appearance of Braſidas, ſent intelligence to Thucydides the hiſtorian, who had the command of an Athenian armament at Thaſus, half a day's ſail from their city. But, though Thucydides made all poſſible haſte, he arrived not in time to ſave the place. He reached only the mouth of the Strymon in the evening of the day on which Amphipolis had capitulated.

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* 79th Olympiad. † Thucyd. lib. 4. cap. 102. Diod. lib. 11. cap. 70.

The loſs * of this ſettlement was a ſevere blow to the Athenians, partly on account of the materials for ſhip-building with which it ſupplied them, and partly becauſe it opened a communication to their other colonies in that country, but principally on account of the large *revenue* it returned, which probably was produced chiefly by the mines in its neighbourhood.

Potidaea was ſituated on the northern ſhore of the Sinus Thermaicus †, near the iſthmus of the peninſula of Pallene. It was firſt inhabited by a colony of Corinthians ‡; but neither the aera nor the occaſion of their ſettlement have been tranſmitted to modern times. We are certain, however, that this colony had been planted before the Perſian invaſion, becauſe it is mentioned by Herodotus § in the hiſtory of that event. Xerxes, after paſſing the Helleſpont, marched his army in three great diviſions. One of them followed a route leading through the middle of Thrace, Macedonia, and Theſſaly; the ſecond moving along the ſhores of the Archipelago, kept always in view the Perſian fleet, which proceeded at an equal rate by ſea; the third purſued a courſe lying between the other two, at nearly an equal diſtance from both, in order to preſerve an eaſy communication with the fleet, and the army ‖. The ſecond of theſe great bodies received the ſubmiſſions and contributions of all the cities on the coaſt through which it travelled, and, among others, thoſe of Potidaea. This colony furniſhed Xerxes with a recruit, both of ſhips and ſoldiers, and remained in ſubjection to that monarch till he retired

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* Thucyd. lib. 4. cap. 108. † Gulph of Salonichi. ‡ Thucyd. lib. 1. cap. 56.
§ Lib. 8. cap. 125. ‖ Herod. ibid.

red into Aſia, after the battle of Marathon. Having rebelled, on that occaſion, in conjunction with ſeveral others of the adjacent cities, Potidaea was beſieged by Artabanus, with the view of reducing it to ſubjection. This General remained before it three months; but found all his efforts ineffectual. He then attempted to prevail by treachery, and, for that end, held a correſpondence with one Timoxenus, a man of rank and influence in the place. He conveyed his diſpatches into the city, cloſely wrapped about the ſhaft of an arrow, and received his anſwers in the ſame manner. The arrow, however unfortunately for him, was obſerved, and the treachery detected and defeated. Artabanus was finally compelled to raiſe the ſiege, by an extraordinary high tide which overflowing the plain where his army was encamped, deſtroyed a great number of his troops. He retired toward the main army of the Perſians, which was cantoned in Theſſaly and Macedonia, under the command of Mardonius, and which, a few months afterwards, was driven out of Geeece.

After the retreat of the Perſians, the coloniſts of Potidaea ſeem to have joined the alliance of the Athenians, and to have ſubjected themſelves to the payment of a ſhare of the annual tax demanded by that republic from all its allies. It is at leaſt certain *, they had become tributaries of that ſtate, before the beginning of the Peloponneſian war. The conduct of the Athenians, in the affair of Epidamnus, and the aſſiſtance and protection which, on that occaſion,

* Thucyd. lib. i. c. 56.

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ſion, they afforded to the Corcyraeans, had given much offence to the Corinthians. The former, therefore, conſcious of having incurred the reſentment of the latter, were anxious to guard themſelves againſt its effects. They were particularly apprehenſive, that the Corinthians might employ their natural influence with their colony of Potidaea, to make it renounce allegiance to Athens; and to prevent the conſequences of a negotiation, which they doubted not would be attempted, they ordered the walls of that city to be demoliſhed, and hoſtages to be given for the future fidelity of the place. Againſt this extraordinary and ſevere exertion of authority, the coloniſts ſent ambaſſadors to Athens to remonſtrate, and to Sparta to implore aid. The latter promiſed protection, if neceſſary; but the former would conſent to no mitigation of its decree. Potidaea, therefore, immediately revolted from Athens, and threw herſelf into the arms of Corinth and Lacedaemon.

The Athenians were extremely eager to recover the ſovereignty of this ſettlement, and the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, to maintain its independence. The former ſent a powerful fleet and army to reduce it to obedience, and the latter furniſhed ſupplies for its defence. The true cauſe, however, of the conduct of Corinth and Sparta proceeded not from pure zeal to protect the liberties of the coloniſts. Theſe they had patiently beheld for many years, equally infringed and invaded. It originated, chiefly, from that jealouſy of the power of the Athenians, which ſoon produced the Peloponneſian war. An anxiety, on the other hand, to

preſerve

preſerve that power, which had begun to create uneaſineſs, generated the decree which commanded the demolition of the walls, and which was thought abſolutely neceſſary to counteract the deſigns of the enemies of Athens *.

One of the moſt famous ſieges, recorded by ancient hiſtory, is that of Potidaea. It continued for ſeveral years, and the garriſon were reduced to the utmoſt diſtreſs, before they would ſurrender. They, at laſt, capitulated on the following honourable terms: That the inhabitants and ſoldiers ſhould have permiſſion to leave the place with their wives and children, and to retire whither they pleaſed; and that every man ſhould be allowed to carry with him one ſuit of apparel, and every woman two. The Athenian commanders were diſpoſed to grant theſe demands, becauſe they were tired of a ſiege which had continued ſo long, which had coſt their country ſo many men, and the enormous expence of 2,000† talents, and becauſe the winter approached, which, in a cold climate, was of the worſt conſequence to their troops ‡. As ſoon as the city was evacuated, it was repleniſhed with a new colony from Athens.

Seven years afterwards, in the ninth § year of the Peloponneſian war, Potidaea was attempted to be taken by ſurpriſe, in the expedition conducted by Braſidas ‖ againſt the Thracian ſettlements of Athens. That general approached the place in the night, and had reached the walls before he was diſcovered. He poſſeſſed not, however, force ſufficient to inveſt the town; and, on

* Thucyd. lib. 1. c. 66. † L. 387, 600. ‡ Thcyd. lib. 2. c. 70.
§ Thcyd. lib, 4. c. 135. ‖ Page 68.

on finding his firſt deſign had miſcarried, he made no farther attempts, but retired with his troops.

The colony remained under the dominion of Athens, till the days of Philip * king of Macedon, and father of Alexander the Great. That enterpriſing Prince had begun to improve the diſcipline of the Macedonian troops, to increaſe greatly the finances of his kingdom by his ſucceſsful attention to the mines of Thrace, and to extend gradually the limits of his territories. Among other incroachments toward the eaſt, which gave occaſion to ſome of the moſt brilliant orations of Demoſthenes, he attacked and conquered the ſettlement of Potidaea †, many of the coloniſts of which he commanded to withdraw to Athens.

From the facts which have been advanced, and the principles which have been explained, it is preſumed that the following ſyſtem, with regard to the colonization of Greece, will be readily adopted by the reader. All the republics of that country were extremely circumſcribed in point of territory, and contained but few inhabitants, partly on account of the narrowneſs of their dominions, but principally on account of the general ignorance of agriculture and manufactures which prevailed among them. When their wars, therefore, which they had almoſt continually among themſelves, did not conſume their ſupernumerary people, the only

* 105th Olympiad. † Diod. lib. 16. cap. 8,

method by which they could diſcharge a burden they were unable to ſupport, was to ſend them out in colonies to diſtant regions, where their ſtrength might defend, and their induſtry ſupport themſelves. The mother-country was glad to exonerate herſelf, for her own peace and ſafety; and ſhe expected no benefit from her coloniſts, becauſe ſhe poſſeſſed no reſources to protect them, or to ſecure any advantages to be derived from them. The only principle, conſequently, of connection which did exiſt, indeed the only one which could exiſt, between the parent ſtate and the colony, was that of affection. This principle prevailed in Greece till the time of the Perſian invaſion. About that æra, both the Athenians and Spartans began to extend their ambition beyond the narrow limits of their domeſtic territories, and thought of reducing, in part at leaſt, their allies and colonies under their juriſdiction. Hence aroſe an important innovation in the political ſyſtem of Greece. Great fleets and armies required a treaſury, and that treaſury could only be ſupplied by taxes. The Athenians ſeized the moſt favourable juncture in the hiſtory of their country for raiſing a revenue; and they ſucceeded to their utmoſt wiſh. From the defeat of Xerxes, to the beginning of the Peloponneſian war, a period of fifty years, they impoſed taxes on their allies, but particularly in their colonies, without oppoſition, and almoſt without complaint. In the courſe of that war, which laſted near thirty years, they loſt many of their allies and colonies; but they ſtill continued to tax thoſe that remained. They retained this practice till the end of the ſocial war, nearly as long as they poſſeſſed a ſingle foreign ſettlement. For a period,

period, therefore, of 120 years, namely, from the beginning of the 76th Olympiad, when the Perſians were driven out of Greece, to the commencement of the 106th Olympiad, when the allies were declared independent at the end of the ſocial war, Athens continued to impoſe taxes on her colonies.

The Spartans were the only other ſtate whoſe reſources enabled them to exerciſe taxation. All the remaining republics, except Thebes, during the ſhort period of the life of the illuſtrious Epaminondas, neither ſought nor expected more influence among their neighbours, than to preſerve the ſmall domeſtic territories they poſſeſſed, and to ſhelter themſelves, with regard to the general ſyſtem, under the alliance of Athens or Sparta*. The conſtitution of the latter prohibited all taxation. Even the domeſtic expences of her government were ſupplied by private contribution, and her ſoldiers ſerved without pay. But, when the Lacedaemonians, in the courſe of the Peloponneſian war, collected great fleets and armies, and undertook expeditions into Sicily and Aſia, and when afterwards, under Ageſilaus, they puſhed their conqueſts in Aſia, and projected the acquiſition

* It is a wild fancy of ſome politicians, who conceive, that the balance of power is a ſecret of policy known only to the modern ſtates of Europe. This ſecret was known and practiſed by the Greek republics, and their endeavours to ſupport it were one great cauſe of the frequent wars and revolutions with which the hiſtory of that people abounds. It even influences and directs the operations of the ſavage tribes of America. It ſeems to be a dictate of nature, and is indeed ſo obvious, as ſcarcely to eſcape the obſervation of any body of men endowed with diſcernment ſufficient to conſtitute a political ſociety.

acquiſition of the ſovereignty of Greece, money became abſolutely neceſſary to carry on ſuch extenſive operations. How did they raiſe this money? Not by regular taxes, indeed, but by means equivalent as to the effect, though much more diſagreeable and deſtructive as to the manner; by heavy contributions demanded of their allies and colonies, by depredations, and ignominious contracts. This practice they continued above ſixty years, from the beginning of the Peloponneſian war, to the battle of Mantinaea, when the dominion of Sparta was almoſt annihilated by Epaminondas. In a word, *the hiſtory of Greece affords no inſtance of any ſtate which had power to levy contributions or taxes from its colonies, and did not put that power in execution.*

Neither was the conduct of Athens and Sparta in this reſpect the cauſe of thoſe powerful combinations againſt them, which finally accompliſhed their humiliation. Had they contented themſelves with levying a reaſonable tribute from their colonies, for the protection they afforded them, or had they ſatisfied themſelves with demanding money from their allies in time of war, to extinguiſh the expences incurred for common defence, it is improbable they ſhould have alarmed the jealouſy of their neighbours, or that they ſhould have been challenged in the exerciſe of ſuch rights. But theſe republics, in extending their dominion, knew no moderation. Their elevation above the level of their ſiſter ſtates inſpired the moſt unbounded ambition, and both of them, by turns, manifeſtly graſped at the ſovereignty of Greece. The Spartans firſt confederated

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the other commonwealths, and conducted their operations againſt the Athenians. The former pulled down the latter only to purſue the ſame aſpiring courſe themſelves. Epaminondas retaliated on the Lacedaemonians the game they had played againſt the Athenians; and the Macedonians ſoon after laid for ever low the laurels of Greece.

CHAP. III.

OF THE ROMANS

SECT. I.

Progreſs of the Roman Arms—Policy of that People relative to conquered States—Their Municipia—Socii—Praefecturae—Colonies—Reaſons of Colonization.

WHEN Romulus laid the foundation of that immenſe fabric, the Roman empire, his reſources were unpromiſing, and external circumſtances unfavourable. The Romans were a ſmall colony of adventurers, who emigrated from Alba, the capital of the Latins, to ſettle near the borders of their territories on the banks of the Tyber. They firſt attempted to build ſomething like a city; but, as they had few inhabitants to poſſeſs it, they were obliged to open a profeſſed aſylum for all the banditti of the neighbourhood, and to procure women for them by ſtratagem, which they could not obtain on more honourable terms *.

Italy

* Liv. lib. 1. cap. 9.

Italy was then inhabited by a great number of ſmall independent ſtates, jealous of one another, and conſiderably advanced in the art of war, from the frequent rencounters which they had among themſelves. The Romans had conquered no fewer than ſix of theſe ſtates, before they had extended their territories twelve miles from their capital, and before the end of the firſt century from the building of their city *. From this period, to the expulſion of Tarquinius Superbus, and the extinction of the monarchy in the year of the city 245, they had acquired territory to the diſtance only of fifteen miles from Rome, though they had built Oſtia, had conquered the Sabines, the Volſci, and the Gabii, had made war againſt the Latins and the Tuſcans, had formed the great lines of their government under Servius Tullius, and had greatly enlarged and ornamented their capital †.

From the baniſhment of the Kings, to the entire conqueſt of the Latins, and the commencement of the war with the Samnites in the year 417 ‡, the Romans could not be reckoned powerful, nor their reſources conſiderable. They had not yet extended their dominions above 130 miles from Rome. The Gauls had over-run their country, demoliſhed their towns, ſeduced their allies, ſeized their capital, and almoſt extinguiſhed their exiſtence as a nation. Their neighbours, the Latins, had refuſed the ſupplies they owed them by treaty, had claimed independence, and renounced all connection with them, unleſs on the principles of an union. Their govern-

* Eutrop. lib. 1. † Ibid. lib. 1. ‡ Liv. lib. 8. cap. 13.

government had been diſtracted with ſeditions and revolutions, which produced the inſtitutions of Tribunes * and Dictators, and the election, by turns, of Conſuls, Decemvirs, and military Tribunes.

Notwithſtanding theſe convulſions at home, and ſuch powerful enemies abroad, the Romans retained that magnanimity which never deſerted them in the moſt critical circumſtances. They attacked the Latins, and boldly declared war againſt the Samnites. They quickly reduced the former to obedience, and adopted ſuch regulations in the ſettlement of the terms of peace, as effectually prevented all commotions from that quarter, for the future †. But the war with the latter proved the moſt formidable they ever undertook in Italy. It continued near fifty years, produced many battles, fought with various ſucceſs, and was not finiſhed till the year of the city 472 ‡. After the conqueſt of the Samnites, the progreſs of the Roman arms became exceedingly rapid. Before the year 500, they had nearly ſubjugated all Italy, and that ambitious people now began to extend their views to Sicily, Spain, and Africa. Before the end of the two ſucceeding centuries, Caeſar and Pompey had diſplayed their conquering eagles in almoſt every quarter then known of the globe. Of the ſeven hundred years, therefore, during which the republic of Rome ſubſiſted, near five hundred were ſpent in acquiring territory, extending only one hundred and thirty miles from the city. During the two remaining centuries, the

* The firſt Tribunes were appointed in the year of the city 259. The firſt Dictator was named in the year 253; Eutrop. lib. 1. Liv. lib. 2. cap. 18. † Liv. lib. 8. c. 14. ‡ Eutrop. lib. 2.

the dominions of that empire became ſo large as ſcarcely to know any bounds.

External circumſtances form the characters, and prompt the exertions of nations, as well as of individuals. The difficulties and dangers, with which the Romans had to ſtruggle for the firſt 500 years of their republic, taught the wiſdom, and inſpired the valour which triumphed over all oppoſition, and finally gained them the empire of the world. Conſtant wars, attended commonly with ſucceſs, filled their ſoldiers with a degree of confidence and courage, rarely to be found in the hiſtory of mankind; but their political ſagacity was not, perhaps, leſs conſpicuous than the gallantry of their legions. They were the firſt nation of antiquity, who put in practice the noble principle of treating the conquered with humanity, inſtead of the barbarous and ſavage cuſtom of ſelling them for ſlaves. They did not even reſtrict their treatment to inſtances of humanity; they extended it, ſometimes, to a degree of privilege and favour, which improved their civil condition and rendered them more happy.

The conduct of the Romans towards the ſtates of Italy, with whom they contended ſo long, and whom they finally vanquiſhed, is abundant evidence of the truth of theſe remarks. When the behaviour of any people merited the beſt expreſſion of their favour, either by ready ſubmiſſion to their arms, or by fidelity and attachment to their intereſt, they conferred on them the privileges of Municipia. Theſe were

chiefly of two kinds. By the firſt, the people were compleatly incorporated with the Romans; they adopted their laws, were admitted into their tribes, and had acceſs to all their offices and honours. In compenſation for theſe advantages, they were ſubjected to all the burdens and ſervices of citizens. By the ſecond, the privileges conferred were in a great meaſure honorary. The people retained their own laws, cuſtoms, and government. They were treated with reſpect and hoſpitality at Rome. But they ſtill acted as allies, and were ſubject to ſuch ſervices and taxes as were ſettled by treaty, or were occaſionally demanded by the Roman ſtate *.

On people who merited an inferior degree of favour, that ſtate conferred the privileges of *Socii*, or *civitates foederatae*. Theſe retained their territories, laws, and government, and were ſubjected only to certain impoſts and ſervices, which were defined by treaty.

The *Praefecturae* were not very numerous, and were treated with the greateſt ſeverity. They conſiſted of people, whoſe conduct had been moſt offenſive, and were, therefore, generally ſtripped of ſome part of their lands. Their civil government alſo was, in a great meaſure, aboliſhed. They had no ſupreme magiſtrates of their own, and a praefectus or governor was annually ſent from Rome to preſide over them, and to execute the laws †.

On

* The firſt kind were called Municipia cum latione Suffragii; the ſecond, Municipia ſine ſuffragio; Liv. lib. 38. c. 36. Feſtus, voce Municipium. Gellius, lib. 16. c. 13. † Feſtus, voce Praefectura.

On lands taken from the Praefecturae, or on lands forfeited by any other means to the ſtate, were planted the colonies which the Romans thought proper occaſionally to ſend from their city. Various and important were the reaſons of this practice. Sometimes the colony was ſtationed on territories recently conquered, that it might defend that quarter of the empire, and ſecure the obedience of the new ſubjects *. At other times, the object of colonization was population † merely, and the increaſe of the numbers of the commonwealth; for, in all ages, the population of colonies has been extremely rapid. Another cauſe was common to the Romans with the other ſtates of antiquity, namely, the ſecurity and peace of the government, which were effectually conſulted, by ſending to a diſtant region all the diſſolute and factious citizens who had power to diſturb or corrupt it ‡. In the later times of the republic, a new reaſon of colonization took place, to accommodate the veterans of the legions whoſe ſervices had recommended them to the different leaders of the victorious factions during the civil wars. Theſe were named *military colonies* §.

* Cicero, Agraria altera. † Liv. lib. 27. cap 9. ‡ Cicero prima epiſt. ad Atticum. § Patercul. lib. 1. cap. 14.

SECT. II.

Colonies of two Kinds, Roman and Latin—Conſtitution and Privileges of a Roman Colony—of a Latin Colony—Former a Model of a Britiſh American Colony.

THE colonies were divided into two kinds, called *Roman* and *Latin* *. Both conſiſted of citizens, except on ſome occaſions, when a few Latins, or other allies, were permitted to join them, who acquired not, by that means, any civil privilege †.

A Roman colony was a body of citizens, who, with their famimilies, emigrated from Rome to ſettle on ſome diſtant territories aſſigned them by the ſenate. An order was publiſhed bearing the name of the territory, the numbers of which the colony was to conſiſt, and requeſting thoſe who chooſed to become coloniſts to offer their names to the Triumviri appointed to conduct them. If more ſubſcribers appeared than the number wanted, the emigrants had to decide by lot who ſhould be preferred. If the ſubſcription did not fill in due time, the citizens were ordered to draw lots for compleating the colony, and thoſe on whom the lot fell were com-

* Liv. lib. 39. cap. 55.

† Ibid. lib. 34. cap. 42.

compelled to emigrate *. The Triumviri conducted the coloniſts to the diſtrict on which they were ſettle, divided the lands among them, and fixed their form of government, which was always modelled after that of Rome.

The coloniſts enjoyed every privilege of Roman citizens which was conſiſtent with their ſituation. They had the regulation of the affairs of the colony entirely in their own hands, when it did not interfere with the arrangements of the ſtate. They had permiſſion to make ſuch local acts as were neceſſary for the adminiſtration of juſtice, and to inflict ſuch puniſhments on crimes, as their particular circumſtances might require †. They were, however, ſubject in all caſes to the ſuperintending juriſdiction of Rome. They retained her civil inſtitutions, and owed obedience to all her laws ‡.

Neither did they poſſeſs any right to vote in the aſſemblies of the mother-country, or to be themſelves elected into any of her public offices. Theſe facts are ſupported by ſeveral reaſons. Firſt, the coloniſts were not enrolled, nor their eſtates valued in the cenſus of any of the tribes of the city; without which qualifications, it is well known, they could have no claim to ſuffrage. They were all muſtered in the cenſus of the colony to which they belonged, and, according to that cenſus, they were aſſeſſed for the local taxes of the

* Dionyſ. lib. 7. cap. 13. This compulſion was a prohibition of the uſe of houſe, fire, and water; for no citizen could be compelled to reſign his freedom without his conſent. † Liv. lib. 6. cap. 17. ‡ Gellius, lib. 16. cap. 13.

colony, and the public taxes of the ſtate. The cenſus of the colony was compleated by its own Cenſor, was brought by him to Rome, and preſented on oath to the Cenſor of the city, for the uſe of the public *.

Another reaſon is derived from the character of a Roman citizen, to conſtitute which three eſſential qualifications were required; namely, reſidence in the city, or Ager Romanus, enrollment in ſome tribe, and acceſs to the honours and offices of the ſtate. One or two of theſe might be poſſeſſed without the other. Foreigners had reſidence only. The libertini † had tribe and reſidence; but neither had acceſs to office. The juſtice and propriety of connecting ſuffrage with reſidence is obvious from the nature of the thing. Why endue any part of the people with a privilege they could not uſe? Their diſtance prevented their attendance on the ordinary aſſemblies of their countrymen; and it was ſurely improper to inveſt them with a power, which might be employed, on extraordinary occaſions, to promote the purpoſes of faction.

The colonies called *Latin* enjoyed only the civil privileges which the people of Latium poſſeſſed at Rome ‡. What theſe were, will be beſt illuſtrated by a ſketch of the hiſtory of that people. The Latins

* Liv. lib. 29. cap. 15. † The libertini were manumitted ſlaves; and, tho' their holding public offices was prohibited by no law, yet conſtant uſage oppoſed it.

‡ Theſe colonies were not called Latin, becauſe they conſiſted of Latins, or becauſe they were planted in Latium, as ſome people have imagined. They never contained many Latins, and very few of them were ſettled in Latium. Livy, on ſeveral occaſions, calls Latin colonies, colonies of Romans; lib. 27. cap. 9. and lib. 29. cap. 15.

Latins inhabited thirty cities *, and cultivated a fertile country, extending from the banks of the Tyber to the Lacus Pomptinus. Theſe cities ſeem to have been, in a great meaſure, independent of one another, and to have aſſociated only for mutual defence. The King of the Latins reſided at Alba; and in that city, perhaps, were held antiently their aſſemblies, which met to conſult the common intereſt of the confederates. After Alba was conquered by the famous rencounter between the Horatii and Curiatii †, and its inhabitants conveyed to Rome, the Romans advanced a claim to the ſovereignty of the whole Latin nation, founded on the circumſtance of having got poſſeſſion of their capital ‡. But, as the other cities of Latium took no part in the conteſt between Alba and Rome, the ſovereignty of the King of Alba was probably nominal, and the claim of the Romans on that account entirely frivolous. The Latins accordingly rejected it, and transferred, for the future, their aſſemblies to the city of Ferentina §.

The Latins conſidered the Romans as deſcended from them, were ambitious of their alliance, and fond to imitate their manners. Their ſoldiers were dreſſed, and armed, and marſhalled after the ſame faſhion with thoſe of Rome. They equalled them in valour, and fought in their legions ‖. The conſtant ground of controverſy between theſe ſtates, was the ambition of the former to be citizens of Rome ¶, while the latter inclined to treat them as ſubjects. Their

* Dionyſ. lib. 6. cap. 63. † Liv. lib. 7. cap. 24. ‡ Dionyſ. lib. 3. cap. 35.
§ Dionyſ. lib. 3. cap. 35. ‖ Liv. lib. 8. cap. 8. and lib. 1. cap. 52.
¶ Dionyſ. lib. 6, cap. 63.

Their alliance, therefore, was frequently interrupted by jealouſies, which produced wars between them. Theſe were ſometimes terminated amicably by accommodation *, at other times by the loſs of ſome of the Latin towns. After the defeat of the Latins at the lake Regillus, they ſent ambaſſadors to Rome, who, in the moſt lowly and earneſt manner, ſupplicated the mercy of their conquerors. They offered to reſign all pretenſions to union or independence, and requeſted only to be allowed to live as their ſubjects. The Romans, in conſideration of the eminent ſervices they had received from them as allies, and in commiſeration of their misfortunes as friends, diſdained to take advantage of their preſent humiliation, and generouſly reſtored them to their former condition †.

This magnanimity, however, did not altogether prevent future revolts. The Latins afterwards ‡ claimed zealouſly the execution of their favourite ſcheme, an union. They inſiſted, that one commonwealth ſhould be formed of the two ſtates, regulated entirely on the principles of equality; that each people ſhould poſſeſs an equal ſhare of places and emoluments; and, particularly, that one of the conſuls, and half of the ſenate, ſhould be furniſhed by the Latins §. The Romans rejected theſe exorbitant demands with indignation, and a bloody war enſued. The Latins were finally defeated, and ſuch meaſures were adopted with regard to their cities, as effectually ſecured their future attachment and obedience.

Six

* Dionyſ. lib. 5. cap. 76. † Ibid. lib. 6. cap. 21. ‡ In the year 415.
§ Liv. lib. 8. cap 5.

Six cities were admitted to the full freedom of Rome, or were created municipia of the beſt form. Three had their lands taken from them, which were repeopled by Roman colonies. The reſt were prohibited from holding any intercourſe with one another, whether matrimonial, commercial, or political. The ſhips of the Antiates were demoliſhed, and the roſtra of them conveyed to Rome, where they were diſplayed as a public monument of the fate of rebellion, and ſerved to adorn the huſtings in the forum, from which orations were made to the people; a circumſtance which gave a new name to that theatre of eloquence, and which it ever afterwards retained *.

From this account, it is plain, that the greater part of the cities of Latium were not admitted to the freedom of the city of Rome. They were not even allowed to adopt the Roman laws †. They retained their own laws, acted as allies of Rome, and furniſhed to that ſtate large ſupplies of troops ‡. They inherited, however, ſome ſingular privileges. They were always treated with particular reſpect and affection, and were allowed, on ſome occaſions, to vote in the comitia; an honour which ſeems to have been conferred on no other ally. This gratification, at the ſame time, was ſo contrived, as to have little influence on the deciſion, for they were not permitted to give their ſuffrages apart; they were arranged in ſome particular

* Liv. lib. 8. cap. 14. † The Romans permitted not even their language to be uſed by their allies, without their conſent. See the petition of the people of Cumae for this privilege, Liv. lib. 40, cap. 42. ‡ Liv. lib. 8. cap. 4.

tribe, which was determined by lot *. By another privilege, any man who had born an office of magiſtracy among the Latins for one year, acquired the freedom of Rome, and might canvaſs in that city as a candidate for preferment †.

The Latin coloniſts, then, inheriting only the privileges of Latium, poſſeſſed not advantages equal to the Roman. They forfeited ‡, it appears, the freedom of the city altogether; nor was any conſiderable recompenſe for this loſs acquired by the occaſional right to vote in the comitia conferred on the whole colony, or by the permanent right of citizenſhip beſtowed on its magiſtrates. We need not wonder, notwithſtanding, that the poorer citizens emigrated in colonies, on theſe diſadvantageous terms. Moſt of the important buſineſs of the Roman ſtate was tranſacted in the comitia centuriata; and, by the conſtitution of theſe comitia, the loweſt claſs, which comprehended all the poorer citizens, was of extremely little ſignificance. It contained only one century out of 193, the number of all the centuries of which the comitia conſiſted; and it was almoſt never brought to vote, as a majority of centuries had generally declared themſelves, and conſequently decided the buſineſs, before the laſt could be called ‖. The poorer ſort of citizens, therefore, would not perhaps value very highly the freedom of Rome. They might even prefer to it the freedom of a colony, where their influence would be greater, as the numbers were fewer, though the buſineſs was of leſs importance.

The

* Liv. lib. 25. cap. 3.

† Appian de bello civili, lib. 2. cap. 443.

‡ Cicero, oratio pro Caecina, cap. 33.

‖ Dionyſ. lib. 8. cap. 82.

The Latin colonies, beſides, might probably think themſelves in a ſituation not much more unfavourable than the Roman. The capital privilege of which they were diveſted by loſing their citizenſhip was, the right to vote in the comitia; and the Roman colonies, we have ſeen, did not poſſeſs this right. The bulk of mankind are little endued with the faculty of anticipation. The Latin coloniſts might, therefore, prize very little, what probably, they would never claim, and what the Roman coloniſts reſerved, namely, the freedom of the city, when they ſhould return to Rome *. Sigonius† aſſerts, that the Latin colonies were not permitted to retain even the Roman law, but in place of it, were obliged to adopt the law of Latium. He ſeems to have embraced this opinion, with a view to mark more ſtrongly the difference between the two kinds of colonies, which he holds to have conſiſted in this, that the one uſed the laws of Latium, and the other thoſe of Rome. But the authorities he quotes are neither unexceptionable, nor neceſſarily involve the interpretation he adopts; on the contrary, they are ſuſceptible of a meaning perfectly conſiſtent with the theory formerly explained. It is farther to be obſerved, that no imaginable good purpoſe could be gained by this arbitrary and wanton exertion of authority. The impoſition of a new code of laws, more imperfect than thoſe with which the coloniſts were familiar, muſt have been inconvenient and detrimental to them, and could promote no end, but to alienate their affections from the mother-country. If the Romans were happy with their own laws, they could not ſurely

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* This right, the Romans called Poſtliminio civitatem recuperare. See the note of Graevius, on the word Poſtliminio, c. 12. oratio pro Balba. † De jure Italiae, lib. 2. c. 3.

ly grudge the enjoyment of the ſame happineſs to their colonies, Would the coloniſts become worſe ſubjects, by retaining laws they approved, and which connected them with the parent ſtate, both by intereſt and inclination? Would not their attachment be manifeſtly ſhaken, by impoſing on them the laws of a country, whoſe inhabitants were not only not citizens, but were ſometimes enemies of Rome? We may, therefore, conclude, it would ſeem, that both kinds of colonies preſerved the uſe of the Roman law, with which they were acquainted, and to which they were attached; and that the chief difference between them was, that the Latin coloniſts loſt entirely the freedom of the city, while the Roman coloniſts reſerved that right, and might reclaim it whenever they pleaſed.

A Roman colony was an exact model of an Engliſh American colony, as far as the different conſtitutions of Rome and Britain will admit. The former had its government ſo conſtituted, as to approach as nearly as poſſible to that of the mother-country; the Duumviri reſembled the conſuls; the Decuriones were the beſt picture that could be procured of the ſenate; and the people of both bore a ſway, and acted a part exactly alike. In the Britiſh colonies, a ſimilar analogy may be traced; the governor repreſents the regal power, the general council bears a ſimilitude to the council of the King, and, as there is no order of nobility who might form a diſtinct branch of the legiſlature, the houſes of repreſentatives are the neareſt image that could be obtained of the two houſes of parliament. The Roman coloniſts had power to impoſe taxes, to enact and to execute laws and regulations for the go-

vernment

vernment and police of the colony, and to chuſe patrons or agents at Rome, who might attend to their intereſts. The coloniſts of America poſſeſs the ſame rights. The Roman coloniſts were deprived of no civil privileges they enjoyed in the parent-ſtate, of which they were not neceſſarily diveſted by their ſituation, becauſe they could not uſe them. The caſe of the Britiſh coloniſts is perfectly ſimilar. The Roman coloniſts had no ſhare in the government of the mother-country, no vote in her comitia, no acceſs to her honours and offices; becauſe they had ſacrificed voluntarily theſe advantages to obtain others in the colony, which they valued more. They might, however, regain all theſe privileges when they pleaſed, by returning to their native country, and reaſſuming the qualifications to which it intitled them. Here, again, the condition of the Britiſh coloniſts is perfectly parallel. They have no ſhare in the government of the parent kingdom. But who is to blame? They knew this would be the neceſſary conſequence of their emigration. Can they poſſeſs things in their nature incompatible? If they judged the political rights of the people of this iſland of value ſuperior to the fortunes they had a chance to acquire in the colonies, they might have retained theſe rights, by remaining at home. They ſtill have it in their power to recover them, whenever they ſhall be diſpoſed to comply with the terms on which they are attainable by the inhabitants of Britain. The Roman coloniſts were ſubject, in all caſes, to the ſuperintending juriſdiction of the people of Rome. So, contends the government of Great Britain, are the colonies of America. This the latter, however, have thought proper lately, in very ſtrong terms, to deny.

The Roman coloniſts were obliged, not only to provide for the expences of their own provincial governments, but alſo to furniſh occaſionally ſuch ſupplies, both of money and troops, as might be demanded by the mother-country, for the ſupport and defence of her government. This is exactly the duty of the Britiſh colonies, maintains their parent-ſtate. I have planted, nurſed, and defended them, and am intitled, by all the laws of reaſon and juſtice, to their obedience and aid. We are intitled, by the laws of nature, to be free, reply the colonies. We make full recompenſe for all your trouble and expence, by the benefit of our trade, which you monopolize. We have no ſhare in your government; and therefore will bear none of its burdens.

The reader has already ſeen evidence to prove the reſemblance of the conſtitution of a Roman to a Britiſh colony. In what manner the Romans would have received and reliſhed, in their coloniſts, the ſentiments and principles contained in the two laſt articles, will be explained as we proceed.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Colonies planted before the Julian Law—Their Number—Allotments of Land—Subject to the ſupreme Juriſdiction of the Parent State, particularly to Taxation—Caſe of the Colony of Velitrae——and of the refractory Colonies in the ſecond Punic War—Exemption from Land-Service claimed by the Maritime Colonies.

THE hiſtory of the Roman colonies may be divided into two periods; the firſt extending from the building of the city to the paſſing of the Julian law in the year 663, under the conſulſhip of Lucius Julius Caeſar; and the ſecond, from the paſſing of that law to the ſubverſion of the republic. The greater part of the colonies planted during the latter period were military, and conſiſted of the troops whoſe ſervices had recommended them to their leaders in the civil wars. Almoſt the whole of the colonies ſettled in the former period were emigrants from Rome, and had their reſidence in Italy.

As the Romans were little acquainted with manufactures, which might have furniſhed employment for the poorer ſort of their citizens, as even agriculture, the principal art they poſſeſſed, was, in the latter ages of the republic, executed chiefly by ſlaves, and, as the burden of military ſervices fell moſtly on the rich by the conſtitution

conſtitution of the comitia centuriata *, Rome often abounded with citizens whom ſhe could well ſpare for emigrations. Accordingly, Livy † informs us, that the republic poſſeſſed, in the ſecond Punic war, no fewer than forty colonies, ten of which he calls *maritime ones*; and, in this catalogue, he comprehends not a conſiderable number mentioned by Dionyſius and other writers. Theſe had probably been ſuppreſſed, or their territories alienated, by the encroachments of their neighbours. From the ſecond Punic war to the paſſing of the Julian law, there emigrated twenty-four colonies. So that, from the building of the city, to the year 663, fifty-four colonies, which then exiſted, had been planted in Italy. Of the far greater part of them no circumſtances are narrated, but their names, and the year of their emigration, which renders it impracticable to exhibit a full account of them. Indeed, ſuch an account would be unneceſſary to accompliſh the end at preſent in view. Our deſign is to aſcertain the nature of their political connection with the parent ſtate; and abundance of materials remain to determine that point, without deſcending much to particulars.

The early colonies conſiſted of few emigrants, and the allotments of land were extremely ſmall. Till the year of the city 441, the numbers of no colony are mentioned, which, on their emigration, exceeded 2500; and ſeveral are found, whoſe numbers did not ſurpaſs 500. During the ſame period, the higheſt allowance of land

* By theſe comitia, the rich monopolized the civil power of the ſtate, but, in return, were loaded in proportion with taxes and ſervices.

† Lib. 37. cap. 9, and 28. Ibid. lib. 36. cap. 3.

land aſſigned to any coloniſt amounted to no more than two Roman acres and a half *. Poſterior to the year 441, the colonies were more numerous, and the allotments more conſiderable. The colony of Alba conſiſted of 6000 emigrants, and that of Sora of 4000 †. The colonies of Placentia and Cremona, ſituated on the borders of Gaul, received at one time a recruit of 6000 families, which were to be divided equally between them ‡. The colony of Thurium conſiſted of 3000 foot, and 300 horſemen. The foot were aſſigned 20 jugera a man, and the horſemen 40 §. The colony of Bononia contained 3000 emigrants, and the horſemen were allowed 70 jugera a piece, and the foot 50 ‖.

The firſt remarkable event in the political hiſtory of the Roman colonization is the caſe of Velitrae. This town was antiently the capital of the Volſci, and was ſituated about 25 miles ſouth-eaſt of Rome. It was taken by the Romans, during the war with that people, about the year 256. Its inhabitants were ejected from their city and its territory, and a colony was ordered from Rome to

* The Roman jugerum, according to Quintilian, (Inſtitut. lib. 1. c. 9.) was 240 feet long, and 120 broad. The Roman acre, therefore, contained 28,800 ſquare feet, ſuppoſing the Roman foot equal to the Engliſh. But it was about $\frac{1}{10}$ part ſhorter. The jugerum, conſequently, contained 27,545 Engliſh ſquare feet; and $2\frac{1}{2}$ of theſe jugera would contain 68,862 ſuch feet. The Engliſh acre comprehends 43,560 ſquare feet; ſo that theſe coloniſts poſſeſſed only 3522 ſquare feet more than an acre and a half Engliſh. A demonſtration, both of the poverty of the coloniſts, and of the richneſs of the ſoil of Italy.

† Liv. lib. 10. cap. 1.

‡ The year 521, Liv. lib. 37. cap. 46.

§ Ibid. lib. 35. cap. 9.

‖ Liv. lib. 35. cap. 55.

replace them *. A few years afterwards, on a report of new commotions excited among the Volſci, in order to aſſert their liberty againſt the Romans, the colony was reinforced with a recruit of inhabitants, and another colony, with a view to ſupport it, was ſtationed at Narba, a town in its neighbourhood. It was impoſſible, however, to retain Velitrae in obedience. After ſeveral ſlighter ſpecimens of diſaffection, it finally joined the Latins, and eſpouſed, with great zeal, the cauſe of that people in their laſt general revolt, when they demanded, as the only admiſſible terms of reconciliation, an union with the republic of Rome †. Velitrae ſhared the fate of the cities of Latium, on that memorable occaſion, and was obliged, in the moſt humiliating terms, to ſupplicate the conquerors for mercy. The Romans treated the Latins with much generoſity and compaſſion. The articles of peace favoured nothing of cruelty or reſentment. The only object of them was to enſure future obedience ‡. They viewed not the conduct of their coloniſts of Velitrae in the ſame favourable light. They conſidered their rebellion as highly criminal, and inflicted on them a puniſhment proportionably ſevere. They decreed that, as they were Roman citizens, and had frequently rebelled, the walls of their city ſhould be pulled down, their government aboliſhed, their lands taken from them, and the whole colony baniſhed into Tuſcany beyond the Tyber, among the enemies of Rome; that, if any perſon belonging to the colony ſhould be found on the ſouth ſide of the Tyber, he might be ſeized by the man who ſhould firſt meet him,

a

* Liv. lib. 2. cap. 31. † Ibid. lib. 8. cap. 3. ‡ Page 88.

a fine of 1000 aſſes* might be demanded for his releaſe, and he might be impriſoned till the fine ſhould be paid †. When the magnanimous Romans puniſhed ſo ſeverely the rebellion of a colony, they muſt have judged its behaviour uncommonly culpable in itſelf, or extremely dangerous as a precedent. Their hiſtory affords few inſtances of their treating, even their moſt inveterate enemies, with ſimilar reſentment.

In the year of the city 541, and the tenth year of the ſecond Punic war, another remarkable incident ‡ happened in the hiſtory of the Roman colonization. As this tranſaction places the ſentiments and conduct of that great people, with regard to their colonies, in a very clear light, it is proper to exhibit a particular account of it.

Annibal, at the head of the Carthaginian army, had now been eight years in Italy, from which all the power of Rome was inſufficient to expel him. Haſdrubal was on his march from Spain with another army, to croſs the Alps, and to enter Italy by the ſame route Annibal had formerly purſued. The allies of Rome, deſpairing, it would ſeem, of her affairs, began to complain loudly of her management of the war. They had, they ſaid, for ten years paſt, been oppreſſed with taxes and levies, the conſequence of which had been nothing but diſgrace; they had ſent abroad their countrymen without intermiſſion, while none of them ever returned home, unleſs they were taken captives, and generouſly diſmiſſed by their enemies;

* The As was equal to ¾d. † Liv. lib. 8. cap. 14. ‡ Ibid. lib. 27. cap. 9.

enemies; if they proceeded much longer in this train, they would ſoon be altogether exhauſted; it was time, therefore, to refuſe ſupplies, before they ſhould be totally ruined.

At this critical period, the deputies of the colonies arrived in Rome, to receive the orders of the ſenate. Twelve of them applied privately to the Conſuls, and, in the name of their conſtituents *, informed theſe magiſtrates, that they could furniſh no further ſupplies, either of men or money; becauſe, having been drained by former demands, they had now none to give. The Conſuls received this intimation with ſurpriſe, and immediately conſtructed it as a prelude to revolt. They rated the deputies in ſevere terms, who had held to the Conſuls a language, which they could not ſurely intend that the Conſuls ſhould communicate to the ſenate; their declaration amounted, not only to a refuſal of ſupplies, but to open rebellion; they ſhould, therefore, return inſtantly to their conſtituents, put them in mind they were Romans, and inculcate the duty reſulting from that relation; they ſhould urge them to adopt more commendable and ſalutary reſolutions in future; for the manifeſt tendency of their preſent meaſures, was treachery and deſtruction to the commonwealth of Rome.

The Conſuls could make no impreſſion on the minds of the deputies, who ſtill perſiſted in expreſſing their inability to furniſh ſupplies. They were compelled, therefore, to communicate the whole tranſaction to the ſenate, who received the information with aſtoniſhment.

* The colonies of Ardea, Nepete, Sutrium, Alba, Corſeoli, Cora, Sueſſa, Circeii, Setia, Cales, Narnea, Interamna.

niſhment. The Roman fortitude ſeemed for a moment to fail; the ſenate of Rome trembled. Many of the ſenators remarked, that their empire was at an end; that the reſt of the colonies would follow the example; and that the colonies and allies had conſpired to betray the city to Annibal.

The conſuls had time to recollect themſelves, during their converſation with the deputies, and to fortify their minds againſt the ſhock of this intelligence. They exhorted, therefore, the ſenators to reſume their uſual ſteadineſs and intrepidity, and aſſured them, that the reſt of the colonies would not follow a conduct ſo ungrateful. They retired from the ſenate, and having called for the deputies of the other eighteen colonies *, they aſked them, whether the ſupplies were ready which their conſtituents were obliged to provide? The deputies replied, that their ſupplies were all ready; that, if more were neceſſary, they would chearfully furniſh them; that they by no means wanted reſources; and that their zeal ſurpaſſed even their reſources.

The conſuls introduced the deputies to the ſenate, who received the news with inexpreſſible joy. They inſtantly paſſed a decree, that the conſuls ſhould call an aſſembly of the people, ſhould preſent to them the deputies as their benefactors, and ſhould recite

* Theſe were, the Norbani, Siticulani, Brundiſini, Fragellani, Lucerini, Venuſini, Hadriani, Firniani, Ariminenſes, Pontiani, Paeſtani, Coſani, Beneventani, Æſernini, Spoletini, Placentini, Cremonenſes, Signini; Liv. lib. 27. cap. 10.

all their former ſervices to the republic, but, particularly, their preſent moſt meritorious conduct. Of the other deputies they ordered, that no notice whatever ſhould be taken; a behaviour which they judged moſt ſuitable to the dignity of the Roman people.

As the ſenate judged it improper to reſent immediately the conduct of the refractory colonies, no ſupplies were demanded of them during the ſix ſucceeding years. After that period, however, the Roman affairs beginning to wear a more favourable aſpect, the ſubject was reſumed in the ſenate*; and it was propoſed, that theſe colonies ſhould not eſcape unpuniſhed. The meaſure was adopted with zeal, and a reſolution was immediately paſſed, that the magiſtrates and ten of the principal inhabitants of each colony ſhould be brought to Rome; that double the number of ſoldiers, which they had in any year furniſhed, ſince the commencement of the war, ſhould be demanded of them; and, beſide, that each of them ſhould contribute 120 horſemen; that if they could not muſter ſo many horſemen, they might for one horſeman, provide three foot ſoldiers, which ſhould be held equivalent; that the moſt opulent inhabitants ſhould be enrolled as recruits, and ſent out of Italy wherever the public ſervice might require; and that, if any colony ſhould heſitate to comply with theſe requiſitions, their deputies ſhould be detained at Rome till the orders were obeyed. It was alſo decreed, that the coloniſts ſhould be ſubjected to a cenſus, executed with equal rigour as at Rome, and that the cenſors of the colonies ſhould depoſit with the cenſor of the city their valuations

* Liv. lib. 29. c. 15.

valuations on oath, before they ſhould be permitted to reſign their offices.

When the deputies of the coloniſts arrived in Rome, and were informed of theſe reſolutions, they exclaimed with one voice againſt their ſeverity. They maintained, that they could not poſſibly furniſh the recruits demanded, becauſe they had them not; that they were ſcarcely able to afford the ordinary ſupplies, far leſs to muſter the double of them. They intreated admiſſion to the ſenate to deprecate its reſentment, and urged, that they had committed no crime which could juſtify their deſtruction.

The conſuls knew well the inſincerity of theſe allegations, and regarded them very little. They inſiſted, that the requiſitions of the ſenate ſhould be complied with, and that the hoſtages ſhould remain in Rome, while the magiſtrates returned home to execute the levies. The coloniſts perceived they would be obliged to ſubmit. They, therefore, thought it eligible to enhance the merit of their compliance, by giving the moſt prompt and ready obedience; and the ſupplies, accordingly, were collected with eaſe and expedition.

This portion of hiſtory proves, inconteſtibly, that the Romans, during the firſt period * of their colonization, exerciſed an ample ſovereignty over their colonies; and that the lives and fortunes of the coloniſts were as much at their diſpoſal as thoſe of their own citizens. They had long been in uſe, it appears, to demand from them contributions both of money and troops, for the ſupport and defence

* Page 95.

defence of their government; and they levied both in the ſame manner as they did at Rome. They ordered a muſter to be made of all the inhabitants, and a valuation to be taken of their eſtates. According to the former, they determined the number of ſoldiers, and, according to the latter, the quantity of taxes, any colony ſhould furniſh. They varied their demands as the exigencies of the commonwealth, or the circumſtances of the colony, ſeemed to require; and the coloniſts poſſeſſed no right to diſpute their orders, or to challenge their authority. The twelve refractory colonies never offer any objection againſt the juriſdiction, or the ſupremacy, of the mother-country; they never inſinuate, that they had no ſhare in her government, and, therefore, would "*bear none of her burdens;* "*that they had the ſole right to give and grant their own money;* "*that they were the proper judges, both of the ſum to be given, and* "*the manner of raiſing it; and that the only ſecurity they had for* "*the poſſeſſion of their civil rights, was the privilege to grant their* "*own money**."

Doctrines of this kind were then unknown, and, we may venture to affirm, would have been reckoned an affront to the government, and an inſult to the honour and integrity of the Romans. The colonies contend, that the demands were exorbitant, not becauſe they were not legal, but becauſe the coloniſts were unable to comply with them. This was ſurely the worſt argument they could uſe, if they had been acquainted with any other more popular or ſolid. The inſpection of the cenſus muſt have at once confuted it.

It

* Minutes of the Congreſs, July 31. 1775.

It muſt, however, be obſerved, that the Romans, on ſome occaſions, granted to their colonies exemptions from public ſervices. But this indulgence ſeems to have been beſtowed only on the maritime colonies, and to have been granted even to them much ſeldomer than it was claimed. It originated, probably, from the zeal of the Romans to encourage navigation; an art with which they were not much acquainted, and of which they had only learned the neceſſity in the firſt Punic war. Seven * of theſe colonies having demanded exemption from land-ſervice in the ſecond Punic war, they were ordered to produce the grounds of their claims before the ſenate, who rejected thoſe of all of them, two colonies only excepted, whoſe requeſts they admitted †.

A ſimilar indulgence, even with regard to the ſea-ſervice, was ſolicited by the maritime colonies, when their inhabitants were impreſſed on board the fleet in the war againſt Antiochus. Their caſe was again referred to the ſenate, and the deciſion which paſſed upon it is a proof, that exemptions reſpected the land-ſervice only, and were calculated entirely for the encouragement of ſeamen. The ſenate decreed, that the maritime colonies poſſeſſed no right of exemption from the ſervice of the fleet ‡.

Such were the principles and practice of the Romans in the management of their colonies, till the paſſing of the Julian law in

* Oſtienſis, Alſienſis, Antias, Anxuras, Minturnenſis, Sinueſſana, Senenſis; Liv. lib. 27. cap. 38. † Antias et Oſtienſis, ibid. ‡ Liv. lib. 36. cap. 3.

the year 663. That law, which granted the freedom of the city to all the allies and colonies in Italy, introduced a great revolution into the political ſyſtem of Rome, and manifeſtly paved the way to the deſtruction of the republic.

SECT. IV.

Account of the Julian Law—Conſequences of it—Military Colonies planted by Sylla—Julius Caeſar—Auguſtus—Provincial Colonies—Averſion of the Romans from ſettling diſtant Colonies—Review of the Principles and Practice of the Romans reſpecting Colonization.

WHILE the Roman territories extended not beyond the limits of Italy, few of the allies and colonies valued very highly the privileges of citizens, or made any vigorous efforts to obtain them. Many of the allies preferred even the ſubordinate juriſdiction they poſſeſſed in their domeſtic governments, to the diſtant, expenſive, and limited influence they could gain by the freedom of Rome. They were generally contented, therefore, with the flattering diſtinction of an alliance with the victorious Romans, and furniſhed, chearfully, the ſupplies demanded by treaty. The latter, at the ſame time, managed their affairs with ſo much gentleneſs and moderation, that the allies perceived not they were really ſubjects, and were led to conſider their ſubordination as merely a complimentary grant of precedency to a ſtate ſuperior to all others in military and political virtue.

But,

But, when the Roman legions began to penetrate into foreign countries; when it appeared that neither Africa nor Aſia poſſeſſed force ſufficient to reſiſt them; when many ſpoils were to be gained, much rich territory was to be diſpoſed of, and many high offices of honour and emolument were to be beſtowed, the citizenſhip of Rome, which conveyed a title to all theſe advantages, became a moſt precious and captivating object, and both allies and colonies contended moſt ſtrenuouſly for its acquiſition. The latter alledged their great ſhare of the trouble as an indiſputable claim to a part of the reward. They furniſhed * a large proportion of the victorious troops that fought the battles, and made the rich conqueſts which procured to the Romans ſo much power, reputation, and emolument; it was therefore reaſonable they ſhould have ſome influence in the government which directed theſe operations, and ſome portion of the honours and profits it had to confer.

The anxiety of the Romans to monopolize advantages, the value of which they found every day to increaſe, was augmented in proportion to the eagerneſs of the allies to divide them. They defeated, therefore, for many years, either by artifice or violence, every attempt to extend to the latter the privileges of the city †. The allies, finally, were fired with reſentment, and flew to arms, reſolving to obtain by force, what they could not acquire by negotiation. The whole of Italy, from the Liris ſouthward, in which diſtrict were planted many colonies, joined in one general revolt, and

* Patercul. lib. 2. cap. 15. † Appian. de bellis civil. lib. 1. cap. 373.

and even the allies who adhered to Rome were extremely diſſatisfied. Theſe revolted ſtates, during their alliance, had imbibed the courage, and learned the military ſkill of the Roman legions; and their numbers rendered their reſources equal, if not ſuperior, to thoſe of Rome. Italy, during four years, loſt, in this bloody ſocial war, no fewer than 300,000 men, and the commonwealth approached the brink of deſtruction *. To ſave the ſtate from ruin, and to remove the grounds of quarrel, by granting what was demanded, Lucius Julius Caeſar, then Conſul, propoſed the famous law, which afterwards retained his name, to extend the freedom of the city to the allies of Rome. The allies and colonies † who remained in ſubjection, firſt enjoyed the benefit of this law; and in a few years it was communicated to the whole.

The paſſing of the Julian law may be ſaid to have annihilated the republic: For, during the ſhort period it afterwards ſubſiſted, it was a ſcene of conſtant tumult, ſedition, and corruption, from which reſulted nothing but convulſions, proſcriptions, and civil wars. The comitia were too numerous before the Julian law; and it cannot be ſuppoſed that the greater part of the people who compoſed theſe aſſemblies, ſhould either have underſtood the affairs which they canvaſſed, or that they ſhould have been guided by any principles of patriotiſm or juſtice in their deciſions. Had not the principal buſineſs of the ſtate been transferred to the comitia centuriata,

* Pater. lib. 2. cap. 15. † The ſuffrages of the colonies are mentioned by Cicero in his orations pro Domo, and pro Sylla; a proof that the colonies were comprehended in the Julian law.

ata, which confined the management of it to the moſt opulent and moſt improved citizens, it is difficult to ſuppoſe a government ſo tumultuary, that its comitia might ſometimes conſiſt of more than 200,000 members, could have ſubſiſted ſo long. What then muſt have been the condition of theſe comitia, when the whole freemen of all the allies and colonies of Italy might be brought to Rome, to give their ſuffrages? Could the moſt remote conception of juſtice, reaſon, or public good, ever pervade ſuch a body? Faction, violence, and corruption, were the only engines which remained; becauſe it was impoſſible to influence ſuch an enormous maſs by any other means. The prodigious ſums * of money ſpent, during this period, in donations and ſhows, to gain popularity among the citizens of Rome, are generally appealed to as marks of the degeneracy of the times; but it is plain theſe corruptions were the conſequences, not the cauſes, of the ſtate of public affairs. At no aera did the Roman genius ſhine with ſuch conſpicuous luſtre. In no equal period did Rome ever poſſeſs ſo many great men. Taſte, eloquence, philoſophy, political and military ſkill, ſecured immortal fame to that age, and render it ſtill the admiration of mankind. It was the co-exiſtence of ſo many heroes, who would not yield their pretenſions to one another, that ſuſpend-

* Julius Caeſar had ſpent all his fortune, and involved himſelf ſo deeply in debt, by the arts of corruption, that he uſed to ſay pleaſantly, he needed 25,000000 of ſeſterces, L. 195,312 : 10 s. to make him worth nothing; Appian. de bellis civ. lib. 2. cap. 432. The ſame author informs us, (ibid. cap. 438.) that a candidate, a little before the commencement of the war between Caeſar and Pompey, advanced, at one time, 800 talents, L. 155,000, to bribe the comitia.

ed a while the fate of the republic, which naturally ſhould have terminated as ſoon as the Julian law was paſſed.

The Romans ſeem to have foreſeen the fatal conſequences of this law, and to have tried every expedient to elude its force. They admitted not the new citizens among the former tribes, where their numbers muſt have born down all oppoſition, and carried every cauſe againſt the old citizens. They claſſed them in eight additional new tribes *, which deſtroyed, in a great meaſure, their influence, and left the thirty-five old tribes a manifeſt ſuperiority. The new citizens became preſently ſenſible of this diſadvantage, and complained loudly of their ſituation †. The ſame irreſiſtible influence which procured the law, procured alſo the amendment of it, and the new citizens were, in a few years, arranged among the old tribes ‡.

The hiſtory of the military colonies affords ſome of the moſt ſtriking proofs of the diſmal conſequences of the Julian law. Previous to that law, every citizen held himſelf obliged to appear in arms, when it ſhould be neceſſary, in defence of his country, and to continue in the public ſervice during the term limited by law. He reckoned this ſervice part of the burden to which he was ſubjected, in return for the important civil privileges he enjoyed, and he bore it with willingneſs and reſolution. He expect-

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* Pater. lib. 2. cap. 20. † Appian. bell. civ. lib. 1. cap. 380.

‡ Epit. Liv. 80.

ed an honourable diſmiſſion, and an exemption from future dangers, when his military age ſhould be elapſed; but he expected and demanded no reward for his labour. Poſterior to the Julian law, the legions ſupported the cauſe, and avenged the quarrel, not of the commonwealth againſt her enemies, but of one leader of a faction againſt another. Large forfeitures were the neceſſary conſequences of theſe wars. The legions fought in expectation of the ſpoils, and were always rewarded with an ample portion of them. The military colonies, then, were detachments of the legionary troops who were ſettled by their victorious leaders upon the lands of their fellow-citizens, which had been confiſcated in the civil wars. They lived in affluence and eaſe on the plunder of their country, and ſecured the obedience of the diſtrict they occupied to their reſpective partizans.

Sylla introduced this practice, after the defeat of the forces of his antagoniſt Marius; and, as his wars were bloody, the conſequences of them were deſtructive. All his enemies, and all their friends, felt his reſentment. Numberleſs proſcriptions of individuals would not ſatisfy him. He confiſcated whole cities and ſtates at once. On lands, of which he had got poſſeſſion by ſuch baſe means, he eſtabliſhed, at one time, no fewer than 23 legions *.

The civil wars of Sylla were ſucceeded, in a few years, by the war between Pompey and Caeſar, which was followed, almoſt immediately,

* Appian. lib. 1. bell. civ. cap. 313. Theſe legions can ſcarcely be ſuppoſed to have contained fewer than 138,000 men.

mediately, by that of the triumvirate, againſt the murderers of Caeſar. The ſecond of theſe wars, was the leaſt deſtructive to the inhabitants of Italy. Caeſar, after defeating his enemies in the field, ſeems to have apprehended no danger from private reſentment. He indulged, therefore, all that humanity towards his foes, which is ſo ornamental in a conqueror, and which reſulted ſo naturally from the dictates of his own heart *. He confiſcated the lands of no individuals who had born arms againſt him. He ſtripped no cities nor diſtricts of their rights and territories. He admitted many of his adverſaries to his preſence, and honoured them with offices of truſt. He wiſhed to recommend his adminiſtration to his countrymen, by affording them protection in their lives and property; and he rewarded his legions rather by largeſſes, than by lands. He planted, for this reaſon, very few military colonies in Italy, though ſeveral are mentioned which he ſettled in the provinces †. If Caeſar meant, on this occaſion, to act the part ſo ſucceſsfully performed afterwards by Auguſtus, namely, to aboliſh republican government, and to eſtabliſh monarchy, his treatment of his enemies was rather commendable than prudent. Open, generous, and unſuſpicious himſelf, he judged of the motives of other mens actions from his own; and, as he could not conceive his enemies capable of entertaining thoughts of aſſaſſination, he was at no pains to guard himſelf againſt

* In the battle of Pharſalia, he called to his troops to ſpare the citizens of Rome. He allowed even thoſe whom he had not pardoned to return home, and reſume their offices and employments. Three perſons only were put to death not in the field of battle, and even theſe are ſaid to have been ſacrificed without his conſent.

† Eight military colonies only were taken notice of by the writers of antiquity, as planted in Italy by Julius Caeſar. Dion Caſſius affirms, (lib. 43. ad finem), that he placed one colony at Carthage, and another at Corinth.

againſt it. The intereſt of the ſtate, he probably imagined, oppoſed ſuch a deſign; and, as all parties ſeemed now ſenſible of the corruptions and imperfections of the republican government, he concluded ſome revolution was abſolutely neceſſary for the peace and ſafety of the ſtate *. If any ſingle perſon was to be placed at the head of the Roman empire, no man had an equal title with himſelf. He had all the military force at his diſpoſal; what could his enemies gain by reſiſtance? They could ſcarcely indulge the idea of reſtoring the former government, which had been the ſource of all their diſtreſſes, though they had it in their power, and they could poſſeſs no power for that purpoſe without his concurrence. Nothing, therefore, remained, but to remove the averſion which his countrymen entertained againſt monarchy, and which had been heightened into horror, by the cruel and undiſtinguiſhing rage of Sylla. The proper method to accompliſh this end was, to ſeem to forget injuries; to treat friends and foes with affability and reſpect, and to make the people feel the happineſs of peace and ſecurity, in place of that madneſs and violence which had deformed the times of the republic.

What is moſt probable is not always true; nor is what is moſt reaſonable always put in practice. Men act from the dictates of their paſſions and their habits more frequently than from the direction of their reaſon. Caeſar, like a ſoldier rather than a politician, ſeems not to have taken the former into his account. It was cruel to kill or baniſh any of his countrymen; it was particularly cruel, to do

* He uſed to remark, that the republic was only a ſhadow of government, a monſter without form or beauty. Suet. Jul. Caeſar. cap. 77.

either in cold blood, and when the neceſſity of the action might not be generally underſtood. But, while ſo many great men remained in Rome, who had ſeen the days of liberty, had felt their conſequence under the old conſtitution, and had ſo many cities and diſtricts of Italy attached to their intereſt, could it be expected they would deſcend peaceably, from the rank of equals of Caeſar, to be his ſlaves? Had he, like Auguſtus, baniſhed or aſſaſſinated every old Roman, who could be ſuppoſed to diſturb his government; had he planted his legions in military colonies near the capital, to ſupport his adminiſtration, and to intimidate his foes, he might, perhaps, have prolonged his life, and ſaved his country another civil war. But his heart revolted againſt ſuch ſanguinary and flagitious meaſures; and, though no man was more ambitious of empire, he could not ſtoop to purchaſe it by ſuch baſe means.

Auguſtus far exceeded Julius Caeſar in diſtributing through Italy military colonies. He even exceeded Sylla himſelf. That cool and political tyrant proceeded, without ſcruple or remorſe, to remove, by the moſt effectual methods, whether right or wrong, every obſtacle which oppoſed his progreſs to deſpotiſm. At his firſt appearance on the ſcene of action, he threw himſelf, with much diſſimulation, into the arms of the ſenate, in oppoſition to Antony, becauſe he concluded he could manage the former moſt effectually to promote his views, and he hired aſſaſſins to put the latter to death *. He ſoon, however, deſerted the ſenate, formed an union with his enemy

* Suet. Aug. cap. 10.

enemy Antony, and with him and Lepidus, conſtituted the famous triumvirate, who aſſumed the whole power of the ſtate, and ſhared among themſelves the government of the Roman empire. Under pretence of avenging the death of Julius Caeſar, they made war againſt Brutus and Caſſius, and the friends of the ancient conſtitution. Under pretence of preſerving the peace of Italy, they baniſhed or put to death every Roman citizen who was ſuſpected to entertain ſentiments unfriendly to their cauſe, or who enjoyed money, houſes, or lands, they longed to poſſeſs. To encourage the legions to engage with zeal in the war againſt the republicans, beſides other donations, they were promiſed, on their return home, to be cantoned in eighteen colonies, on the beſt and moſt pleaſant lands in Italy; and the towns and territories are even ſpecified which they might expect to obtain *.

The execution of this moſt ungracious taſk was committed to Auguſtus, who, with the ſame apathy with which he had ordered the aſſaſſination of every priſoner of eminence taken at the battle of Philippi, proceeded to diſpoſſeſs the harmleſs inhabitants of the fineſt countries of Italy, to make room for the accompliſhment of his promiſe to the legions. He diſregarded the remonſtrances of the former poſſeſſors, and the violation of the laws of juſtice and humanity. He gained not even the approbation of the troops †, whoſe hopes, it ſeems, were ſo high, that nothing could ſatisfy them.

When,

* Appian. Bell. civ. lib. 4. cap. 590. Capua, Rhegium, Venuſia, Beneventum, &c.

† Suet. Aug. cap. 13.

When, in the courſe of his progreſs to empire, Auguſtus diſcovered that he no longer depended on external reſources for ſucceſs, he firſt ſtripped Lepidus of his power, and afterwards prepared himſelf to act the ſame part with regard to Antony. Having defeated the forces of the latter in the battle of Actium, he repeated the ſame tragedy which had been performed after the battle of Philippi. He proſcribed, or committed to the hands of aſſaſſins, every Roman of any conſideration, who had been connected with his rival, and extirpated the inhabitants of the different diſtricts of Italy who were attached to his intereſt *. On the lands of the latter he ſtationed the troops who had ſerved him in that war, of which he formed no fewer than twenty-eight military colonies; and the policy of this crafty Emperor is ſtrongly marked by the civil regulations he adopted with regard to theſe coloniſts. Though he had, by their aid, ſucceſsfully violated all the principles of juſtice, reaſon, and humanity, demoliſhed the antient conſtitution, and laid the lives and fortunes of his countrymen at his feet, he thought it expedient, hypocritically to preſerve, even with regard to them, the forms of the republic, and to make proviſion for the commodious exerciſe of their important privilege of giving their ſuffrages in the comitia of Rome. As the diſtance, then, of the ſituation of the coloniſts might render their attendance on theſe aſſemblies extremely inconvenient and troubleſome, he ordained that the ſuffrages of the colonies ſhould be taken on the ſpot, ſhould be ſent to Rome, properly authenticated by the ſenate of the colony, and ſhould be

* Dion. Caſſ. lib. 51. An author extremely willing to extenuate the enormities of Auguſtus.

be admitted to their ſhare of influence in calculating the votes of the citizens *.

This regulation is the only circumſtance that remains on record relative to the civil juriſdiction of the military colonies, and it will be allowed to be of ſuch a nature as to deſerve very little regard as a precedent of liberty. It is of the ſame character with the other civil tranſactions of the Romans poſterior to the paſſing of the Julian law, which concur to demonſtrate this propoſition, that the virtue of that people did not expire with their government, but that the ſpirit of their conſtitution ſubſiſted after the power of it was extinct. Inſuperable, almoſt, muſt that ſpirit have been, which could not be extinguiſhed by ſo many civil wars, aſſaſſinations, and baniſhments. Deſtructive to the conſtitution muſt have been that law which was the occaſion of them. For this reaſon, though I judged it would be acceptable to the reader to purſue the hiſtory of the colonization of the Romans to the ſubverſion of the republic, it will appear that the authority of their practice is only valuable previous to the time of the Julian law.

It will perhaps create ſome ſurpriſe, that the account given of the Roman colonization appears to conclude, without taking notice of any colonies planted in the provinces. It will probably be aſked, Were no colonies ſettled in the provinces during the long period of 150 years which elapſed between the firſt Punic war, when the Romans began to acquire territory beyond the limits of Italy, and

* Suet. Aug. cap. 46.

the aera of the Julian law, when the eſtabliſhment of military colonies commenced; and, if none were ſettled during that period, what was the reaſon of a conduct apparently ſo unaccountable?

In anſwer to the firſt of theſe queſtions, it is to be obſerved, that no colony was planted beyond the borders of Italy before the year of the city 620, forty-three years only previous to the framing of the Julian law. About that time a colony was eſtabliſhed at Carthage by the famous Tiberius Gracchus; and Paterculus * informs us, that it was the firſt which had been ſtationed in the provinces. It is uncertain whether any other provincial colonies emigrated during the remaining forty-three years, as no mention is made of them; but, if any did emigrate, they were probably very few. The colony of Carthage ſeems not, by its proſperity, to have given encouragement to that practice. It would appear it had been unſucceſsful; for, about the year 700, we find Julius Caeſar employed in eſtabliſhing a new colony at the ſame place †.

With regard to the ſecond queſtion, it is to be remarked, that the Roman coloniſts diſliked ſituations very remote from the capital, and that they were in uſe to deſert their ſtations when they found them either inconvenient or dangerous. The coloniſts of Cremona and Placentia, planted on the confines of Ciſalpine Gaul, relinquiſhed their poſſeſſions for fear of the ſavage people in their neighbourhood, and left their territories almoſt uninhabited. The Romans

* Lib. 2. cap. 15.

† Dio. Caſſ. lib. 43.

mans found it neceſſary to ſend out a numerous emigration to replace them *.

But the chief impediment to provincial colonization, aroſe from the opinions of the people of Rome. The cautious old Romans were jealous, it ſeems, of the proſperity and power of diſtant colonies, and dreaded, that they might one day rival and reſiſt the dignity and authority of the parent ſtate. They were afraid, Rome might ſhare the fate of Tyre, Phocoea, or Corinth, whoſe colonies of Carthage, Marſeilles, and Syracuſe, far ſurpaſſed their parent ſtates in grandeur, opulence, and power. From ſuch colonies, hiſtory had taught them, that the mother-country could derive no benefit, as it was not to be expected, that gratitude ſhould operate in any colony, when the authority of the mother-country had loſt its influence. Accordingly Paterculus † declares the law of Gracchus, by which a colony was ordered to be tranſplanted to Carthage, to have been one of the moſt pernicious to the commonwealth which ever was framed. That law was paſſed in the midſt of the moſt violent Agrarian contentions, and in oppoſition to the ſentiments of many of the wiſeſt and moſt powerful citizens. It is probable, for this reaſon, when the ferment had ſubſided, that the old opinions would regain their influence, and would prevent the farther eſtabliſhment of provincial colonies, during the exiſtence of the authority of the republic.

Though

* 6000 families, Liv. 37. c. 46. † Lib. 2. c. 15.

Though the principle of planting no colonies in the provinces, founded on jealouſy of their eminence and power, certainly contained a conſiderable mixture of narrow politics, when adopted without limitation, it marks, at the ſame time, very ſtrongly the opinion of the Romans, in the pureſt times of the republic, with regard to the objects of colonization. That they might have made ſettlements in Gaul, Spain, or even Africa, reſtricted and regulated in ſuch a manner, as to ſecure to themſelves the advantages reſulting from them, can ſcarcely be doubted; and it is obvious, that the policy was imperfect which forfeited theſe advantages. But, when a ſmall chance only of loſing their juriſdiction over their colonies, induced them to forego manifeſt emolument to be derived from ſuch eſtabliſhments, it is a demonſtration, that their notions of the ſubordination of the latter were extremely high.

The amount of what has been advanced, concerning the colonization of Rome, may be collected into one view, in the following manner. The Romans, learning wiſdom from the Greek colonies, moſt of which, by their proſperity and diſtance from the mother-country, had been tempted to renounce their allegiance, and not doubting, that, in ſimilar circumſtances, their own coloniſts would act the ſame part, were extremely averſe from the eſtabliſhment of colonies, either very remote or very large. For this reaſon, during 663 years from the building of the city, they planted only one colony in the provinces, though they had eſtabliſhed above fifty in Italy. They ſubjected all their colonies to ſuch reſtrictions, and modelled their conſtitutions in ſuch a manner, as they judged

judged neceſſary to ſecure their ſubordination and dependence. They deprived all of them of the right of ſuffrage in the comitia of Rome, partly to maintain the ſupremacy and dignity of theſe aſſemblies, by preventing them from becoming too numerous, and partly becauſe the diſtance of the coloniſts rendered their attendance ſo inconvenient, that it could not be expected, except, on extraordinary occaſions, to ſerve the purpoſes of faction. They deprived the Latin colonies of the freedom of the city altogether. They impoſed, even on the Roman, their moſt favoured coloniſts, a temporary ſuſpenſion of that privilege. They obliged all their colonies to acknowledge their ſupreme juriſdiction, and, in teſtimony of that acknowledgment, to furniſh ſuch ſums of money in taxes, and ſuch ſupplies of troops, as ſhould be demanded of them for the ſervice of the ſtate. They regulated even the mode of levying theſe taxes and ſupplies. They appointed the rate (or formula, as they called it,) according to which the eſtates of the coloniſts ſhould be ſubjected to taxation. They aſcertained the number, and deſcribed ſometimes the denominations of the coloniſts who ſhould be inliſted for recruits. They diſpoſed of their money as they judged proper, and ſent their ſoldiers on military ſervices, wherever the intereſt of the commonwealth required.

After ſettling the government of a colony, and dividing among the members of it the lands allotted by the ſenate, both which offices were performed by ſome perſons of eminence, appointed to conduct them to their place of reſidence, the Romans permitted the coloniſts to manage their private affairs as they pleaſed. They accordingly

framed and executed ſuch laws as they thought neceſſary for the internal government of the colony. They levied money, and puniſhed crimes of every ſort, within their own juriſdiction. And, that nothing might be done, even by the parent-ſtate, which affected their intereſt, without their knowledge, they retained patrons or agents at Rome, who conſulted their advantage, and defended their rights *.

Such

* That the reader may obtain a compleat view of the practice, both of antient and modern ſtates, with regard to the taxation of colonies, I ſhall ſubjoin, in this note, a ſhort account of the taxes impoſed upon their coloniſts by the Dutch, French, Spaniards, and Portugueſe. The Dutch are the nation whoſe policy, reſpecting colonization, would naturally be ſuppoſed to attract the attention of Britain. But the reader will perhaps be ſurpriſed to find, that it is conducted on principles leſs liberal than thoſe of any other modern ſtate. The ſpecies of government moſt diſadvantageous to coloniſts, is to ſubject them to the juriſdiction of a company, poſſeſſed of excluſive privileges, for which it pays a certain revenue to the ſtate; yet this kind of government is adopted by the United Provinces, in their ſettlements both in the Eaſt and Weſt Indies. The Dutch Eaſt India company advance to the republic large ſums of money for every renewal of their charter. They pay duties of import for all the commodities they receive from India, and duties of export for the articles they ſend abroad. The renewal of their grant, in the year 1743, was obtained on the condition, that the ſtate ſhould receive 3 per cent. on the dividends of the company.

In the French Weſt India iſlands, all merchandiſe is liable to a duty on importation from France. The planters pay a certain tax for every Negroe upon their eſtates, and moſt of the articles produced in the iſlands are alſo ſubjected to taxation.

The King of Spain demands the fifth part of the ſilver, and the tenth of all the gold, collected in Mexico, beſides a duty of 33 per cent. on all goods ſent from Europe, $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on all ſales, and large ſums on extraordinary occaſions, under the denomination of loans.

The King of Portugal receives the fifth part of all the gold found in the Braſils, and a tax of 1500 livres for every diamond mine which ſhall be wrought, whether the adventurer be ſucceſsful or not.

Such were the maxims and conduct, in the management of colonies, of the Carthaginians, Greeks, and Romans, the nations of antiquity moſt remarkable for virtue, refinement, and political liberty; and for whoſe opinions and practice, in matters of government, all civilized nations have entertained the higheſt regard. What then is the wiſdom we may derive from their example, to direct the councils of our own country at the preſent conjuncture? What are the precedents they afford, in the treatment of colonies, which may be uſeful to us in the ſettlement of our own?

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Application of the preceding NARRATIVE to the preſent CONTEST between GREAT BRITAIN and her COLONIES in AMERICA.

SECT. I.

Ambitious Views of the American Coloniſts—Similar Views entertained by the rebellious Coloniſts of Carthage—Athens—and Rome—Right of Britain to tax America ſupported by the Practice of the Carthaginians—Greeks—and Romans—None of the Coloniſts of Antiquity admitted to a Participation of the Civil Government of the Parent State.

THE great object which the American coloniſts have long had in view, and which they have lately taken up arms to obtain, is to be totally independent, as to their internal government, of the two houſes of parliament of Great Britain *. They claim that, in every colony, their reſpective houſes of repreſentatives ſhall engroſs the authority of the two houſes of parliament, and that theſe houſes of repreſentatives, along with the King or his

* American Bill of Rights, Article 4.

his viceroy, ſhall poſſeſs every parliamentary power within the colony, as fully is as done by the King and parliament of Great Britain within that iſland. Taking it for granted they have an indiſputable title to this privilege, they eaſily reſolve it into every demand and complaint they make; for example, that they ſhall have the ſole right to give and grant their own money; that *conſtitutional* requiſitions ſhall be made to them when money is wanted, the purpoſe ſpecified, the ſum named, an account given of the expenditure; that they ſhall be allowed to judge and decide on every article; in a word, that their houſes of repreſentatives ſhall be treated with the ſame reſpect and ceremony with which his Majeſty treats the parliament of Great Britain. From this principle, alſo, they complain, that *our* parliament ſhould preſume to make laws to bind ſtates, over which it has no authority; that their charters or compacts with the crown ſhould be altered, their money levied and diſpoſed of, their civil and criminal laws framed, and their judges appointed by acts of *our* parliament, which has no juriſdiction over them, and all whoſe acts, conſequently, of interference, are tyranny, oppreſſion, and deſpotiſm *.

Having emancipated themſelves from the ſtern authority of the two houſes of parliament, they ſeem to have entertained little apprehenſion from the power of the crown. Their minds were eaſy on this article, when they reflected that they had all the game to play, by the grants of money, which was put in practice againſt the

* Journal of the Congreſs, July 31. 1775.

Sovereigns of the laſt century. And, as the crown had little influence in their aſſemblies by the gifts of places, they concluded the royal authority would be little better than an empty name *. Such only are the terms on which America would remain in friendſhip with Great Britain; ſuch are the claims ſhe has taken up arms to obtain. With regard to the people of this iſland in general, theſe terms are equally diſadvantageous with the independence ſhe has now avowed; with regard to his Majeſty, they are very little preferable. But I mean not to undertake an examination of the rights and claims of the parties in this conteſt, which have been already ſo ably and fully diſcuſſed †. My deſign is to appeal to precedent and experience, which commonly have a greater influence with mankind than ſpeculation.

It is obvious to remark, from the preceding hiſtory, that the colonies of America have acted the ſame part with the rebellious colonies of antiquity, in ſimilar circumſtances. They demand the immunities above ſpecified, becauſe they judge themſelves now in a ſituation to aſſert them.

The article of the laſt peace, which took Canada out of the hands of France, was the immediate occaſion of the preſent rebellion; but its cauſe is to be traced to an aera more diſtant. The principles from which it proceeded have been ripening and gathering ſtrength during the whole courſe of this century. The coloniſts waited only for the

* Ibid. † See Rights Aſſerted; and Anſwer to the American declaration of independence.

the arrival of that ſeaſonable period, when they ſhould become ſo powerful, or Britain ſo weak, that they might expect to put them in practice with ſucceſs. The extent and fertility of their country; the amazing increaſe of their population; the forbearance of the mother-country to impoſe taxes, long after they were able to bear them; her irreſolution and repentance, after ſhe had taken the deciſive ſtep by the ſtamp-act, the timidity and weakneſs of which even the Canada act was conſidered as a conſequence; the exaggerated importance of American commerce, without which it was ſuppoſed Britain could not ſubſiſt; all concurred to make the coloniſts conclude, that the favourable juncture was arrived; and that this iſland, corrupted with luxury, diſtracted with factions, and loaded with debts, after a long and expenſive war, could neither find men, money, nor proviſions, to ſupport armies to preſerve the ſubordination of provinces ſo diſtant and ſo powerful.

Similar views of emancipating themſelves from the dominion of the parent ſtates, and ſimilar opinions of the inability of the latter to aſſert their rights, excited the colonies of Africa to rebel againſt the Carthaginians *, the Leſbians to revolt from the Athenians †, and the refractory colonies, in the ſecond Punic war, to refuſe obedience to the Romans ‡.

The rich coloniſts of Africa, like the Americans, but with much better reaſon, thought themſelves abſolutely neceſſary to the exiſtence of

* Page 18. † Page 55. ‡ Page 99.

of the mother-country. From them had been drawn, during the firſt Punic war, a great part of the ſupplies which ſupported the expences of the Carthaginian ſtate. They wiſhed to moderate the exactions "of a people in whoſe legiſlation they had no ſhare, "who diſpoſed of their property without their conſent," and levied their contributions with ſeverity, unleſs when they were paid without reluctance. The coffers of Carthage were drained by the war, and the arrears of the mercenaries were unpaid. A mutiny enſued, followed by a rebellion, in which the coloniſts joined the foreign troops; becauſe they expected to avail themſelves of the embaraſſment of the ſtate, in order to procure an alleviation of their burdens. After waſting much more treaſure than they might have paid in taxes for many years, and after cauſing the deſtruction of many thouſands of their countrymen, they were compelled to return to their allegiance, and to ſubmit themſelves to that yoke they had attempted to ſhake off.

The Leſbians alſo, like the Americans, had formed a plan to render themſelves independent of their parent ſtate, and they waited only for a proper opportunity to put it in practice. They complained loudly of the tyranny and encroachments of the adminiſtration of Athens, that ſyſtems of ſlavery and deſpotiſm pervaded all her councils, and that ſhe miſapplied and ſquandered the money ſhe levied from her coloniſts on ſpectacles and favourites, and neglected the intereſt of the public. The true meaning of this language was, not that the councils of the Athenians were more corrupted and tyrannical than uſual, but that the Leſbians aſpired after

after independence, and thought the occaſion moſt ſeaſonable to urge that claim. The Athenians were engaged in a formidable war with Sparta and her allies, for the ſovereignty of Greece. They could ſcarcely ſupport themſelves againſt their foreign enemies, far leſs could they vindicate their authority over their coloniſts. If Athens ſhould not yield to their pretenſions, they needed only to throw themſelves into the arms of Sparta, who would afford them their protection. This plan was exceedingly plauſible and flattering, and was readily embraced at Leſbos. The activity, however, of the Athenians anticipated the execution of it, and the Leſbians had much reaſon to repent their treachery.

The conduct of the twelve refractory colonies of Rome was influenced by the ſame principle, introduced by ſimilar pretenſions, though more modeſtly expreſſed, and attended by correſpondent circumſtances. It ſeems evident, that theſe colonies had formed a deſign of independence, and that, had the Romans, inſtead of forbearance, proceeded to uſe force to compel them to ſubmit, they would have rebelled, or revolted to the Carthiginians. They diſputed not, however, the juriſdiction of Rome, nor complained of the oppreſſion of her adminiſtration. They adopted the pretence of inability to comply with her demands, and remained, with ſullenneſs and obſtinacy, on that ground. They wiſhed, perhaps, for a ſpecious cauſe of rebellion, or defection; and, after they had reſolved to revolt, like the Americans, thought it a matter of mighty conſequence who ſhould firſt draw the ſword. The ſeaſon was moſt favourable for the advancement of their claims. Rome was in the

deepeſt diſtreſs, and her reſources were about to fail. One formidable commander, with a powerful army, was at her gates. Another army was on its march, and in a few weeks would have reached the capital. Rome herſelf was obliged to give way, and to grant to theſe colonies a temporary independence. The ſenſe, however, the Romans entertained of the ingratitude and treachery of their conduct, is ſtrongly marked by the ſevere regulations introduced into their government, and the heavy additional burdens impoſed on them.

It is farther obſervable, that the right of Great Britain to impoſe taxes on her American colonies, is ſupported by the practice of the greateſt and freeſt ſtates of antiquity, the Carthaginian, Greek, and Roman.

Carthage, like Britain, was a great commercial nation. She excelled all antiquity in the knowledge of naval affairs; and ſhe had wiſely applied that knowledge to promote the purpoſes of trade. Having experienced the emolument reſulting from her commerce with foreign ſtates, ſhe was extremely eager to eſtabliſh colonies, to render that commerce more beneficial. The voyages round Africa, and along the coaſts of the Atlantic, but particularly the great armaments commanded by Hanno and Himilco *, are ſtrong proofs of the prevalence of her commercial ſpirit. It is, however, of the management of her ſettlements in the iſlands of the Mediterranean, and along the coaſts of that ſea, that any accounts remain;

* Page 7.

remain; and from these we learn, as similar causes, in all ages, produce similar effects, that her principles and practice, with respect to her colonies, resembled very much those of Great Britain. She superintended their commerce, and established such regulations concerning it, as might secure most effectually the benefit of it to the parent state. She relaxed or restricted these regulations, according to the situation of the colonists *. She did not, however, think that the monopoly of their trade was all the advantage she was entitled to derive from them. She most certainly collected recruits for her armies in her colonies of Sicily and Sardinia, and she employed these recruits in Africa or Spain, as the exigencies of the state required. She levied large contributions, both of money and corn, from her colonists in Africa, who submitted readily to her authority, and complained only of the exorbitancy of her demands, or of the severity of her farmers of the revenue.

Had the sentiments now so prevalent in America been understood by these colonists, they would have remonstrated to the Carthaginians, that they were entitled, by the laws of God and nature, to be free, and that their freedom consisted in giving and granting their own money †, which no power on earth had right to take from them, without their consent; that they had no controul over the senate or people of Carthage, who imposed these taxes, and, if the latter could levy money from them for common defence, they might take from them all the property they possessed. What could defend them

* Page 14. † American Bill of Rights.

them againſt a power ſo dreadful? They would have urged, that legiſlation and taxation are inſeparable; and they would therefore pay no taxes, becauſe they had no ſhare of the government of Carthage; that the monopoly of their trade was more than ſufficient compenſation for the protection they enjoyed; if the Carthaginians wanted more, let them aboliſh that monopoly, and they would chearfully contribute their proportion of the public expence, when *conſtitutionally* required *; and that, to pay taxes on other terms, would be to confeſs themſelves ſlaves, and to acknowledge that "the di-"vine author of our being intended a part of the human race to "hold an abſolute property in, and unbounded power over others, "marked out by his infinite goodneſs and wiſdom as the objects of "legal domination, never rightfully reſiſtible, however ſevere and "oppreſſive †." The coloniſts of Africa never heard ſuch language, and were totally unacquainted with ſuch principles. It was perhaps fortunate for them they were ſo ignorant, as little doubt ſeems to remain, that the ſtate of Carthage would have conſtructed ſuch opinions to be treaſonable.

The ſituation of the Greeks, in reſpect of their colonies, was ſingular; and I have endeavoured to account for their conduct towards them, from the particular circumſtances of that ſituation. It muſt be allowed, that the former levied no taxes from the latter, till the time of the Perſian invaſion, and that, even poſterior to that aera, regular taxes were demanded by no ſtate of Greece, except Athens. The

* American Petition to the King, July 8. 1775.

† American Declaration on taking up arms.

The authority, however, of this precedent cannot be employed in favour of the Americans; becauſe the ſituations of the coloniſts are by no means ſimilar. The reaſon of the conduct of the Greek ſtates was not, that they judged taxation illegal, unjuſt, or tyrannical, but that no political connection ſubſiſted between them and their colonies, which could entitle the former to levy ſupplies from the latter. Their coloniſts were not ſettled, like the Americans, on lands within the territories and under the juriſdiction of the parent ſtates. They received from them no protection, no aſſiſtance, no privileges of any ſort. They were bands of citizens who could find no employment at home, nor ſubſiſtence in any provinces of the mother-country. They were ſent abroad as ſoldiers of fortune, to ſeek habitations, to procure ſubſiſtence, and to defend themſelves in the beſt manner they could. The parent ſtates could retain no dominion over ſuch coloniſts, and had no emolument to expect from them. If the latter chooſed to treat the former with the common formalities of ceremony practiſed in Greece in ſuch caſes, they had nothing farther to demand.

But, after the Perſian invaſion, Athens having acquired power, ſoon found a pretext for levying taxes from her colonies; and ſhe continued this practice till ſhe loſt her dominions, and, along with them, her ſupplies. She regulated the amount of the money any colony ſhould be obliged to furniſh. She converted, ſometimes, military ſervices into taxes *, and even employed force, when it was neceſſary, to ſupport her requiſitions. The caſe of the

* Page 53.

American colonies reſembles that of the coloniſts of Athens, poſterior to the Perſian expedition. They have been planted on territories within the dominions of the parent ſtate. They have received from her encouragement, protection, and ſupport, and they have ſhared every advantage, conſiſtent with their ſituation, ſhe had to beſtow. That the Athenians would have ſubjected ſuch coloniſts to taxation, no doubt can exiſt. That they would have employed the ſword, as Great Britain has done, to vindicate her authority and procure obedience, the whole hiſtory of their colonization evinces.

Even Sparta, the only other ſtate of Greece, which poſſeſſed ability to levy contributions from her colonies, would have treated the Americans in a manner nearly the ſame as has been done by Great Britain. She would not, indeed, have required any annual tribute *; but ſhe would have demanded very heavy occaſional ſupplies, whenever the exigiences of her ſtate made them neceſſary †.

Of

* Page 47.

† A late author of much ingenuity and erudition *, has publiſhed an imperfect account of the colonization of Greece. He has overlooked the practice both of Athens and Sparta, poſterior to the Perſian invaſion, when theſe ſtates levied contributions from their colonies. He ſeems to have attended only to the policy of Greece, preceding that aera; and, therefore, he repreſents the Greek ſtates, as if they never had claimed any juriſdiction over their colonies, and the latter, as if they had afforded the

* Dr Adam Smith.

Of all the ſtates of antiquity, the Romans exerciſed the moſt extenſive authority over their colonies. They were jealous of their aiming at independence; and they took the moſt effectual methods to defeat that deſign. They ſubjected them all, without exception, to levies of money and troops; and they regulated the amount and the manner of collecting theſe levies. They diſpoſed of both as they judged proper, without permitting the coloniſts to make the leaſt inquiry into their management *.

The lives and fortunes of the Roman coloniſts were compleatly expoſed to the operation of that unlimited power, of which the Americans ſo loudly complain, and which they reckon the eſſence of ſlavery; namely, to have their money taken from them without their conſent, by a body of men extraneous to their conſtitutions, and over whom they had no controul; to have that money diſpoſed of by this body of men as they judged expedient, without any right being retained by the coloniſts to inquire into the application of it, "or to ſee whether it be not waſted among the venal and "corrupt, for the purpoſe of undermining the civil rights of the gi-"vers, nor yet to be diverted to the ſupport of ſtanding armies, in-"conſiſtent with their freedom and ſubverſive of their quiet;" in a word, "to a power ſo unbounded, as to include an accumulation of "all

the former every mark of reſpect and aſſiſtance, prompted ſolely by obligations of alliance or friendſhip. I have the higheſt reſpect for the judgment of this writer; but muſt be allowed to obſerve, that his information has been incompleat. The authorities I have quoted fully juſtify this aſſertion. * Page 101.

" all injuries, a power which claimed a right to make laws, to bind " them in all caſes whatſoever *." If the apparently dutiful and temperate language of the twelve refractory colonies, in the ſecond Punic war, repreſenting their inclination to furniſh ſupplies, had they poſſeſſed reſources for that purpoſe, merited from the Roman conſul the appellation of ſedition and treachery, I leave the reader to determine what name he would have given to opinions which diſclaimed the right to demand theſe ſupplies, and which held forth that right as iniquitous and tyrannical.

It may be remarked, in the laſt place, that none of the parent ſtates of antiquity admitted their coloniſts to a participation of their civil government, till thoſe of Rome were allowed that privilege by the Julian law.

The whole of the citizens of Carthage who had any ſhare of the legiſlative power, reſided within the original territories of the commonwealth, which were not very extenſive †. The people, in all the antient republics, had ſuch frequent occaſions to attend the public aſſemblies on the buſineſs of the ſtate, that they could not be conveniently ſtationed at a diſtance. A remote reſidence was equivalent almoſt to an excluſion from the right of citizenſhip; becauſe that right could not be exerciſed without much detriment. The Tribus Faleria, one of the moſt diſtant of the Roman tribes, and which occupied territory near the mouth of the Liris, was not ſituated

* Minutes of the Congreſs, July 31. 1775.

† Page 14. See note.

ated above eighty miles from the city. The greater part of the tribes reſided not beyond half that diſtance. From the nature of the caſe, therefore, it is obvious, that the coloniſts of the antient republics, who were eſtabliſhed on lands generally much more remote, would neither demand nor be permitted to retain the privileges of citizens, becauſe theſe could not be attended with any benefit.

This theory is ſupported by many facts, which neceſſarily preſuppoſe its truth. The coloniſts of Africa cannot be imagined to have rebelled againſt the Carthaginians on account of the exorbitancy of exactions, to the impoſition of which they had themſelves conſented. The coloniſts of Athens and Sparta could not poſſibly aſſemble from Italy and Sicily, from Aſia and Thrace, to attend the different comitia of their parent ſtates. But, with regard to the Romans, the accounts of whoſe colonization have deſcended to us moſt entire, we have poſitive evidence *, that their coloniſts poſſeſſed no ſhare in the civil government of the mother-country antecedent to the Julian law. After that law, they were admitted into the legiſlative body † of the commonwealth, and contributed not a little to deſtroy its conſtitution.

* Page 99. † Page 108.

SECT. II.

Independent Principles not eaſily to be eradicated from the Minds of the Americans—Modes of Settlement—The ſupporting a Standing Army in America—The admitting into Parliament Repreſentatives from the Coloniſts—Reſpective Advantages and Diſadvantages of each ſcheme.

THOUGH little doubt is to be entertained that his Majeſty's arms will ſoon prevail againſt all oppoſition in America, and reduce his rebellious coloniſts to ſubjection; yet it is not to be ſuppoſed, that the independent and unconſtitutional principles, which have taken ſuch faſt hold of the minds of the people, can be ſuddenly eradicated. Time only is able to produce compleatly that effect. Till this, however, ſhall happen, all that government can do is to fortify itſelf againſt the conſequences of theſe principles. That the coloniſts, who are now ſo opulent and powerful, as to think ſeriouſly of reſiſting the whole force of one of the greateſt nations on the face of the earth, ſhould be ſubjected to ſome part of the public expence, all the laws of juſtice and reaſon demand, and all the precedents of antiquity authorize. The difficulty is to accompliſh this end, and to ſupport, at the ſame time, the authority of government. One of two plans, it ſeems, muſt be adopted. Either the obedience

obedience of the coloniſts muſt be enforced by a military power *, or they muſt be admitted to a ſhare in the Britiſh legiſlature. The firſt will not ſatisfy the coloniſts; the latter is a piece of ſelf-denial ſcarcely to be expected from the parent ſtate. The firſt is countenanced by the practice of the pureſt republics of antiquity; the latter would be the greateſt ſacrifice to liberty that ever was offered by any nation. Each plan has its advantages and diſadvantages. It may not be improper, perhaps, to take a ſhort ſurvey of both.

The American coloniſts have, for ſome time paſt, watched the principles and conduct of Parliament, with the ſame jealouſy and ſolicitude which were exerciſed by the people of England during the laſt century, in order to guard againſt the encroachments of the crown. Aſſuming as an indiſputable maxim, that their territories formed no part of the dominions ſubject to the juriſdiction of the Britiſh parliament, and that they owed obedience only to the legiſlatures compoſed of the King and their houſes of repreſentatives, they have conſidered all acts of parliament, impoſing internal taxes, as infringements of their liberty, no leſs illegal than the levying of ſhip money by Charles the Firſt. As they judged theſe deeds equally unjuſt, it appeared of little conſequence, whether they were executed by one man or by five hundred, by the King

* The object of the Americans is to ſubmit themſelves, not to the requiſitions of parliament, but to thoſe of the crown, which, conſiſtently with their ſyſtem, they reckon only conſtitutional. For this reaſon, the reſolution of the Houſe of Commons, permitting them to offer and collect their own money for the common defence, ſeems equally offenſive with direct taxation. Though this mode of ſettlement, therefore, ſhould be adopted, the neceſſity of a large army in America will ſtill remain.

King alone, or by the King in conjunction with his parliament. It is not my purpoſe at preſent, to expoſe the ſophiſtry of this political reaſoning, nor to ſhow from the nature of the conſtitution, the abſurdity and falſehood of the principle on which it proceeds. My intention is to trace the origin of the opinions which unfortunately prevail in America; and it is obvious, that jealouſy of the power of parliament has produced there the ſame averſion from a ſtanding army, which the jealouſy of the prerogative generated, during the laſt century, in England. In both caſes, an army has been held in the higheſt deteſtation, becauſe it has been reckoned an irreſiſtible and ready engine, in the hands of power, to deſtroy the liberties of the ſubject.

During the courſe of the preſent century, the averſion againſt a ſtanding army has gradually ſubſided in Britain. The eſtabliſhment of it, in time of peace, has inſenſibly increaſed; and ſo little is it now apprehended to be hoſtile to liberty, that the chief reaſons offered for its reduction are derived, rather from the expence than the danger of it. Suppoſing, then, from the example of our own country, that the Americans may hereafter acquire the ſame degree of indifference on this ſubject, yet that example will lead us to conclude, that this aera muſt ſtill be at a conſiderable diſtance; and that, in the mean time, they will view a ſtanding army as their oppreſſors, and the government which adopts ſuch a meaſure as tyrannical. When, beſides, we reflect on the ambitious proſpects of independence, they have for ſome time entertained, and have lately avowed, the republican principles openly embraced and defended

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by many of their leaders, but chiefly that ſpirit of turbulence and faction inſinuated into them by the party at home, who wiſh to embaraſs the operations of government for the purpoſe of forcing themſelves into power, it is eaſy to perceive that this mode of ſettlement muſt be not a little diſagreeable to the colonies.

Diſagreeable, however, as it may be to modern coloniſts, little doubt can remain, that it would have been adopted readily by the Greeks and Romans in the management of theirs, had the practice been known in antient times. But neither the Greeks nor the Romans maintained ſtanding armies in time of peace, unleſs the military colonies ſtationed in Italy during the civil wars may deſerve that appellation. The antient commonwealths abounded with citizens trained to arms, from whom they were able, in a very ſhort time, to levy troops, in order to ſuppreſs ſedition or rebellion in any quarter of their territories. When the purpoſe was accompliſhed for which theſe troops were muſtered, they were marched home and diſbanded, to ſave the public the expence of ſupporting them. But, to modern ſtates, filled with manufacturers and mechanics, few of whom are bred to war, an army becomes in ſome meaſure neceſſary to protect thoſe liberties, which cannot otherwiſe be ſucceſsfully defended. That the free governments of antiquity would have admitted ſuch eſtabliſhments, had they not had other reſources, and that they would have judged them neither unreaſonable nor tyrannical, their treatment of their rebellious colonies abundantly demonſtrates. The examplary puniſhment inflicted on the colonies

of Samos * and Leſbos † by the Athenians, and the confiſcation and baniſhment of the coloniſts of Velitrae by the Romans ‡, fully evince that theſe antient ſtates ſcrupled not to employ much ſeverer chaſtiſements than the maintenance of a ſtanding army among their diſcontented colonies, and, conſequently, that they would not have heſitated to adopt a meaſure comparatively mild.

Theſe precedents of antiquity afford one of the ſtrongeſt arguments in favour of this mode of ſettlement. There is great hazard of error in modelling any government on principles of ſpeculation; and all changes of a civil conſtitution will ever be made, by wiſe politicians, with the utmoſt reſerve. The moſt patent road, perhaps, to deſpotiſm, is too refined notions of government, attended with reſolute and fearleſs exertions to realize whatever ſhall be thought practicable in ſpeculation. It is impoſſible to foretell the conſequences of important innovations in the conſtitution of a ſtate, which may often prove fatal before we are aware; and a prudent legiſlator will ſeldom chuſe to extend his reformations far beyond the point at which the practice of the pureſt times ſupply him with precedents. Having reached that ſtage of perfection, which has been the fortune only of a very ſmall part of poliſhed nations, it is perhaps prudent to be ſatisfied, leſt, by graſping what is unattainable, we loſe what we poſſeſs.

What title, then, have the Britiſh coloniſts of America to be more independent than thoſe of Athens or Rome? No coloniſts ever enjoyed greater

* Page 53. † Page 55. ‡ Page 97.

greater advantages, or were ſubjected to fewer reſtrictions. The extraordinary increaſe of their population and riches, is the moſt inconteſtible proof of the moderation of the government under which they have hitherto lived. No colonies ever were ſo proſperous and ſo happy. Great Britain has not hitherto oppreſſed them. What will tempt her to do ſo in future? If ſhe has been ſo favourable, when ſhe could obtain no return, will her conduct be reverſed when ſhe may expect ſome compenſation? If parliament incumber, and conſequently diminiſh, the commerce of the coloniſts, ſo eſſential, as is contended, to the wealth and importance of the kingdom, will they not as effectually hurt their own intereſt as by the impoſition of any tax which affects only the iſland of Britain? If the funds ariſing from America be deficient, they muſt be replaced by ſupplies collected at home; if the commerce of the colonies ſhall fail, the price of the commodities of this iſland muſt fall, and the authors of that failure will immediately feel the conſequences of their error. If America, then, ſhall think it reaſonable to allow any indemnification for the immenſe ſums of money this country has ſpent in her defence, and in raiſing her to a condition which enables her to rebel, ſhe has ample ſecurity againſt the exorbitancy of the demands of the parent kingdom. The intereſt, not to mention the juſtice or the honour of parliament, will be more connected with the flouriſhing ſtate of the trade of America, if it be ſo important as is pretended, than it can be with any tax which is at preſent levied in Great Britain.

It is to be ſuppoſed alſo, that the members of parliament, who at preſent poſſeſs the right to impoſe taxes on every part of the Britiſh dominions, will be unwilling to have that right either taken from them or circumſcribed. There is ſcarcely an obligation, of which individuals are ſuſceptible, that has not a correſpondent one to which ſocieties may be ſubjected; and, if the obligations contain nothing unjuſt or illegal, their being more or leſs favourable to one of the contracting parties, is never reckoned a ſufficient reaſon for ſetting them aſide. If the condition of the coloniſts of America, in reſpect of taxation, is unfavourable, who is to blame? Did they not voluntarily ſubject themſelves to this diſadvantage, when they emigrated? Is the right of taxation relinquiſhed in any one of their charters, the authority of which, in other reſpects, is held ſo inviolable? Is it not ſuppoſed in all, and expreſsly mentioned in ſome of them, to reſide in the parliament of Great Britain? Can the coloniſts expect, that parliament will relinquiſh any part of their juriſdiction, becauſe they chooſe to complain of it? Can complaints of that juriſdiction be well founded, when it has ſcarcely ever been exerciſed? Parliament is not only deprived of its rights, but inſulted by ſuch uſurpations. Such ungrateful conduct, may render men of high ſpirits more tenacious of their powers, but will never induce them to reſign theſe powers. No ſtate ever made a ſimilar reſignation of its juriſdiction.

Moſt of theſe inconveniences may be removed, ſay the abettors of repreſentation, by the admiſſion of members from the colonies to ſeats in the houſe of commons, in proportion to the ſupplies they

they ſhall furniſh to the ſtate. The coloniſts will readily accept theſe terms of pacification, being the moſt equal and favourable they can poſſibly obtain. Their leading men will be attached to government, by the proſpect of emoluments and honours, ſuperior to any advantages they have to expect, on ſuppoſition of the independence of the colonies. The ſeeds of rebellion will be eradicated, by ſuch a conſpicuous proof of the juſtice and moderation of the parent ſtate, and by the ſecurity the coloniſts will acquire, that their intereſts ſhall not be ſacrificed. They will be captivated with the flattering hopes of ſeeing their influence increaſed, according to the augmentation of their contributions, and with the arrival, perhaps, of the period, when American influence may preponderate in parliament, when that influence may, therefore, transfer to their own country the ſeat of empire, and thus, without hazard or convulſion, may render that great continent, ſo admirably fitted by nature for the purpoſe, the reſidence of one of the greateſt and freeſt governments which ever exiſted.

As it is abſurd to ſuppoſe the conſtitution of any government abſolutely perfect, as many improvements have already been made in our own, when time enlightened the minds of men, and circumſtances rendered theſe improvements neceſſary; is it not prepoſterous to maintain, that, after the prodigious additions which have been lately made to the territories and riches of the Britiſh dominions, the ſame repreſentation ſhould be retained in ſituations ſo totally different from thoſe in which it was eſtabliſhed? Is it not highly expedient, that ſome conſiderable alteration ſhould be adopted

in the repreſentation of this iſland itſelf, ſuitable to the decreaſe of the population and importance of ſome places and diſtricts, and to the increaſe of others, occaſioned by cauſes which have come into exiſtence ſince that repreſentation was fixed? Is it not ſtill more expedient, that ſome conſideration ſhould be had of the extenſive continent of America, growing in population and importance, beyond all precedent in the hiſtory of civil ſociety? Though the power of Great Britain may ſucceed at preſent, in ſupporting her juriſdiction over her coloniſts, though ſhe may continue to preſerve that juriſdiction for many years to come, by the terror of her arms; yet, it is ſcarcely to be ſuppoſed, that the ſame cauſes will always produce the ſame effects, under a continued alteration of circumſtances on the part of the latter, and that the time will not arrive, when the reſources of America may be adequate to the plan of independence. Is it not, therefore, the beſt policy, to adopt that mode of ſettlement, which moſt effectually ſecures the attachment and emoluments of the colonies, without checking their improvements and population, and which affords the moſt reaſonable proſpect of perpetuating theſe advantages to the lateſt poſterity? That the execution of this plan will be attended with no convulſions or conſequences deſtructive to the conſtitution, is apparent from the introduction, into the two houſes of parliament, of the repreſentatives of Scotland at the union, whoſe influence and votes produced no conſiderable alteration on the meaſures of government. It is, therefore, reaſonably to be ſuppoſed, that the admiſſion of an additional number of repreſentatives from America, even

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larger, if it were neceſſary, than that from Scotland, would not occaſion any immediate or important innovation.

But, not only will this mode of ſettlement ſecure to government a conſiderable additional revenue; it will alſo ſave more money perhaps than can be drawn from America by taxation, on any other plan, for many years to come. By removing even the appearance of diſaffection and diſcontent, it will ſuperſede the neceſſity of expenſive military eſtabliſhments on that great continent, which can only be neceſſary to keep the inhabitants in ſubjection, becauſe they are expoſed to danger from no foreign enemy. The money, conſequently, which would be expended in ſupporting theſe eſtabliſhments, might be applied to purpoſes much more beneficial to the ſtate.

Neither have the preſent members of parliament any good reaſon to oppoſe this mode of ſettlement, on the ground of being deprived by it of any part of that juriſdiction and influence they now enjoy. They have gradually, for many years paſt, been adding to both, in their character of legiſlators, by the natural progreſs of improvements, and the extenſion of the reſources of the kingdom. It is now time to lay them under ſome reſtrictions. Although they ſhould not gain any power by the diſpoſal of an American revenue, and the offices reſulting from the management of it, they will ſtill retain much more influence than was enjoyed by their predeceſſors, when the preſent number of repreſentatives was aſſigned. The additional buſineſs and offices which may ariſe from an American revenue,

revenue, will be ſufficient to occupy the additional repreſentation, and to gratify and employ the members from the colonies. The preſent members will bear the ſame proportion to the buſineſs and emoluments of the ſtate as formerly; and, though they gain nothing, they will incur no loſs. They have good reaſon to be ſatisfied, though they acquire not the additional power derived from an American revenue. They retain all they ever poſſeſſed, and they add ſtability to the conſtitution, which ſecures the long continuance of theſe poſſeſſions.

The plan is viſionary and dangerous, reply the oppoſers of this mode of ſettlement, and ſhould not be adopted in a government ſo ſituated as that of Great Britain. The coloniſts cannot properly be repreſented in parliament, on account of their diſtance, and other circumſtances; and they requeſt not that privilege. Is it not to encourage rebellion, to load the rebels with advantages ſuperior to thoſe they enjoyed before they renounced their allegiance, ſuperior to thoſe enjoyed by all the territories of Britain beyond the limits of this iſland? Will not the world affirm, that theſe privileges were conferred, becauſe they could not be with-held? May not the inhabitants of Quebec, Nova Scotia, the two Floridas, and the Weſt Indies, with equal propriety, demand repreſentation? Is it an argument, conſiſtent with the juſtice or honour of Great Britain, to maintain, that the latter are not in a condition to force her to grant their requiſition; that their reſources are ſo ſmall, their ſituations ſo diſtant from one another, they cannot combine together, ſo as to render their union formidable to the authority of the mother-country?

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She can govern them without repreſentatives; and therefore they are not to expect to be indulged in ſuch ambitious requeſts. May not, in like manner, the Eaſt India company, with a good grace, demand repreſentation, in proportion to the large revenue they advance to the public, on account of the extenſive territorial juriſdiction they poſſeſs in Aſia, under the protection of Great Britain? In a word, if repreſentatives be admitted from the colonies now in rebellion, is there any reaſon or juſtice in denying them to any part of the Britiſh dominions which now can, or which hereafter may, furniſh as good a claim to that privilege as theſe colonies?

What are the probable conſequences of ſuch innovations? The houſe of commons will reſemble a tumultuary Poliſh diet, or a ſeditious aſſembly of the people of Rome. That houſe, perhaps, is already too numerous to diſcuſs with advantage the buſineſs it has to execute; and a great part of ſuch a large body of men can ſcarcely be ſuppoſed to attend to that buſineſs. A wide field is diſplayed for the operations of faction and intrigue, by which the moſt ſalutary meaſures of government may be retarded or fruſtrated. The management and gratification of the members occupy the time of a miniſter, and leave him little leiſure to concert or to execute plans of extenſive and important ſervice to the public. If ſuch inconveniencies exiſt at preſent, what is to be apprehended, ſhould the Houſe of Commons become much more numerous? All theſe inconveniencies may at leaſt be ſuppoſed to be augmented in proportion. It is of little conſequence to reply, that the aſſemblies of the people

under the antient republics were much more numerous than the Houſe of Commons will be, after any addition it can be ſuppoſed to receive. The truth is, very few of the members of theſe aſſemblies can be imagined to have underſtood the public buſineſs of which they pretended to judge. They had neither time nor capacity ſufficient for that purpoſe. They were led by the oratory or influence of ſome individual, and they concluded their deciſions to be right, becauſe they were dictated by ſome partizan, in whoſe diſcernment and patriotiſm they repoſed confidence. The people appeared to poſſeſs the power; but the demagogues really governed the ſtate.

This mode of ſettlement reſembles exactly, though on a leſs ſcale, the admiſſion of all the allies and colonies of Italy to the freedom of Rome by the Julian law; and all the tumultuary and deſtructive conſequences of the latter meaſure may be in part expected from the former. The admiſſion of the allies and coloniſts appeared reaſonable in itſelf, and ſeemed to improve the conſtitution of Rome; in fact, however, it deſtroyed that conſtitution. It appeared to introduce univerſal liberty, founded on the moſt reaſonable and liberal principles; but it produced only anarchy and confuſion. It appeared to provide full ſecurity for all the intereſts of all the allies and colonies of Italy; while it provided ſecurity only for the intereſts of faction. It appeared to exalt the authority of reaſon and juſtice in the government of Rome; but it baniſhed forever both reaſon and juſtice from her aſſemblies. It appeared to eſtabliſh peace and tranquillity in the ſtate; but it gendered only convulſions,

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aſſaſſinations, and civil wars, and, after a few paroxyſms, terminated in deſpotiſm.

What power will prevent Great Britain from ſharing a ſimilar fate in ſimilar circumſtances, with the republic of Rome? Factious and ambitious leaders are to be found in modern times, as well as in thoſe of antiquity. The members from the colonies may be attached to ſuch men, or dependent on them. Party-ſpirit may blind their underſtandings, or corruption may procure their ſuffrages. Their fortunes will not be ſo independent, nor their ſentiments perhaps, ſo liberal as thoſe of moſt of the repreſentatives from this iſland; and men of this diſpoſition are half diſpoſed to the purpoſes of faction. The Houſe of Commons is already divided, and the junction of the new members may make either ſcale preponderate ſo much, that the conſequences are to be dreaded. We have lived long in poſſeſſion of much liberty: Let us be ſatisfied, leſt, by graſping the ſhadow, we loſe the ſubſtance.

I leave the reader to judge of the reſpective merits of theſe modes of ſettlement, and to determine which of them deſerves to be preferred. He will probably conceive the advantages and diſadvantages on both ſides to be ſo equally balanced, and the deciſion ſo doubtful, that all parties ought to be ſatisfied whichſoever plan ſhall be adopted.

THE END.

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